



National  
Qualifications  
2022

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# **2022 History**

## **Advanced Higher**

### **Finalised Marking Instructions**

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## General marking principles for Advanced Higher History

*Always apply these general principles. Use them in conjunction with the detailed marking instructions, which identify the key features required in candidate responses.*

- (a) Always use positive marking. This means candidates accumulate marks for the demonstration of relevant skills, knowledge and understanding; marks are not deducted for errors or omissions.
- (b) If a candidate response does not seem to be covered by either the principles or detailed marking instructions, and you are uncertain how to assess it, you must seek guidance from your team leader.
- (c) Marking must be consistent. Never make a hasty judgement on a response based on length, quality of handwriting or a confused start.
- (d) Use the full range of marks available for each question.
- (e) The detailed marking instructions are not an exhaustive list. Award marks for other relevant points.
- (f) Award marks only where points relate to the question asked. Where candidates give points of knowledge without specifying the context, award marks unless it is clear that they do not refer to the context of the question.
- (g) Award knowledge and understanding marks where points are:
  - relevant to the issue in the question
  - developed (by providing additional detail, exemplification, reasons or evidence)
  - used to respond to the demands of the question (e.g., evaluate, analyse).

### Marking principles: 25 mark essay questions

To gain more than **12 marks** in a **25 mark** essay question, candidates must make a reference (however minor) to historiography. If candidates do not refer to or quote from historians, or show that they have considered historical schools of thought, they are not meeting the basic requirements of the marking scheme and so will not achieve more than **12 marks**.

The detailed marking instructions provide guidance on the intention of each essay question, and the possible format and relevant content of expected responses.

### Marking criteria grids

The marking criteria grids give detailed guidance on how to assess candidate responses against these four criteria:

- structure
- **thoroughness and/or relevance of information and approach**
- **analysis, evaluation and line of argument**
- historical sources and interpretations.

Of these four, use the two criteria given in **bold** to determine where to place an essay within a mark range.

The grids identify features of essays falling within the given mark ranges, which correspond approximately with the grades D, C, B, A, A+ and A++, assuming candidates perform evenly across all questions in the paper, and in the coursework.

Most essays show some, but perhaps not all, of the features listed; others are stronger in one area than another. Features described in one column may appear in a response which, overall, falls more within another column(s).

The grids describe the typical qualities of responses. Individual candidate responses do not follow a set pattern and some may fall outside these descriptions, or a candidate's arguments and evidence may differ substantially from the marking scheme. Where this is the case, use your professional expertise to award marks appropriately.

## 25 mark question – mark ranges and individual marking criteria

| Mark ranges      |           |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|------------------|-----------|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marking criteria | STRUCTURE | 0–9  | 10–12   | 13–14   | 15–17   | 18–19   | 20–22   | 23–25   |
|                  |           | No attempt to set out a structure for the essay.             | An attempt to structure the essay, seen in at least one of the following:                                   | The structure displays a basic organisation but this may be loose. This would refer to:                     | The structure is readily apparent with a competent presentation of the issues. This would include:  | Clearly structured, perceptive, presentation of issues. This would be included in:  | Well–defined structure displaying a very confident grasp of the demands of the question:  | Structured so that the argument convincingly builds and develops throughout:  |
|                  |           | No relevant functional introduction.                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant functional introduction</li> </ul>                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant functional introduction.</li> </ul>                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant functional introduction with main interpretations.</li> </ul>                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a suggested line of argument.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a clear line of argument.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised and clear direction of debate and a clear line of argument.</li> </ul> |
|                  |           | No separate sections which relate to relevant factors.       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>   |
|                  |           | No conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, bringing together the key issues.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue evaluating the key issues.</li> </ul>                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue based on synthesis and evaluation of key issues/points.</li> </ul>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue based on direct synthesis and evaluation of key issues/points.</li> </ul> |

|                  |  | Mark range                                      |   |   |  |  |   |   |
|------------------|--|---|---|---|--|--|---|---|
| Marking criteria | THOROUGHNESS/<br>RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION AND APPROACH | 0–9   | 10–12   | 13–14   | 15–17  | 18–19  | 20–22   | 23–25   |
|                  |  | No evidence of relevant knowledge of the issue. | Treatment of the issue shows little relevant knowledge.<br><br>Some elements of the factual content and approach relate only very loosely to the issue. | Treatment of the issue shows sufficient knowledge which reflects a basic understanding of the issue.<br><br>The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis. | Treatment of the issue shows an awareness of the width and depth of the knowledge required for a study of the issue.<br><br>The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis and evaluation. | Treatment of the issue is based on a fair quantity of research, demonstrating width and depth of knowledge.<br><br>Evidence is linked to points of analysis or evaluation. | Treatment of the issue is based on wide research and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge.<br><br>Evidence is clearly linked to points of analysis or evaluation. | Treatment of the issue is clearly based on a wide range of serious reading and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge.<br><br>Evidence clearly supports linked to points of analysis or evaluation. |



|                  |                                    | Mark range                                    |   |  |  |  |   |  |
|------------------|------------------------------------|---|---|--|--|--|---|--|
| Marking criteria | HISTORICAL SOURCES/INTERPRETATIONS | 0–9   | 10–12   | 13–14  | 15–17  | 18–19  | 20–22   | 23–25  |
|                  |                                    | No discernible reference to historical works. | No discernible reference to historical works. | There is some awareness of historians' interpretations in relation to the issue. Historians may be used as illustrative points of knowledge. | There is an awareness of historians' interpretations and arguments. Historians may be used as illustrative points of main lines of interpretation. | There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments.<br><br>There is some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them. | There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments which is consistent.<br><br>There is some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them. There may be an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations. | There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments and an engagement with current historiography.<br><br>Shows consistent awareness of possible variations of these interpretations and connections between them, including an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations. |

## Marking instructions for each question

### Section 1 – Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

#### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

**Question 1**                      To what extent were the personal ambitions of the emperors the main motive for the Roman invasions into Northern Britain from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD?

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that personal ambition motivated invasions:**

- some emperors required a triumph, no mention of acquiring minerals, agricultural produce – personal triumph sought above all else
- ‘if it was politics that brought the Romans . . . it was politics that caused them to leave again’ – occupations were a part of broader political and dynastic concerns. DJ Woolliscroft and B Hoffman
- the Flavians were a new dynasty following civil war, 69 AD, and keen to initiate forward movement in Britain to secure prestige
- fanfares of victory following Agricola’s return to Rome – indicative of prestige and glory
- Antoninus Pius considered a ‘stop gap successor’ – needing military prestige as weak 2nd choice successor
- Antoninus Pius needed easily won military prestige which his advisers believed could be won in Britain, by a recovery of lands already overrun and briefly held by Agricola
- ‘Advance under Antoninus Pius appears to have been engineered simply in order for the new emperor to gain military prestige’ – did not even attempt to complete the conquest of the whole island. David Breeze
- Antoninus Pius biography highlights that the occupation was motivated by desire for glory and prestige, ‘although the emperor stayed in his palace in Rome and delegated responsibility for the war, he deserved the glory for the whole start and progress of the expedition as though he had taken charge of steering a warship’
- dynastically, Antoninus Pius sought to embark on expansion as a ‘douceur’ to the marshals of Emperor Trajan who had experienced years of inactivity under Hadrian
- in 142 AD Antoninus Pius took the title imperator, ‘Conqueror’ – unequivocally bestowing prestige on previously weak emperor
- Severus regarded expansion as his potential ‘swan song’ – a prestigious and glorious end to his reign
- Severus took the title ‘Britannicus’, Conqueror of Britain to glorify military reputation.



## Evidence which supports the view that there were other reasons for Roman invasions:

### Military motives:

- throughout all of the Roman intervals in Scotland, the presence was virtually exclusively military
- Rome sought, at different times, military control or to embark on military punitive campaigns
- Vespasian charged Petillus Cerealis, Sextus Julius Frontinus and Gnaeus Julius Agricola with the task of restoring order in Britain and taking forward Roman arms
- Agricola called to fight a just war, fearing in 82 AD, 'a rising of the northern tribes'
- Agricola was responsible for the brief 'Britain was conquered' – military aim was met albeit fleetingly ('... and immediately abandoned')
- Antoninus Pius impelled to rely on Lollius Urbicus to 'thrust back the barbarians ... conquer the Britons' – suggests Antonine occupation was motivated by disturbances and unrest in Northern Britain and by military failure of Hadrian's Wall
- coin issued in 154 AD shows Britannia subdued following the quashing of unrest
- Severus' arrival in Britain, with his two sons, motivated against unrest of Caledonians and Maetae
- Severus sought military conquest and to cow the natives, signing treaties with the persecuted natives
- Severus aimed at conquest of the whole island, establishing strong forts at Carpow and Cramond – something more than just a punitive campaign
- Severus aimed at military 'genocide', to wipe out every last man, woman and child who opposed Roman rule.

### Motivated by economic gain:

- army collected custom duties and taxes in the frontier areas
- collected taxes in cash or in kind
- Tacitus relays information on the payment of tax
- army did not necessarily pay for goods – dearth of coins and artefacts on native sites suggests Rome seized what they wanted
- during Antoninus Pius' reign, regiments on the wall were to protect the province from attack and to control the movement of people – indicative of desire for bureaucratic control to foster economic gain
- however, little evidence to suggest that North Britain was desirable economically, Aelius Aristides claims that by controlling southern Britain, Rome had all that was worth having and even that brought in little money.

### Motivated by imperialism:

- Roman state inherently imperialistic with imperialists' attitudes to other people
- Rome considered herself free to intervene in affairs of other lesser states
- David Breeze refers to Romans as having 'a belief that they had a mission to rule the world' or 'a right to rule the world'
- motivated by desire to bring benefits of their own civilisation to the barbarians
- Rome's expansion likened to the advent of the 'world's current superpower' – fixed on expansion
- Rome sought co-operation from the tribal nobility with offers of citizenship and imperial favour, e.g. Votadini enjoyed peaceable relationship with Rome, suggests imperial motives over military.

### Historians

### Perspective on the issue

Lawrence Keppie

Highlights that under the veil of military motives, expansion was largely a result of personal motives and the need for prestige.

David Breeze

Reinforces the imperialistic ambitions of Rome to rule the world, whilst acknowledging personal and military motives.

G Maxwell and W Hanson

Stress that most expansion coincides with the accession of a new emperor and North Britain as a remote province would fire the imaginations of the populace.

D J Woolliscroft and B Hoffman

Suggest Severus was 'planning for complete and permanent conquest' but for Antoninus Pius it was the politics that brought them North.



## Question 2

Candidates might refer to:

### Evidence which supports the view that Northern British society was changed by Rome:

- James Fraser argues that the idea of native Celts as ‘preserving their natives ways . . . untouched’ is ‘utter fairy tale’
- ‘The peoples had been snug in bed with the Roman elephant during the Roman Iron Age’ (James Fraser)
- the idea that the North was unchanged by Rome is a reflection of popular culture, embracing ‘the uplifting idea of a free Caledonia, where native Celts manfully and womanfully preserved their independence’ (James Fraser)
- socially/politically native religion was changed – brought Christianity to the Frontier Zone
- Native society gained fledgling signs of literacy – Traprain Law
- John Mann (1974) suggests the threat of Rome led disparate Iron Age tribes to amalgamate – he suggests the creation of the Pictish Confederacy
- Rome inadvertently created the Picts, forced to become a larger, more centrally controlled group to pose a serious military threat to Rome
- fewer tribal names are recorded post Roman invasion compared to those documented in Ptolemy’s Geography – testify to amalgamation
- Rome’s presence and influence destabilised native power sources – access to Roman goods and the ability to emulate them became an important source of power and prestige
- society may have been destabilised – societies became too reliant on Roman goods, elite relying on Roman exotica to display their power – when Roman goods were not available societies were destabilised or collapsed
- Economically/Material Culture Trade, diplomacy and tribute flourished during the Roman occupation – plugs Northern Britain into Mediterranean network
- hoards of silver coins, especially North of the Forth, such as at Birnie, Moray, suggests Rome ‘bought peace’ – either to pay off troublesome tribes or sweeten friendly tribes – bolstered native system of control
- 40% of native sites from Southern Scotland revealed Roman finds – indicates Roman presence and influence
- Roman finds are relatively abundant and cannot be explained away as exclusively status items – Roman finds associated with jewellery and feasting are not uncommon and may indicate a change in Iron Age practices.

### Evidence which supports the view that Northern British society was unchanged:

- Rome had minimal impact – the presence of Rome was ‘but a hiccup in the development of Iron Age societies in Scotland which had no lasting impact’ (Hanson 2003, Keppie 1989, Harding 2004)
- Roman interlude was little more than a series of brief military interludes
- Hanson highlights the short timescale of Rome’s presence in the North – he points out that the total period of Roman occupation of any substantial part of Scotland was limited to some 40 years
- Roman occupation never extended to even half of Scotland’s land mass – all known forts are south of the Highland Boundary Fault
- society was unchanged as Rome’s temporary presence was exclusively military – largely temporary camps, forts and fortlets – not occupied for any real length of time
- Romans did not have to change the North economically as evidence suggests much of the produce needed during the occupation was actually imported, e.g., wheat
- impact of the presence of Rome on the nature of settlements has been overestimated have a picture of broad continuity, not disruption or change, ‘the core remained largely untouched’ (William Hanson).

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|-----------------------|---|
| <b>John Mann</b>      | Argues that tribal amalgamation and long-term tribal change occurred due to Rome's influence.   |
| <b>Nick Atchison</b>  | Points out that the proximity of Rome's NW frontier and the wealthy province beyond provided an incentive for raiding while the loot supported socio-political elites, the emergence of kingdoms and a society organised for war. |
| <b>Alfred Smyth</b>   | Suggests that fully fledged Celtic kingdoms sprang up or rather re-merged as Roman power waned.   |
| <b>William Hanson</b> | Maintains that Roman presence was of little consequence in terms of changing Iron Age society.  |

### Question 3

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that the Picts had developed a distinctive identity by the 8<sup>th</sup> century:**

- since the publication of 'The Problem of the Picts' in 1955 the Picts have been perceived as distinct, enigmatic and problematic
- Bede identified the Picts as distinct in terms of their foreign origins, their succession practice, their barbarity and their language, they were part of a Scotland which had emerged as a land occupied by 'four nations and five languages'
- Antiquaries cultivated view that Picts were distinct based on their use of symbols and sculpted stones
- Sally Foster identifies the issues/areas where Picts have, rightly or wrongly, been identified as distinct – including symbols, language, succession and barbarity
- one of the most important perceived cultural oddities about the Picts is their allegedly non Indo-European custom of matrilineal succession, which some attribute to Bronze Age cultures. This passes through the female line, instead of the male (as the Scots and Angles)
- Tacitus identifies the Picts as a distinct racial type when he tells us that the Caledonians, supposedly one of the name-groups of the Pictish race, were 'fair or reddish haired and long limbed'
- distinct place-names – place-names beginning with 'Pit' are found throughout Pictish areas and this is thought to be a survival of a Pictish term meaning a parcel of land, such as Pitlochry and Pitsligo
- strong differences among Picts, Angles, Gaels and Britons. The Picts were linguistically and culturally closely related to the Britons, but seem to have had an intermittent political cohesion, which distinguished them from their southern neighbours
- religiously, many parts of Pictish territory remained pagan long after the people of the British regions were describing themselves as 'the baptised'
- the Pictish language has been seen as a mix of Celtic and non-Indo-European elements, requiring a translator to aid communication between the Pictish king, Bridei and St Columba
- what undoubtedly was distinctive, however, was the series of symbols employed by the Pictish nobility to decorate monuments – abstract, geometric, animalistic
- the meaning of the symbols still remains open to debate and there is no key to their meaning
- the symbol stones also suggest that the Picts were distinct because they denote a distinct degree of social and cultural unity – unlike in neighbouring societies there is a clear unifying culture among the Picts, a shared emblematic language and practices.

**Evidence which supports the view that a distinctive Pictish identity had not developed by the 8<sup>th</sup> century:**

- evidence has been adduced to symbolise the separateness of the Picts, but not all of these would now be accepted
- there is an enduring 'perceptual barrier' which perpetuates the notion that Picts were distinct and enigmatic (Sally Foster)
- current opinion favours Leslie Alcock's view that the Picts were 'typical north-west European barbarian society with wide connections and parallels'
- traditionally interpretations have emphasised differences over similarities and as such the distinctiveness of their identity has been exaggerated
- Picts were part of the shared 'Celtic Commonwealth' – much like their Celtic neighbours
- at a certain level, the ruling élite throughout Northern Britain, of whatever ethnic background, shared common aims and values
- the material culture of Picts, other than the symbol stone was little different from that of their neighbours
- the notion that their language was distinct is ill-founded. Picts did not speak a non-Indo-European language; rather they spoke another type of Celtic language, P Celtic, similar to their neighbours' Q Celtic

- The Foul Hordes Paradigm which suggested Picts were especially barbaric and backwards can be dismissed. It was a convention of writers to describe their enemies as given to monstrous atrocities, the commonplace jibes of neighbours
- the idea that kingship among the Picts was determined by an allegedly non-Indo-European custom of matrilineal succession has been shown to be at best an exaggeration of the truth. Instead, the Picts shared with their neighbours the custom of allowing succession to go through the female line in cases of dispute, but perhaps used the custom somewhat more frequently or openly
- even the distinctive symbol stones reveal similarities between the Picts and their neighbours – they reflect common Celtic concerns: the conversion to Christianity, the pursuits of the aristocracy through scenes of hunting, hawking, horse riding and battle
- by the 8<sup>th</sup> century there was a common Celtic ‘insular artistic style’, fusing elements from Anglo-Saxon, Pictish and Irish art.

| Historians    | Perspective on the issue  |
|---------------|---|
| Sally Foster  | Suggests that it is questionable whether the Picts were any more aggressive, barbaric or enigmatic than their neighbours.   |
| Nick Atchison | Points out that the proximity of Rome’s NW frontier and the wealthy province beyond provided an incentive for raiding while the loot supported socio-political elites, the emergence of kingdoms and a society organised for war. |
| Ewan Campbell | Refers to artistic integration and the existence of a melting pot of styles by the 8 <sup>th</sup> century rather than a distinct Pictish identity.   |
| Alfred Smyth  | Concludes that some notions of Picts having a distinct identity are in essence unverifiable and that Northern Britain was essentially a Celtic land.  |

## Question 4

### Candidates might refer to:

#### Evidence which supports the view that religion was central in the life of the Britons:

- Britons were a Celtic people, on the fringes of the old imperial province and thus may have retained a thin veneer of Romanitas/Christianity
- the Britons of Strathclyde were Christian – there are 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> century Christian stones at Kirkmadrine and Whithorn in Galloway
- the Britons of Strathclyde were educated in the gospels by the missionary Mungo (dearest beloved) – real name Kentigern and Glasgow became his centre
- the Britons were quicker to accept Christian teachings than either the Picts or the Angles
- Govan was the most important religious site in the Brittonic Kingdom of Strathclyde. Archaeological digs have revealed that a curved side of the graveyard follows the line of a Dark Age boundary ditch that would have marked out an ancient monastic enclosure
- carved stones, crosses and sarcophagi from Govan highlight value attributed to Christianity, warfare and kingship
- see early Christian burials across British lands – early cemeteries with dug or trench like graves suggest unified Christian church (Hallow Hill).

#### Evidence which does not consider that religion was central in the life of the Britons:

#### Warfare played a central role in the lives of Northern Britons:

- Britons, occupying the Lowlands, were sandwiched between the Picts in the North and the Angles and Saxons to the south. As the Angles expanded north, the Britons were forced to move west and south-west
- seemingly endless bouts of warfare amongst Britons and their neighbours – documented accounts of battles and siege between Britons and Angles and Picts and Vikings
- Saint Patrick writes about society at the time of King Ceredig's reign, describing a warrior society, warbands, capable of piratical raids on the Irish coast (even Ceredig's name meaning 'guledig' or 'wealthy' indicates successful plundering)
- indications of a measure of sea power – able to raid the Irish shores
- sporadic warfare between neighbours – Irish Annals record various battles including British king overthrowing king of the Picts 'slew him and many of his men', around 752 AD
- warrior values reflected in carvings at Govan
- Viking incursions are well documented and encroachment of competing powers would have been a constant
- Norse king, Olaf of Dublin captured Dumbarton Rock in 870 AD, as recorded in Welsh Annals – the summit of Dumbarton Rock was destroyed, and prisoners taken back to Dublin
- by the mid or late 5<sup>th</sup> century a successful British dynasty with an active warband was established on Dumbarton Rock, carrying out plundering raids against north-east Ireland
- Y Gododdin in the Book of Aneurin records heroic values, feasting, fighting and death in battle amongst the men of the Gododdin, leaving Dun Eidynd (Edinburgh) to fight the Angles of Deira.

#### Kingship/kingdoms:

- Annals document an array of British kingdoms including Kingdom of Strathclyde and Kingdom of Gododdin, based in Edinburgh
- British kingdoms have fluctuating fortunes reflecting instability of the period – Rheged, Gododdin and Elmet (Elmet) are swallowed up by Northumbrian advance during 7<sup>th</sup> century
- Royal centres have been recorded – Pertreche/Partick, Dumbarton, Rutherglen
- Kingdom of Strathclyde flourished around 7<sup>th</sup> century whilst the Kingdom of Gododdin was destroyed in around 640 AD
- from about the middle of the 6<sup>th</sup> century, Kings of Strathclyde emerge as historical figures
- King Rhydderch (580 AD – 614 AD) – documented accounts of raids, plundering and concern of enemies slaughtering him
- kings closely tied to the Christian church – recorded as seeking advice from Saints
- intermarriage between royal dynasties – King Beli (627 AD) may have married a lady of Northumbrian royal descent, 'son of the king of Dumbarton' was a very powerful king of the Picts,

Brude son of Beli, who defeated Angles at Battle of Dunnichen = complex web of family alliances and power bases

- North British kings bolstered power through alliances with an array of neighbouring kingdoms such as Angles in Bernicia around 590 AD.

**Typical Celtic concerns:**

- Britons were in many regards much like their neighbours – Celtic kingdoms
- little difference between the Britons and their neighbours in terms of social organisation – ‘fully fledged barbarian realms’
- they spoke an ancient form of Celtic language that has been classified as Brythonic or Brittonic. It is identified by linguists as a member of the P-Celtic form of languages spoken by other Britons, Welsh and Cornish.

| Historians      | Perspective on the issue   |
|-----------------|--|
| Tim Clarkson    | Clearly highlights that ‘warfare played a central role in the life of a kingdom’, king and aristocracy relied on warfare and obligations to secure and maintain power. |
| Alfred Smyth    | Refers to the Britons as ‘a full-blooded barbarian Celtic aristocracy’.  |
| Alan MacQuarrie | Emphasises the role of kingship and intermittent warfare.  |
| Sally Foster    | Discusses that they are a typical post-Roman Celtic kingdom.   |



## Question 5

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence both supporting and refuting the view regarding social distinction:**

**Minimal social distinction:**

- shared common Celtic background of Scots and Picts
- shared warrior values, prestige based social organisation
- shared tribal attitudes
- shared subsistence methods
- shared social values – status rested on kindred and land
- a new common practice/style of kingship was developing – power legitimised by the church and extended through the support of the church and the political elite (mormaers and thanes)
- united system of control emerging – ‘Mormaers’ used as a common term for leading magnates fighting alongside Scottish kings and used practically to extend central royal authority over remote parts of Scotland.

**Continued social distinctions:**

- significant degree of social fragmentation existed due to undeveloped infrastructure of the North – Highlands and Islands remained remote
- unstable geographic frontiers.

**Evidence supporting and refuting the view regarding cultural distinctions:**

**Minimal cultural distinctions:**

- linguistic divisions between P and Q Gaelic speakers may have begun to decline even before the 9<sup>th</sup> century political changes – see increasing gaelicisation of Scotland (Sally Foster)
- increasing gaelicisation of toponymy – decline of ‘pit’ placenames
- increasing gaelicisation of art – rapid loss of Pictish symbols
- Gaelic names given to Picts
- intermarriage between different kingdoms
- ‘what continued was . . . an oral culture which continued to sing the praises of the warlord and chief of the kindred.’ Michael Lynch
- all the societies of Northern Britain were intensely hierarchical, a person’s identity was dependent on gender, age, wealth, family ties and the possession of a craft or specialised learning
- united by fact that almost everyone was engaged in farming their local environment
- united by the importance attributed to conflict – military action, fortified residences, military equipment war horses – reflects common warrior values.

**Evidence of minimal religious distinctions:**

- all peoples of Northern Britain were or were becoming Christianised
- Sainly missionaries had converted Southern and Northern Picts. Angles had been converted
- Viking conversion well underway by 10<sup>th</sup> century
- Synod of Whitby had resolved ecumenical differences between the Roman and Celtic church
- common religious and administrative centre focused on St Andrews
- united in use of Christianity to secure Kingship
- united by spread of continental artistic influences – common religious art and symbolism
- A A M Duncan asserts, ‘the kings of Scotia and Scotland stamped unity upon the four or five disparate peoples north of the Tweed and Solway’.

**Evidence of continued religious distinctions:**

- Irish/Celtic cultural zone on Iona endured after the establishment of new eastern Christian centres still hints of paganism – evidence of 10<sup>th</sup> century Vikings retaining polytheism.

| Historians   | Perspective on the issue  |
|--------------|---|
| Sally Foster | Contends that Picts identity was subsumed . . . they had become Scots, but the new peoples of Alba shared common culture, land organisation and faith.  |
| A A M Duncan | Highlights disappearance of distinct Pictish identity and culture, subsumed into Scots.   |
| A Smyth      | Suggests some fragile religious unity amidst political changes but cultural divisions remained between those in south-western Scotland, the eastern spine and the north.  |
| Fiona Watson | Highlights the role played by the church in diminishing distinctions but suggests that for ordinary people life remained the same irrespective of cultural and social distinctions, priorities remained the same: farming and meeting the family’s basic needs. |

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 6

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source A   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>   |
|---|--|
| One aspect of fortification which is clear on both broch and non-broch sites, however, is that the enclosures formed by the ramparts are rarely rational as defensive circuits. | This suggests that in the Iron Age the design of ramparts around fortified sites made defending enclosures very difficult thereby suggesting the need for defence/warfare was secondary. |
| It is possible that much of the warfare within these societies was ritualised, involving challenges between champions . . .   | Suggests disputes among communities in the Iron Age society were often solved by single combat between champions.  |
| . . . defensive function was symbolic rather than practical with the blockhouses representing platforms for ritualised warfare or display.                                      | Suggests that in the Iron Age society warfare and defence was more about ritualised display rather than the need for practical solutions.  |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- brochs do not make much sense in terms of formal warfare with reference to inability to withstand prolonged siege, lack of fresh water supplies, inability to accommodate sufficient livestock
- occupants were vulnerable since attackers only needed to burn/destroy their crops to ensure starvation ensues or smoke out occupants
- some brochs sited on low lying islets immediately overlooked by higher ground from which attackers could have rained down fire and missiles
- hillforts difficult to defend when covering large areas as at Eildon Hill North and Traprain Law
- some hillforts (Chesters and Pirn Hillfort) built immediately next to larger hills – negates defensive value whilst others had only slight defences merely accentuating natural contours
- trappings of warfare (chariots, swords and spears) may have been symbols of power rather than actual weapons of war – akin to the power of suggestion
- pre-battle preening, ritualised aggression and the threat of violence may have played as great a role as actual warfare in Late Pre-Roman Iron Age society
- forts, crannogs and brochs may not have been built for a practical defensive need – intended to demonstrate the status and prestige of the occupants – designed as symbolic of military strength.

| Point in Source B   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given  |
|---|--|
| The King and a warrior aristocracy sat at the apex of the pyramid . . .   | Suggests there was a warrior aristocracy that was part of the social hierarchy making warfare an important part of Iron Age society.   |
| The small group of professional warriors gathered around the king or a ruling family certainly made up the core fighting force . . .  | Suggests that the ruling classes had the best warriors positioned around them, which may suggest there was a need for protection and perhaps status in a violent society.          |
| At Mons Graupius, Tacitus mentioned a much larger host than could be mustered from the aristocratic elite alone, so there must have been a large contingent of farmers on the battlefield that day, armed with whatever they could turn to offensive purpose. | Argues that even the lower social classes in the Iron Age were involved in war, which again suggests warfare was common, and there was a need for all classes to be able to fight. |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- literary evidence, Caesar's *Gallic Wars*, Tacitus' *Agricola*, the early Irish law texts analysed by DA Binchy, all identify Celtic society as hierarchical: an upper tier of warriors/nobles/leaders, a middle tier of free peasants, craftsmen and a lower tier of unfree and enslaved peoples – no doubt war booty, as well as a class of seers/Druids/religious experts
- 'heroic', lordly practices of warfare, feasting and drinking were all important in Iron Age society – evidence by finds such as the Torrs Pony Cap from Kirkcudbrightshire
- Tacitus' account of Mons Graupius talks of chiefs using chariots
- Newbridge Burial – shows tribal leader buried with their chariot
- Calgacus was 'the swordsman' – indicates leaders took centre stage during battles
- warfare played a role in securing and maintaining the power of elite members of the social hierarchy
- boar-headed carnyx found from Deskford, Banffshire – paraphernalia of warfare.

**Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- crannogs still vulnerable to attacks by fire or siege. Less easy to defend than a mainland roundhouse with a stout palisade. Little evidence of warfare associated with crannogs
- crannogs arguably more representative of a display of power or status than for defense (Dixon 'no effort to hide')
- defences on sites such as Hownam Rings in the Borders and Broxmouth in East Lothian were in disrepair by the Late Pre-Roman Iron Age – society was essentially peaceful with little need of defences
- the transition from palisaded sites with multi and univallate defences, to enclosed and finally to unenclosed settlements suggests that warfare was at most, incidental
- contrasting views on role of warfare – has been perceived as defining trait of Iron Age society but now considered to be of secondary importance, following prestige and subsistence
- Roman writers fuelled notions of a warlike society, e.g., Dio stated that northern tribes had no cultivated lands, lived naked and fought barefoot
- Rome sought to highlight the role of warfare in Northern Britain in order to make their advance through the north seem epic and gallant
- modern picture of Celtic society is of stability – undefended farms, wholesale land cultivation and stability
- aerial photography reveals complex field systems, cord-rig, cultivation ridges – indicators of settled, sophisticated farming communities.

| <b>Historians</b>              | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| <b>Anna and Graham Ritchie</b> | Stress the existence of a warrior aristocracy securing and maintaining power through warfare.   |
| <b>Alfred Smyth</b>            | Argues that the names of barbarian magnates as found in Roman authors' works and on Roman inscriptions, prove there was a warrior elite in N Britain, e.g., Calgacus meaning 'The Swordsman' and Argentocoxus meaning 'Silver Leg'. |
| <b>Ian Armit</b>               | Supposes that warfare was of a small scale and was infused with symbolism and display.  |
| <b>Dennis Harding</b>          | Underlines the use of space and residences as expressions of power and social organisation.   |

## Question 7

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source C |   | Possible comment on the provenance of the source   |
|--------------------|---|--|
| <b>Author</b>      | Early original text, the author is unknown. Later compiled into the 14 <sup>th</sup> century Poppleton Manuscript by Robert of Poppleton.   | Clearly the account of someone educated who allegedly was a contemporary of Kenneth II as the account ends during his reign which may suggest he was under the authority of Kenneth II to record these events.   |
| <b>Purpose</b>     | Record of events explaining the ascension of Kenneth MacAlpin and subsequent Kings through to the reign of Kenneth II.  | Utilises pre-existing material to craft a particular picture of the kingdom and dynasty of Alba and the Scots. Later recorded in the Poppleton manuscript in the 14 <sup>th</sup> century leading historians to suggest it was part of a compilation justifying the Royal lineage. |
| <b>Timing</b>      | Written in the 10 <sup>th</sup> century during the reign of Kenneth II then transcribed at least once before being copied into the 14 <sup>th</sup> century Poppleton Manuscript. | The original text was allegedly recorded at the time of Kenneth II as it promptly stops during his reign suggesting this was still a work in progress.   |

| Point in Source C  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance   |
|--|---|
| Pictland was named after the Picts, whom Kenneth destroyed; for God deigned to make them alien from, and void of, their heritage, by reason of their wickedness because they spurned the Lord's mass . . . | Suggests MacAlpin carried out God's purpose in destroying the Picts as punishment for not following the correct procedures of the church. This is justification for MacAlpin destroying the Picts and vindication of his and the Scots right to rule. |
| His military prowess was clear to everyone. In his efforts to secure his kingdom he seized and burned Dunbar and Melrose and boldly invaded England six times.   | Outlines how MacAlpin formed the kingdom on the battlefield establishing his rule and dealing with potential threats ruthlessly, while helping demark the new kingdom.  |
| Fortune favoured him because he was also able to take advantage of the attacks on his enemies when the Britons burned Dunblane, and the Danes laid waste to Pictland as far as Clunie and Dunkeld.         | Demonstrates that his role was not the sole factor in the formation of Alba rather that he opportunistically benefited from the misfortunes of others.  |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Kenneth was a warrior leader, he did not succeed peacefully but was helped by his own aggression; though he must have been from a royal line he also gained a lot of experience from fighting the Vikings
- Kenneth MacAlpin clearly made a huge personal contribution as war leader and tactician. He may have been in league with the Vikings. He may have had a claim to the Pictish throne through his mother. However, all his achievements could well have died with him, leaving him a minor footnote in history
- Kenneth did replace the old Pictish kingdom in the South-East however, several Pictish kings before his time had Gaelic names and probably Scots blood
- he was named as the son of Alpin; later accounts/genealogies wrote that this Alpin was king before his son for a year or two; there seems to be no contemporary evidence for this, it was propaganda to legitimise the dynasty which Kenneth founded
- the primacy of St Andrews, the head church of Pictland, was not eclipsed, despite the growing importance of Dunkeld, where Kenneth MacAlpin installed the relics of St Columba in a new church.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- in the late 8<sup>th</sup> century, the century before Kenneth's time, several Pictish kings not only had royal fathers from Dal Riata but ruled the two kingdoms simultaneously
- Oengus II and his son Bogan, who ruled both kingdoms from Fortriu in modern Perthshire, were Scots first and foremost, as were their names. They were thoroughly Scots Gaelic in their culture
- the kingdom of the Picts was larger than Dal Riata in Argyll and both more populous and agriculturally richer, which was of course part of the attraction for the Scots
- the Pictish kingdom was highly organised: an army, a navy, an obligation to military service, taxation, judges, powerful royal officers, mormears, thanes, all supported by the church. The wealth and power of the new Alba was no doubt predominantly Pictish and testimony to the gradual merging of the two peoples
- the church favoured political union, especially if led by the Dal Riata, the people of St Columba
- the appearance of St Columba and other saints from Gaelic Ireland among the Picts from 590s on introduced a major cultural influence and brought the Picts within the Gaelic cultural sphere for the next 200 years, producing a Christian society heavily influenced by Gaelic models
- the Viking incursion was important; it weakened gradually the Picts and lost them the Northern Isles and Caithness: also there was a Viking victory over the Picts in 839 AD just before Kenneth took over the Pictish throne. 'a battle was fought by the gentiles against the men of Fortriu and a large number fell in the engagement'. Annals of Ulster
- similarly, Viking pressure on the coast of Dal Riata put pressure on the people there to move east.

**Historians****Perspective on the issue**

|                     |  |
|---------------------|--|
| <b>Alfred Smyth</b> | Argues that in fact there was a gradual infiltration of the Picts by the Scots, coming from the West.  |
| <b>Ian Walker</b>   | Suggests Kenneth MacAlpin 'was completing a gradual process of the merging of two cultures which had begun centuries before.' 'a slow fusion of two cultural groups over a long period of time.' |
| <b>Sally Foster</b> | Suggests conflict a major component but cannot alone account for emergence of Alba; emphasis on church.  |
| <b>Dauvit Broun</b> | Deconstructs standard narrative on creation of Scotland which emphasised Kenneth MacAlpin's role. Broun highlights Norse as a catalyst and calls for a reinterpretation of creation of Alba.     |

## Question 8

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source D   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given  |
|---|--|
| The position of the Orkney Islands, lying to the north of mainland Scotland, was strategically important for giving access to both western and eastern sides of the British Isles . . . | Suggests the geographical position of the Northern Isles was a perfect position to gain access to the rest of the British Isles making this part of Northern Britain very attractive to the Vikings. |
| Erik . . . is said to have been forced out of Norway by his half-brother, Haakon 'the good', moving west to Orkney around 947 AD . . .  | Suggests that there were political squabbles in Norway that forced key Vikings out and led to settlement in the Northern Isles.  |
| . . . they accompanied Erik on his raiding expedition to the Hebrides, Ireland and Strathclyde.   | Suggests there was a desire to accumulate wealth raiding the western sea-board and Ireland as an attraction to come to Northern Britain.   |

### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- geographically the Northern Isles were unmissable: Shetland was 70 miles from Norway and the long chain Shetland, Fair Isle, Orkney, Caithness was bound to yield a landfall
- theory that Viking population had outgrown the agricultural potential of their Scandinavian homeland – land was being divided into smaller and smaller fragments, incapable of sustaining a family unit
- a 'youth bulge' led to the families along the western seaboard of Norway, where fertile land was in short supply, seeking land in Northern Britain
- younger sons, political exiles, mercenary warriors and traders all had the option of becoming colonists in land now familiar from the tales of returning raiders
- they were also ideal bases for raiding the prevailing winds blew the Vikings West in the Spring and East in the Autumn
- plenty of safe anchorages: Scapa Flow, e.g., could shelter hundreds of long ships
- possession of the Northern and Western Isles opened up the whole of the Irish Sea and the Western Approaches
- abbeys had treasure in the form of communion plate, adornment of gospels, reliquaries, vestments and psalters with gold, silver and precious stones
- native settlements yielded enslaved peoples and livestock in abundance.

### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- coastlines were in some areas similar to fjords
- the Vikings who came to Northern Britain were from Norway in the main and were pastoral farmers whose life-style was based on the raising of cattle and sheep with a little growing of oats and barley where possible; the Northern and Western Isles, as well as looking like home, were ideal for this
- the Norwegian Vikings also lived in isolated farms, not in village communities: once again the Isles were ideal for this
- topographically the Isles provided a multitude of the type of settlement sites the Vikings wanted: ease of access to the sea; grazing land for livestock; plenty of drinking water; fuel and building materials
- Orkney has very good soil and plenty of sandstone for flags for building; Shetland has patches of good soil; the machair on parts on the Hebrides, both Inner and Outer, is good for farming; plenty of shelving beaches; the lie of the ground favoured portages; conditions were ideal for fishing, both pastoral and arable farming and for fowling
- climatically the winters were warmer than in Scandinavia, mild enough to out-winter stock, especially sheep
- Viking influence in Strathclyde would give access to trading networks between York and Dublin.



| <b>Historians</b>       | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-------------------------|--|
| <b>Anna Ritchie</b>     | Talks of not just loot and plunder, desire for land a key factor.  |
| <b>Barbara Crawford</b> | Emphasises the importance of maritime links and extent to which North was familiar environment.            |
| <b>Alfred Smyth</b>     | Argues that attraction of Northern Britain was mixed – a route way, a source of loot and a source of land. |
| <b>Clare Downham</b>    | Highlights the importance of trading links.  |

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 9

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that Alexander failed to successfully deal with the key problems of his reign:**

- Alexander failed in his key duty, to leave a living male heir
- Alexander was widowed in 1275 but did not remarry until 1285
- Alexander's own behaviour led to his early death in March 1286, plunging the country into a crisis due to the lack of a direct, clear heir
- Alexander failed to properly secure his granddaughter as his heir in 1285, instead expecting to produce further children
- Alexander did not get his granddaughter over from Norway, or secure a marriage alliance for her as his potential heir
- Alexander gave homage for his lands in England to Henry III and Edward I, leaving open the idea that this homage could include the kingdom of Scotland
- Alexander failed to gain lasting recognition from the English kings of Scottish independence, and he allowed Edward I to reserve the right to raise the issue again in the future
- most of the good relations with England stemmed from Alexander's personal relationship with Edward I (his brother-in-law) – a situation which would not outlast Alexander's death
- Alexander's treaty with the Norwegians left his country paying substantial sums to Norway in perpetuity for the Western Isles, a potentially crippling debt
- Alexander continued to allow his magnates to maintain their cross-border land holdings in Scotland and England, despite the potential for split loyalties and conflict
- Alexander did not tame the magnates, but instead relied on them to extend his authority, run his key government posts, lead campaigns in Man and at Largs. The Comyn family increasingly dominated Scottish government under Alexander III, leading to resentment from other nobles
- Alexander did not assert royal authority in the newly claimed Western Isles which remained divided and unsettled.

**Evidence which supports the view that Alexander dealt successfully with the key problems of his reign:**

- Alexander worked with his political community to govern successfully. However, he retained ultimate power and decision making
- the Scots use of a parliamentary style system under Alexander would be vital to enable guardians to govern in the absence of an adult male after 1286
- Alexander held on to his estates in England (Cumbria and Northumberland) and managed to extend his kingdom into the Western Isles with the Treaty of Perth, 1266
- Alexander was able to use his nobility to help extend royal authority into previously unruly areas like the Highlands or Galloway
- Alexander worked with his political community to refute English claims to overlordship over Scotland
- Alexander was able to consolidate and continue much of the work of his father in extending and securing the kingdom
- after the factionalism of Alexander's own minority, he left behind a political community largely able to work together for the good of the kingdom
- after the death of his three children, Alexander brought his political community together to seek a resolution – a new marriage and a temporary heir agreed to by the political community
- Alexander largely kept the peace, which allowed his kingdom to prosper. However, he was prepared and able to defend his lands when needed against Norway (1263) and consolidate his gains in a treaty and marriage alliance
- the instability and noble factionalism of Alexander's minority did not reoccur during his adult reign.

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-----------------------|--|
| <b>Richard Oram</b>   | Takes the view that Alexander's myth has taken over historical accounts, but that he had to have been a good king to have deeds the myth could build upon.                                       |
| <b>Norman Reid</b>    | Takes the view that Alexander oversaw fairly steady political and economic growth which led to Scotland becoming strong, stable and prosperous.  |
| <b>Michael Penman</b> | Takes the view that Alexander was strong enough to successfully negotiate his tailzie moving succession to the Maid and this promise was honoured after the king's death.                        |
| <b>Michael Brown</b>  | Takes the view that while Alexander contained and managed his nobility, this was based on his personal lordship rather than a lasting change to the social structure within Alexander's kingdom. |

## Question 10

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that King John's failure as king of Scots was due to his betrayal by his political community:**

- the political community had become used to the additional power of governing during the interregnum and may have been unwilling to give up this new status
- John inherited the political factionalism which remained from Alexander III's reign
- John's naivety and lack of knowledge about Scotland or its political structure left him vulnerable to the whims of his political community
- John's political community was dominated by the Comyn family and their allies, and John was related by marriage to John Comyn lord of Badenoch
- John's political community advised him poorly on several occasions e.g., to deprive MacDuff of his lands. This left him no option but to appeal to Edward I as overlord, escalating the issue
- the political community allowed/advised John to attend the English parliament in Westminster when he was first summoned over the legal appeals rather than sending legal attorneys to act on his behalf, which was a mistake
- the Bruce family spent 18 months attempting to avoid paying homage to John, humiliating the new king
- negotiating an alliance with France was a risky strategy, provoking war with England. The political community negotiated the terms, which were not all that favourable for the Scots
- the political community established the Council of Twelve, to support or replace the king. They would have decided or advised on fortifying the border with England and invading the north of England – a clear act of aggression Edward could not ignore
- the political community led the Scottish army in 1296, possibly as John had no military experience. It was their tactics that Edward was able to overcome.

**Evidence which supports the view that other problems caused John Balliol to fail as king of Scots:**

- John had no experience as Scottish king or with Scottish politics. He was a civil servant in England, used to their political system, and had not prepared himself to become king
- John appears to have found it difficult to stand up to anyone, including Bek, Bishop of Durham and Edward I. It took him 18 months to force the Bruces to pay homage
- John buckled whenever he was put under pressure, giving in to English threats of contempt of court
- John knew that to provoke Edward was to risk war and that Scotland was too small, weak and militarily inexperienced to defeat the English
- John had a church-based education and could not cope with the legal intricacies of the appeals when confronted with Edward I, a trained lawyer
- John was prepared to agree to provide military service to Edward I for Scotland in the English war against France – an unacceptable situation for most Scots
- John had much to lose. If he stood up to Edward I he would face a likely unwinnable war. If the war went badly, he could lose his estates in England and the kingship in Scotland
- Edward was a formidable opponent that anyone would have struggled against. He appears to have been determined to enforce his overlordship from the outset, from demanding the annulment of the Treaty of Birgham-Northampton over the Christmas period of 1292–1293 to encouraging appellants to bring their legal cases to him and provide an excuse to enforce his overlordship, e.g. the wine merchant from Gascony and Alexander III's unpaid wine bill
- Edward had experienced a similar situation himself as duke of Gascony, vassal of the king of France. He would have been well aware of what he was insisting on from John, but acted against John anyway, making the Scottish king's position untenable.

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-----------------------|--|
| <b>Michael Penman</b> | Takes the view that it was Edward I's agenda that fatally compromised Balliol's authority as king as he exploited his jurisdiction ruthlessly.   |
| <b>Michael Brown</b>  | Takes the view that the Council of Twelve was designed to direct the king towards the policies supported by his nobility, suggesting that they now set policy having removed power from their king.                        |
| <b>Fiona Watson</b>   | Takes the view that anyone would have struggled against Edward I and that Balliol was right to take his time to stand up to Edward given the devastating war this would subject the kingdom to.                            |
| <b>Steve Boardman</b> | Takes the view that Edward wanted to solidify his vague claim to overlordship and Balliol was unable to cope with this powerful adversary combined with other problems such as the disaffection of the Bruces in Scotland. |

## Question 11

Candidates might refer to:

### **Evidence which supports the view Edward successfully established English occupation of Scotland:**

- Edward removed the ancient relics and archives from Scotland to prevent their use to stimulate attempts to resurrect independence
- Scottish political leaders were jailed or exiled
- by getting the Scottish political community to sign the Ragman Roll Edward had written proof of their submission, rather than their verbal agreements from 1291–1292, which had proven inadequate
- an English administration was established in Berwick with key posts held by Englishmen
- Ormesby became justiciar, Cressingham was to collect taxes, John de Warenne, earl of Surrey and leader of the English army at Dunbar in 1296 became the Royal Lieutenant to run Scotland for Edward
- church vacancies in Scotland were increasingly filled by English priests. In October 1296 Edward ordered that vacancies in Galloway could only be filled by English priests
- Cressingham was able to successfully raise significant taxation from the Scots to help pay for the French campaigns, such as £5,188 sent to London in May 1297. Wool was also seized for the English crown
- Edward offered to release Scottish rebels from jail if they would serve for England in France, such as John Comyn the younger
- English garrisons were established in Scottish burghs and castles which had previously been controlled by the Comyns, such as Kirkintilloch or Elgin.

### **Evidence which supports the view that Edward did not successfully establish English occupation of Scotland:**

- Edward underestimated the maturity and unity of the Scottish kingdom compared to his dealings with Ireland and Wales. His humiliation of King John and imposition of direct rule stimulated rebellion rather than prevented it
- Berwick was too far south and too isolated for central government. When rebellions broke out in the north and isles, they were too cut off to react quickly enough
- Edward was too distracted by his war in France, fooled by the easy conquest of Scotland into thinking his administration was as easily set up and in full control
- Edward did not understand Scottish politics. When he did appoint Scots, he ignored local rivalries, stimulating dissent e.g., promoting Macdonald in the Western Isles alienated the Macdougalls, relations of the Comyns and pro-King John men
- by promoting Englishmen to the Scottish Church it forced the clergy to support Scottish political independence to protect their ecclesiastical control
- the imposition of ‘aliens’ with foreign accents and dialect with no knowledge of Scots laws or customs stimulated resentment
- Scots were unused to heavy, regular taxation. By July 1297 Cressingham could no longer collect taxation
- Warenne disliked Scotland (and its weather) so much that he refused to live there; instead he based himself in his Yorkshire estates. He left Cressingham to run the country
- in July 1297, Cressingham wrote to Edward I that the English occupation was on the verge of collapse – Englishmen were being forced out of their new posts and the Scots replaced then with their own officials across the country, except for Roxburgh and Berwick
- Edward relied on Scots to quash initial uprisings e.g., he released John Comyn lord of Buchan and Alexander Comyn earl of Buchan from prison to send them to stop Andrew de Moray’s rebellion in the north-east, rather than using English troops
- Edward contemplated removing John de Warenne from Scotland and taking him to join the campaign in France, believing his rule in Scotland to be secure.

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|-----------------------|---|
| <b>Michael Brown</b>  | Takes the view that Scots increasingly resented the ‘aliens’ who ruled their country without any understanding of Scottish traditions.                            |
| <b>Fiona Watson</b>   | Takes the view that Edward was likely to arouse resentment as he clearly considered the Scottish system of government backward and worthy of contempt.            |
| <b>Colm McNamee</b>   | Takes the view that Edward trampled over Scotland’s separate identity, ignoring an acceptable union or a limited presence in Scotland which might have succeeded. |
| <b>Peter Traquair</b> | Takes the view that Edward had not planned past his initial conquest and his heavy-handed ‘colonial policy’ made further fighting inevitable.                     |

## Question 12

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that in their resistance the Scots were able to successfully maintain their interests:**

- the Scots quickly established a new guardianship under the leadership of the next generation of Scottish nobles: Robert Bruce and John Comyn
- despite frequent changes in personnel, the Scottish Guardians were able to continue to run the country and largely maintain active resistance
- the Scots avoided pitched battles and focussed on guerrilla tactics like raiding English supply lines and pressurising English-held castles
- Scots resistance to English occupation remained active until only weeks before their submission in 1305
- the Scots ran a well-organised and well-maintained war of attrition against the English
- the Scots were able to recapture Stirling Castle (1299) and therefore control the gateway to the north of Scotland
- the Scots were able to take advantage of Edward's problems raising money and armies for his Scottish campaigns to limit English conquests
- in 1303, the Scots managed a significant victory over the English at Roslin under the leadership of John Comyn
- the Scots were able to lobby King Philip IV of France and Pope Boniface VIII to pressurise Edward to leave Scotland alone. In particular, Bisset shone at the Papal Curia
- Boniface issued the *Scimus fili* to Edward in 1301 giving the English king an ultimatum – six months to justify his actions in Scotland
- the Scots were able to secure John Balliol's release from English custody, first to papal custody and then to his own estates north of Paris, under the supervision of the French king
- the Ordinance of Scotland was the culmination of two years of discussions and negotiations. Edward had clearly learned from his experiences in 1296 and was prepared to include the Scots to create a settlement that would last
- Scotland's distinctive governmental system was preserved in the 1305 Ordinance, as were the positions of Scots in law and order and basic levels of government
- 10 Scottish representatives would travel to Westminster to work with the English on a lasting constitution for a final settlement.

**Evidence which may consider that in their resistance the Scots were not able to successfully maintain Scottish interests:**

- the Scots were unable to maintain international pressure on England – France made peace with Edward I and did not include the Scots in his settlement, and Pope Boniface turned on the Scots
- the Scots were unable to prevent key Scottish nobles from defecting to the English cause, such as Robert Bruce in 1302
- 1303–1304 Edward was able to winter his army in Scotland and thereby maintain pressure for a sustained period
- Edward was able to advance into the north of Scotland during his 1303–1304 campaign, harrying Comyn heartlands
- eventually, key Scots were more concerned with securing their own lands and lordships by making peace with Edward than maintaining their rebellion e.g., the earls of Lennox, Ross and Atholl
- in the Ordinance of Scotland, the most important posts (royal lieutenant, chancellor and chamberlain) would all be held by Englishmen, justiciars would be pairs of an Englishman and a Scot, and most of the Border sheriffs were to be Englishmen
- Edward now openly referred to the 'land of Scotland', no longer a kingdom
- the Ordinance saw the Scots divided again, with Soules and the Stirling garrison refusing to submit and Robert Bruce alienated from Edward by its contents.



| <b>Historians</b>        | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|--------------------------|---|
| <b>David Santiuste</b>   | Takes the view that the Scots maintained their resistance to England by learning from the past and avoiding pitched battles for guerrilla methods.                          |
| <b>Fiona Watson</b>      | Takes the view that by the time Bruce defected to the English in 1302 he was a political ‘has-been’ rather than representative of the Scots as a whole.                     |
| <b>GWS Barrow</b>        | Takes the view that Scotland in 1305 was once more a conquered country.   |
| <b>Michael Prestwich</b> | Takes the view that Scotland was Edward I’s Vietnam — he sent in huge armies and failed to develop a strategy to deal with the Scots who after Falkirk refused open battle. |

## Question 13

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may suggest that by Bishopthorpe, the Scots had failed to win the war against England:**

- the Scots failed to capture Edward II at the end of the Battle of Bannockburn, which would have enabled the Scots to ransom the English king for their independence
- Bannockburn did not destroy English resources – Edward II was able to raise another army in 1319 and 1322. Bruce did not engage in another pitched battle with the English
- the Bishopthorpe Truce was negotiated between the king of England and ‘Sir Robert de Brus’, highlighting that Edward II still considered Scotland a land and Robert a rebel, not a king
- Edward II remained stubborn, refusing to back down over the issue of Scotland, leading to stalemate in their war
- raiding northern England put only minimal pressure on Edward II, it was geographically too far from his capital to really threaten Edward’s authority
- the invasion of Ireland used up a huge resource of men and supplies which the Scots could ill-afford, forcing them to fight on two fronts against the English
- King Robert had to fight with his brother in Ireland, a huge risk, and eventually cost the Scottish king his last surviving brother and male heir
- Ireland proved that the Scottish king was not invincible and that his tactics were not always successful
- both sides agreed to the 13-year ceasefire as they were war weary and needed a respite. This was a long period for the Scottish king, who was elderly and whose heir at the time was his young grandson
- by 1323, Robert had not won any international recognition of his title – from England, France or the papacy
- for all the Scottish military dominance, the length of the Bishopthorpe truce highlights that they had little power at the bargaining table against the English
- terms of Bishopthorpe were more favourable to the English – the Scots would withdraw from Northumberland and there was no recognition of Robert or Scottish independence. Meanwhile the Scots would be deprived of the opportunity to continue to profit from warfare.

**Evidence which supports the view that the Scots were in the superior position by 1323:**

- the Scots had managed to remove English garrisons from their territory and regained the last Scottish castle, Berwick, in 1318
- by fighting and winning the pitched battle in 1314, the Scots showed their military superiority over Edward II and his forces
- Bannockburn left Bruce more secure in Scotland, disinheriting his enemies and regaining his wife and daughter to secure his succession. This made him harder for Edward to defeat with fewer outright enemies in Scotland
- Edward II was rarely willing to campaign in Scotland, leaving Robert to win by default
- Edward II was incapable of protecting his garrisons in Scotland, even through the numerous truces negotiated across this period
- Robert was able to raid further and further into English territory over the border, reaching Yorkshire and Lancashire, bringing supplies and plunder as well as financial gain
- when Edward II came north in 1319 and 1322, King Robert was able to use a variety of tactics to force Edward to withdraw, from starting distraction raids into England or using scorched earth tactics to stretch English supply lines
- Robert had been prepared to flout papal truces before 1323, even recapturing Berwick during a truce. There was nothing to suggest that Robert would honour the 13-year pause in hostilities
- removing active hostilities through the truce in 1323 enabled the two sides to meet with less friction to organise serious peace talks at York in 1324.

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|-----------------------|---|
| <b>Michael Brown</b>  | Takes the view that Robert showed his military capabilities with successful military tactics which ranged from preparing in advance for pitched battles to mobile, plundering raids into enemy lands. |
| <b>GWS Barrow</b>     | Takes the view that Bruce won the war and independence, the English were just not prepared to accept the fact.  |
| <b>Steve Boardman</b> | Takes the view that the English realm could always absorb one defeat and could always generate another army to continue the fight.  |
| <b>Michael Penman</b> | Takes the view that despite years of Scottish military dominance and problems in England, in the long run the Scots had gained very little at the bargaining table for the Bishopthorpe truce.        |

## Section 2 – Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 14

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source A |  | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance   |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Author             | Treaty confirmed by the Scottish parliament.   | Confirmation made by the Scottish political community, led by the guardians, who shared authority over the kingdom in the absence of an adult king or queen.   |
| Purpose            | Negotiate acceptable terms for all regarding the future of Margaret, Maid of Norway. | Approve the terms negotiated by envoys of Norway, England and France whereby the King of Norway would send his young daughter Margaret to become Queen of Scotland and ensure her safety was guaranteed. |
| Timing             | 6 November 1289.   | Three and a half years after Alexander III died without any surviving children, during which period the Scots set up a guardianship to govern until the Maid of Norway could become queen.               |

| Point in Source A   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance   |
|---|---|
| . . . if the lady [Margaret] comes to England totally free of all contract of marriage, then he is required to send her on to the kingdom of Scotland also totally free of all contract of marriage, just as he received her.   | Edward I of England is formally declaring his willingness to send Margaret to Scotland if she was not married or engaged when he received her, he would send her to Scotland in the same manner. The declaration stresses that she must be totally free which emphasises the importance of the situation. |
| . . . the people of Scotland have given sufficient guarantee to the king of England that they will not marry her without his desire, advice and permission, and with the consent of the king of Norway, her father.   | The emphasis here is on the word sufficient. This suggests the determination of the king of England to ensure the Scots uphold the conditions of the declaration.   |
| . . . if by any chance any one or more of the guardians of the kingdom of Scotland shall be considered untrustworthy, then they should be removed, and others of Scotland be put in their place. This will be done by the agreement of the good men of Scotland and Norway, and those that the king of England sends there. | The conditions stress that they would be considered untrustworthy if they do not comply with the Treaty. This further emphasises the enormity of the commitment required of the Scots. The Scots were legally binding themselves to interference from two other countries.                                |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the Norwegian king had been reluctant to send his daughter to Scotland after the Bruce uprising and the murder of the earl of Fife
- the Treaty agreed that Margaret would be sent to England until Scotland was settled and at peace
- Scotland had no royal court where the young queen could be brought up and taught how to rule. Edward's court in England, which protected his own daughters, would have seemed to be a logical solution
- to avoid civil war, the Scottish political community had agreed to uphold their oath to Alexander III at the 1284 parliament at Scone. Therefore, it was vital that they secure the person of their future monarch as soon as possible
- 6 (or 7) guardians ruled the country with the support of their political community, maintaining government as best they could without royal authority
- by involving the English king, the guardians were possibly continuing the policy direction begun by Alexander III who possibly wrote to Edward before his death to suggest a marriage alliance between Margaret and Edward's son, Edward Caernarvon.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- Robert Bruce the grandfather had attempted a rising to take the throne through force, but this was quelled by the guardians
- the guardians accepted the papal dispensation negotiated in secret by Edward I to marry Margaret to his son despite their familial connection, as second cousins
- the Scottish guardians sought to gain legal protections for the future independence of their kingdom in the Treaty of Birgham, 1290. These included that parliaments for Scotland could only be held in their country and that no one could be asked to go to England for Scottish justice
- when Margaret died in Orkney in 1290, the Bishop of Glasgow wrote to Edward I for help resolving their renewed succession problem
- the Scots asked Edward to adjudicate between John Balliol (primogeniture) and Robert Bruce the grandfather (nearness of degree)
- the Scots were forced to accept Edward's demands for a judgement in order to gain his help
- the Scottish guardians tried to refute Edward's demands for overlordship, claiming not to know of his right to such control and then stating that they did not have the authority to make such a decision for their kingdom
- Edward forced the guardians to resign their authority once he became overlord. He reappointed them under his guardianship, but they lacked independence or power
- Edward had 104 auditors to help determine the outcome of the Great Cause. However, he only appointed 24 of those men. Balliol and Bruce each appointed 40, meaning their supporters from the Scottish political community advised the English king on his decision.

**Historians****Perspective on the issue****ADM Barrell**

Takes the view that the guardians realised a marriage between Margaret and the English prince would persuade the English king to support the Scottish rulers and help ensure strong government.

**Ranald Nicholson**

Takes the view that the proposed marriage alliance with England would have worried some, especially the church who feared attempts to extend English influence over them.

**Alan Young**

Takes the view that the Treaty of Birgham shows that Scottish nationalism was clearly and fully articulated well before war or the 1320 Declaration of Arbroath.

**Wendy Stevenson**

Takes the view that the terms of the Treaty of Birgham show that the Scots did not trust Edward I, especially after his conquest and treatment of Wales even though they sought his help in their difficult situation.

## Question 15

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>                     |
|---|--|
| . . . need to destroy the power centres of his Scottish opponents – the Comyns.   | Suggests Robert needed to secure his authority against his Comyn enemies by more than just capturing and destroying their castles.               |
| Castles were subjected to ruthless destruction in the north of Scotland, many on the coast of the Moray Firth, including Inverness castle . . .   | Suggests some of the tactics Robert used, including destroying castles along an entire stretch of northern Scotland.                             |
| . . . Bruce actively making use of a castle rather than destroying it. Following his victory over the forces of John of Lorn, the castle of Dunstaffnage was taken by Bruce. A castellan [castle governor] was appointed and the castle supplied with men and food. In this singular case Bruce clearly intended that Dunstaffnage would control the surrounding countryside and seaways. | Suggests that Robert occasionally left castles intact when he felt he could use them to his benefit as he expanded his control over the kingdom. |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Robert was unable to hold castles he captured as he had insufficient troops to leave a garrison at each castle
- Robert moved across the country from south-west to north-east, taking and destroying castles as he went
- Robert was able to rely on his key lieutenants, including his brother Edward and James Douglas to secure and expand his authority in one area while he travelled elsewhere
- the death of John Comyn left Robert's opponents leaderless, enabling Robert to pick them off one at a time, rather than having to face a united opposition.

| Point in Source C  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>  |
|--|---|
| They returned on Christmas Day 1307 and obtained a truce, after which Bruce stayed for eight days . . .  | Suggests Robert was willing to make truces, even temporarily, with his enemies to allow him to make his plans and prepare for future battles.                                   |
| . . . King Robert heard this, he rose from his bed, to which his illness had confined him. Though he could not sit upright without two men supporting him, he hastened to do battle with his enemies. As soon as Comyn and Moubay saw him, they turned and fled. | Suggests Robert was prepared to fight for his kingdom even when ill, and this gave him a formidable reputation which could terrify his opponents before he even began fighting. |
| . . . Bruce burned the earldom of Buchan, laying waste to the complete area.   | Suggests Robert was prepared to destroy entire areas to destroy his enemies (herschip of Buchan).   |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Robert brought several former enemies into his peace, such as the earl of Ross
- Robert often used surprise attacks against his enemies
- Robert was able to go on from Buchan and Inverurie to capture Aberdeen and gain control over most of the north.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- Robert turned his back on traditional warfare and pitched battles after Methven. Guerilla tactics involved swift attacks, that were small scale and always under the Scots control
- Robert fought on ground he knew and could prepare in advance, preferring ambushes
- Robert used existing elements of the landscape including bogs, hills and lochs, but could augment these with pots
- Robert used the support from some key churchmen to expand his support and authority. Some provided military aid, others preached for him
- Robert exploited Highland rivalries to gain support, especially from the western Highlands and Islands
- Robert was prepared to reward supporters, particularly with the redistribution of land
- Robert benefited from the death of Edward I in 1307, particularly as Edward II did not provide much support for his followers in Scotland
- Robert controlled north of the Forth and Galloway, but there was much work to be done across the area south of the Forth to secure control.

| Historians      | Perspective on the issue   |
|-----------------|--|
| Alexander Grant | Takes the view that Robert's enemies in the north were too separated and had no earl to organise resistance to Robert.   |
| Alan Young      | Takes the view that the destruction of the Comyn powerbase in the north was vital, without which Robert's kingship over Scotland could not have become a reality.  |
| Colm McNamee    | Takes the view that Robert had four main elements of rules for war: slight castles, blackmail, destroy enemy lands and retreat to favourable ground.   |
| Peter Traquair  | Takes the view that recapturing Aberdeen was vital as all other eastern ports were controlled by the English. Aberdeen had Flemish connections and enabled Robert to open a supply line into the continental arms trade. |

## Question 16

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source D  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given               |
|--|---|
| Acts survive demonstrating Robert's even-handed lordship to members of the other estates including confirming the constabulary town of Haddington in all its burghal [town's] privileges.                        | Robert tried to re-establish good government confirming privileges vital for the economy.   |
| . . . heightened sense of insecurity and potential division, which is underlined by the enactment of a statute which forbade conspiracies and rumours which could cause discord between the king and his people. | Robert tried to legislate against his people conspiring against him or even spreading rumours against him as king.                  |
| . . . its timing suggests that Robert I and his close advisors were already aware of collusion against his rule by former Scottish opponents who had entered the Bruce peace between 1312 and 1315.              | Robert and his governing council were aware that not everyone who had pledged loyalty were convinced of the legitimacy of his rule. |

### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the death of Edward Bruce in 1318 contributed to the unsettled atmosphere in Scotland across this period to the conspiracy
- Edward Balliol had returned to England, contributing to the mood of uncertainty in Scotland and contributing to the timing of the conspiracy and Robert's reaction to it
- some were involved in rumours and revolts out of jealousy over how well men like Douglas and Randolph were doing under Robert
- Edward Balliol offered an adult male rule. After 1318, Robert would be succeeded by a minor which could be unsettling.

### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Robert's government issued two series of documents – the Declaration of the Clergy (1309) and the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) to justify his kingship internationally, to France and the Papacy
- Robert claimed to have authority from popular consent as well as divine backing
- Arbroath established the concept that a king could be replaced if he failed to properly defend the kingdom
- Robert's government issued the tailzie of 1315 establishing his brother Edward as his heir as an experienced adult male would have been preferable as leader in such uncertain times rather than Robert's daughter, Margaret
- a second tailzie was issued in 1318 after Robert's brother and daughter had both died. Although his young grandson was to be his heir, provisions were established for a clear guardianship to avoid the problems of 1286
- Robert used his parliament in 1313 to issue an ultimatum to his political community to accept his kingship or lose their Scottish estates and titles. Cross-border land holdings would no longer be accepted
- Robert used his parliament at Cambuskenneth to disinherit those who would not accept him as king of Scots
- Robert was prepared to doctor accounts to suggest his meetings and parliaments had more support than existed at the time
- Robert redistributed lands, especially after Bannockburn and the Disinherited, rewarding his supporters. Randolph, Douglas and Edward Bruce benefited most
- even those who transferred allegiance post-Bannockburn were rewarded, e.g. Adam Gordon in the borders received lands in the north-east
- Robert used the 'Black Parliament' of 1320 to try conspirators reducing opposition to his kingship.



| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-----------------------|--|
| <b>Fiona Watson</b>   | Takes the view that Bruce was always insecure about his lack of legitimacy as king.  |
| <b>Michael Brown</b>  | Takes the view that some had given allegiance to Bruce only as a matter of necessity, their acceptance of him rested on shallow roots. |
| <b>Michael Penman</b> | Takes the view that Robert's parliaments' greatest concern was the proclamation of Robert I's legitimacy as king.                      |
| <b>Roland Tanner</b>  | Takes the view that Bruce resorted to coercion and seal abuse in the two Declarations to expand the image of support he provided.      |

**PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES**

**Question 17**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which supports the view that the golden age of tobacco was based on the tobacco lords' lawful business methods:**

- the Glasgow tobacco barons were renowned for pioneering and investing in efficient business methods. E.g., the development of naval architecture – pioneering hull design enabled transatlantic vessels to navigate the shallow coastal waters of Chesapeake
- employment of experienced ship's captains reduced voyage time and freight cost which often enabled two round trips a year, a feat rarely achieved from other British ports
- faster passages enabled the quicker return of investors' money and thus encouraged further investment
- 1762 – first dry dock opened in Glasgow, enabling ships to be careened, resulting in quicker, cheaper repair and ultimately more ships being seaworthy at any one time
- the store system allowed lower purchase prices and faster turnaround times, while increased ownership rather than chartering of ships reduced costs further
- improved port facilities allowed merchants to abandon satellite ports of Greenock and Port Glasgow by the 1750s as over 200 wharves and jetties were able to support ocean-going ships
- effective consolidation of relationships with Scots-American emigrants who were often pivotal figures in the plantation economies of Virginia and Maryland
- established firms increasingly owned rather than chartered ships, resulting in lowered costs. By 1775 over 90% of the Clyde's tobacco fleet were 'company ships'
- Glasgow merchants were able to draw credit from newly established banks. They also invested profits into high yielding bonded loans, providing further capital for investment.

**Evidence which supports the view that the golden age of tobacco was not based on the tobacco lords' lawful business methods:**

**Unlawful business methods:**

- illicit methods which pre-dated the Union included smuggling and fraud on a huge scale enabling Glasgow firms to accumulate capital quicker than their rivals, thus allowing investment in infrastructure and innovation
- under-weighting incoming cargoes by custom officers resulted in Scottish merchants paying duty on as little as 2/3rds of the tobacco imported in the 20 years following the Treaty of Union
- however – protests from rival ports and government concern resulted in new legislation (1723 and 1751) and the reform of the customs authority resulting in a sharp decline in fraudulent practice.

**Treaty of Union:**

- The Union guaranteed free trade to the colonies and the English home markets, providing a context within which the growth of the industry was possible
- continuation of illicit practices tolerated partly because Scotland was now within the Union
- benign British rulers would've been unlikely to have afforded such an attitude to foreign competitors
- Scottish ships now sailed under the protection of the Royal Navy's cruisers.

**Geography:**

- the position of Glasgow was advantageous to harness the prevailing trade winds enabling shorter, cheaper voyages in comparison to British and European rivals
- during the War of Jenkin's Ear, the passage around the north of Ireland was significantly safer than more southern routes, advantaging Glasgow
- Glasgow's location gave fortuitous access to Atlantic trade, enabling shorter sea crossings and resultantly lower freight costs across the Atlantic
- however, Glasgow's location was further from European markets where 90% of all tobacco was re-exported.

| Historians          | Perspective on the issue  |
|---------------------|---|
| Stana Nenadic       | States the importance of the legal business practices, innovations and willingness to take risks which contributed to the success of the tobacco trade and the unprecedented wealth of the Glasgow tobacco lords.   |
| Michael Lynch       | Argues that the illegal methods were instrumental to the success of the industry, particularly in the early 18 <sup>th</sup> century. ‘The tobacco trade until the mid-1720’s grew not through the new opportunities offered by free trade but through the long-honed skills of Scottish merchants of carrying on an illicit trade evading customs regulation. The enterprising Scot in the 1707 generation was often the smuggler or black marketeer’. |
| Tom Devine          | Suggests that while the Union was important in providing a context where growth of the tobacco trade was possible and smuggling played a role, it was business methods which were pivotal – ‘The Union did not cause growth in the Atlantic trades; it simply provided a context in which growth might or might not take place . . . the golden age of the tobacco trade was based on efficient business practice rather than clandestine smuggling’.   |
| Christopher Whatley | Emphasises the opportunities which were afforded by the Union which provided a context in which spectacular success was possible.   |

## Question 18

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that it was the lack of domestic support which ensured the failure of the Jacobite rising of 1745–1746:**

- the 1745 rising required enough popular support to create an army large enough to mount a serious challenge to the Hanoverian machine. The Jacobite army peaked at around eight thousand men, small by contemporary European standards and dwarfed by the Hanoverian army, particularly once the Duke of Cumberland's army returned from the continent
- Charles's strategy in terms of recruitment was based on an assumption that his loyal subjects would join his army in significant numbers. However, support for the rising was regionalised within Scotland and even within the Highlands. Sparsely supported throughout the lowlands the Jacobites met outright hostility in Glasgow and the surrounding industrialising Clyde valley
- Charles's most trusted advisors, famously including Sir Thomas Sheridan, continually lamented the lack of troops at their disposal
- in sharp contrast to the '15 many important clan chiefs including Macdonald of Sleat and Macleod of Dunvegan refused to support the rising. Mitchison notes that support in the 'sincerely Jacobite' north-east lowlands was patchy
- desertion significantly weakened the Jacobite force throughout the rebellion. It's noteworthy that this was already an issue as early as the capture of Edinburgh, when the Prince's currency was at its peak. At Culloden food, and critically money, were running short – Charles' army was underfed, underpaid and haemorrhaging manpower. The calamitous night raid led to further desertions on the eve of battle
- despite victory at Prestonpans, in truth Charles' army was too small to make a 'fortress Scotland' strategy viable. It lacked the numbers to establish a secure hold on Scotland. Counter-revolution occurred across the country – Edinburgh reverted to Hanoverian control once the Jacobite army advanced into England
- partly due to the speed with which the Highland army marched, partly through indifference to the cause and partly as a result of an increased Hanoverian control of the populace than was possible in the Scottish Highlands, the lack of support in England as a whole was almost total. English Jacobites volunteers totalled barely more than a few hundred men who formed the Manchester regiment. The prime motivation for the invasion of England was to rally the English Jacobites which simply did not occur.

**Evidence which supports the view that it was not the lack of domestic support which ensured the failure of the Jacobite's rising of 1745–1746:**

**European support:**

- French supplies and money were landed in the seaports of Aberdeenshire, but French assurances of support remained ambiguous throughout the campaign
- around 600 Scots and Irish troops in the French service also landed but there was no French invasion of England, despite Charles's promises
- in contrast, the Hanoverian army was reinforced by their European allies – Dutch, Swiss and German soldiers were also under the command of the Duke of Cumberland.

**Hanoverian response:**

- initially the British government was taken by surprise and as demonstrated by Prestonpans was in a state of unpreparedness, however Cumberland landed with 6,000 battle hardened troops from the continent
- they were better fed and equipped than the Jacobites, and benefited from new drills and effective artillery as was demonstrated at Culloden
- at Culloden Cumberland commanded in excess of 10,000 well trained men
- the Royal Navy's role was pivotal. The blockade largely cut off further French aid, whilst also keeping government forces well supplied
- effective Hanoverian propaganda successfully depicted the Jacobite threat as a wild Highland mob led by a Catholic tyrant.

**Poor leadership of the Jacobites:**

- various strategic decisions turned out badly; the march into England; the withdrawal to Inverness
- the decision to hold Carlisle was never going to work. The attempt to capture Stirling Castle was a costly failure
- the early successes gave Charles over-optimistic ideas about the extent of loyalty to 'divine right', and of the power of the Highland Charge
- Charles' poor management led to damaging quarrels between Scots and Irish, and the marginalisation of Lord George Murray.

| Historians         | Perspective on the issue  |
|--------------------|---|
| Tom Devine         | Emphasises the lack of support for Charles's cause rather than the specific events at Culloden. 'Scottish backing during the rising was remarkably thin on the ground long before the crushing defeat of Culloden; it was this together with the virtual disappearance of support in England rather than force of arms in itself which ultimately ended the last hopes of restoration'. |
| Murray Pittock     | Concludes that the absence of French support was critical in causing the failure of the rising, arguing that France's decision at the beginning of February 1746 to abandon the planned invasion was of such significance that it was 'the first occasion on which it became clear the Jacobites must lose'.  |
| Rosalind Mitchison | Argues that the strength and scale of the Hanoverian response was key to the defeat of the rising, noting that on the eve of the battle of Culloden an exhausted Jacobite force faced 'a force half as large again, of disciplined men, cheered by their long advance, backed by artillery and trained against the Highland charge'.  |
| Alan Macquarrie    | Also suggests that the failure of the French to launch an invasion ensured the rising would fail – 'the French were unwilling to commit troops to what in effect amounted to a sideshow'.   |

## Question 19

Candidates might refer to:

### **Evidence which supports the view that Scotland was an urbanised nation by 1815:**

- growth in the population of towns considerably outstripped that of the countryside throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In 1750 – 9% of the population lived in towns – by 1800 this figure had doubled, by which time nearly 1 in 4 Scots lived and worked in towns or cities
- these developments resulted in new middle class urban communities; provide a contrasting model of urban development from that associated with industrialisation and the arrival of workers from the countryside
- the administrative, judicial, religious and economic role of towns and especially cities was reinforced and redefined, partly as a result of the emergence of town planning. The most significant buildings in the country such as the High Court and Universities continued to be an exclusively urban phenomenon. New public buildings and open spaces emerged, such as Glasgow's Chamber of Commerce and George Square
- Scotland's rapid rate of economic growth in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century at least partly due to the increased urbanisation and resultant greater concentration of consumers and producers due enlarged pools of labour and external economies such as reduced transport costs
- Edinburgh's New Town was imbued with political significance, its street names confirming the new Whig Scotland's loyalty to the House of Hanover. An extremely expensive development, an unintentional consequence was to concentrate many of Scotland's gentry into an urban environment as their second residence. It also redefined class divisions, as the urban poor remained in the old town. Notably the old town continued to be as densely populated as any city in western Europe
- spectacular expansion of existing areas of Glasgow and establishment on entirely new areas – most notably Glasgow's Merchant City and the west end
- Glasgow's western district consisted of thirteen new streets and squares. Perth and Aberdeen had analogous, smaller scale developments
- historic burghs retained their civil and political importance whilst continuing to expand at unprecedented rates during the last three decades of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Analogously ancient towns such as Alloa transformed into commercial hubs as early labour-intensive industry created an acute demand for urban-based workers.

### **Evidence which supports the view that Scotland was not an urbanised nation by 1815:**

- every rural region of Scotland registered population growth during the late 18<sup>th</sup> century
- although the urban population was growing faster than that of the countryside, the rural population remained a far larger proportion of the total Scottish population at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century
- the agricultural revolution transformed the rural economy. Increased production and productivity and the re-organisation of agricultural practice significantly increased output. Devine estimates that vegetable production doubled while animal production increased six-fold between 1750 and 1820
- urban expansion was confined to the central belt and the north-east. Aside from Inverness, complete absence of significant urban development in the Highlands. In the south-west and the borders the growth of towns was less spectacular
- substantial increases in food production provided the foundation for both industrialisation and urbanisation
- rural hinterlands became steadily more prosperous, resulting in increased incomes of tenant farmers and landlords
- vast majority of the population employed in agriculture or rural based industry
- many major industries including pig iron manufacture and coal mining were often located in villages. The establishment of early forms of industrial production were typically rural – New Lanark is arguably the most notable of many examples which also include the Carron Ironworks
- the industrial workforce was by no means an exclusively urban phenomenon – in 1800 two thirds of Scottish weavers continued to live in villages and small towns.

| Historians        | Perspective on the issue  |
|-------------------|---|
| Tom Devine        | Emphasises the extent and rapidity of urbanisation in the latter 18 <sup>th</sup> century. 'Town expansion in Scotland . . . was altogether more abrupt and swift. The towns were no longer adjuncts to an overwhelmingly rural social order, but had become the dynamic centres of economic change'.   |
| Christopher Smout | Concludes that urbanisation impacted on a minority of the Scottish population by the end of the 18 <sup>th</sup> century – 'even by 1830 a great many more people lived in a rural environment, as they always had done, than in a town . . . as late as 1820 seven Scots out of ten still lived in rural communities: the farm and the village were still not replaced as the typical social environment in which a man spent his life'. |
| Ian Whyte         | Suggests Scotland remained dominated by rural habitation by the end of the 18 <sup>th</sup> century despite encroaching urbanisation. 'Although still an overwhelmingly rural country, Scotland had by 1760 one of the fastest growing urban populations in Europe'.  |
| Stana Nenadic     | Notes that such was the rapidity and scale of urbanisation that tensions were created between different classes, as witnessed by riots and protests between the inhabitants of Edinburgh's New and Old Towns.   |

## Question 20

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that Henry Home, Lord Kames, deserves to be considered the most significant contributor to Scotland's agricultural revolution:**

**Henry Home, Lord Kames:**

- prolific agricultural author and publicist Henry Home, Lord Kames, wrote extensively on the importance of the practical application of science in agriculture, most famously in his publication of the influential 'Gentleman Farmer' (1776) and 'The Progress of Flax-Husbandry in Scotland' (1776)
- Lord Kames held numerous influential positions including being a committee member for both the Board of Trustees for Fisheries, Manufactures and Improvements in Scotland and the Forfeited Annexed Estates
- Lord Kames' political economy of husbandry combined theoretical pronouncement with practical application on a huge scale allowing him influence a generation of gentlemen farmers that led Scotland's agricultural Enlightenment
- provided capital for ambitious rural transport improvements including road improvements, bridges and the cutting of canals
- gained fame for the scale of his improvements on his Blair Drummond estate which included the drainage and cultivation of 330 acres of marsh, described by a contemporary as 'the most singular and considerable improvement in Scotland'
- a regular visitor to England he embraced improvements originating there, importing and applying a wide range of pioneering husbandry techniques
- influence upon contemporaries summed up by Adam Smith; 'We must every one of us acknowledge Kames for our master'. Progressed the careers of Enlightenment figures beyond the confines of agricultural improvement including Adam Smith, Thomas Reid and John Millar, David Hume and John Home.

**Evidence which supports the view that Henry Homes, Lord Kames does not deserve to be considered the most significant contributor to Scotland's agricultural revolution:**

**Sir John Sinclair:**

- evangelical improver and influential member of the Highland Agricultural Society
- relatively late Improver – inherited huge holdings in Caithness in 1770
- instrumental in establishing the Board of Agriculture in 1793
- prolific agricultural writer, including specific volumes addressing the challenges of Improvement within the northern counties of Scotland. Also compiled the Statistical Account of Scotland
- established model villages at Thurso (1793) and Halkirk (1800) through which he sought to link agricultural and industrial production.

**Sir Archibald Grant of Monymusk:**

- an early and influential Improver who pioneered enclosure, the granting of long term written leases and the commutation of rents in kind to cash value from 1716 onwards
- transformed his Aberdeenshire estate by enclosing, dyke construction and drainage
- evangelically adopted soil improvement and fertilisation using clover, sown grasses and turnip using increasingly complex rotations
- responsible for afforestation on a colossal scale, planting 5,000,000 trees, motivated by the insatiable demand of Britain's shipyards
- gained a reputation for paternalism and a generosity, as attested to by the testimony of John Wesley who praised the social conditions of Grant's tenants.



**John Cockburn of Ormiston:**

- an early Improver who amalgamated small holdings into larger farmsteads from 1714 onwards, John Cockburn became known as 'The Father of Scottish Agriculture'
- granted longer term leases to incentivise new forms of husbandry
- enforced the abolition of infield-outfield rotation incorporating root crops and grasses and improved large areas through full scale enclosure and subsoil drainage resulting in the cultivation of previously unworkable land
- pioneered the model village at Ormiston which featured flax processing and linen production
- over capitalised his investments to the point of bankruptcy.

| Historians         | Perspective on the issue   |
|--------------------|--|
| Ian Simpson        | Provides the traditional interpretation of Lord Kames' importance describing him as 'the leading figure and early practitioner of agricultural improvement'.         |
| Ian Donnachie      | Suggests Sir Archibald Grant of Monymusk emerged as an Improver of considerable influence 'he was an energetic and persuasive advocate of agricultural improvement'. |
| Rosalind Mitchison | Underlines the contribution of Sir John Sinclair whom she argues was a 'prominent MP, landowner, politician and propagandist of Improvement.                         |
| David Allan        | Champions the contribution of Archibald Grant of Monymusk whom he argues 'will always be the most memorable'.  |

## Question 21

Candidates might refer to:

### **Evidence which supports the view that Scottish universities could claim to be modernised institutions of excellence by 1815:**

- Scottish universities developed into international centres of learning, educating students irrespective of religion students from across Europe
- many of the great minds of the Enlightenment were educated at Scottish universities – for example, Adam Smith and David Hume. Many gained international standing whilst holding teaching positions at Scottish universities
- individual universities gained international recognition in specific fields of excellence. Aberdeen gained prominence in the fields of moral philosophy and political economy while Edinburgh's medical faculty, established in 1726 as the first faculty of medicine in Britain, became the pre-eminent place to study anatomy in Europe
- at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century Scots studied medicine in Europe yet by the end of the century Scottish doctors attended royalty and nobility throughout Europe
- Latin, often taught at parish schools, was the usual entrance requirement. Fees were affordable for many. Glasgow University's fees were approximately a tenth of those charged at Oxford and Cambridge
- unlike Oxford and Cambridge, Scotland's universities did not accept only Anglicans. Egalitarian nature of Scottish Universities in comparison to those in England and Europe. Access was fundamental to the Scottish universities irrespective of religion. Dissenters and Catholics were welcomed at a time when Oxford and Cambridge excluded them
- due to increased literacy rates Scottish universities provided a dual role as centres of both academic study and popular education
- new Professorships were gradually created in faculties such as history, philosophy, law and medicine, enabling the parallel development of both science and the humanities
- 1708 – system of specialised professors replaced regenting at Edinburgh University. Thus, lecturers no longer taught students the entire curriculum. By the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century lectures were increasingly delivered in English rather than Latin.

### **Evidence which supports the view that Scottish universities could not claim to be modernised institutions of excellence by 1815:**

- Scottish universities were ancient institutions whose curriculum had been dominated by Calvinist doctrine. 18<sup>th</sup> century boards of regents remained divided between enlightened reformers and Presbyterian hardliners
- religious tests, which had famously denied David Hume a Chair at Edinburgh, continued to be rigidly applied for professorial appointments
- bursaries remained very limited, and although fees were lower than in England, they remained too expensive for the majority to afford. Women were excluded from Scottish universities throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century
- although cheaper than in England, fees remained sufficiently high to ensure upper and middle rather than working class students were in the majority. Typically, students were the sons of merchants and skilled tradesmen rather than the genuinely poor
- Smout estimates that the proportion of the Scottish population who attended Scotland's universities at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was around four thousand, less than 1 in five hundred of the total population
- examples of notable Scots of modest backgrounds including Thomas Telford, Hugh Millar, Robert Burns and Alexander Somerville who achieved their success without the benefit of a university education
- despite gradual curricular change, divinity remained at the heart of Scottish universities. The evolution of newer disciplines was gradual, and the width and depth of curricular reform was not uniform across the four institutions
- curricular reform was deemed insufficient by some contemporaries – as exemplified by the establishment of Anderson's Institution in 1796 which was committed to teaching practical subjects applicable to commerce, industry and applied science.

| <b>Historians</b>        | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|--------------------------|--|
| <b>John Mackie</b>       | Reminds us that the tradition of students from modest means pre-dated the 18 <sup>th</sup> century. 'Nor was university barred against the poor man's son. At the beginning of November, when he had finished helping his father with the harvest, the poor student came up to college . . . until the end of the session in April when he left his books and returned to the plough'.   |
| <b>Christopher Smout</b> | Scrutinises the legitimacy of the 'lad o' pairts' tradition, questioning the ability of any but the better off to attend. 'The plain fact of the matter was that throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Scottish universities were well outside the pocket of the majority of the Scottish people. . . universities were largely the preserves of the middle class and effectively closed to the children of labourers'. |
| <b>Tom Devine</b>        | Underlines the growing academic credentials of Scotland's universities and their influence on the Enlightenment. 'the Scottish universities would be at the heart of the enlightenment, with many of the leading thinkers drawn from the professoriate'.   |
| <b>Michael Lynch</b>     | Analogously emphasises the increased stature of Scottish universities and the widening of the curriculum. 'There was a broad-based advance amongst Scottish universities, and especially in Edinburgh and Aberdeen, in the study of mathematics, law and some of the physical sciences'.   |

## Section 3 – Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 22

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Candidates might refer to:

| Point in Source A   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>  |
|---|---|
| . . . success, however, depended on French support. This was rendered impossible by the death of Louis XIV on 1 September 1715, as France's ability to intervene was weakened by the minority succession of a young King Louis XV which followed his great grandfather's death. | Suggests that French support would have been vital, but the ability of France to assist was restricted as a result of the changed leadership of the country.                    |
| Militarily, George I's administration made short shrift of the English Jacobites who formed part of the 1715 rising. On 13 November the government entirely defeated the English rebels at Preston in Lancashire.   | Indicates that the defeat of the English Jacobites isolated the Scottish Jacobites, leaving them as the sole fighting force against the Hanoverians.                            |
| . . . James Francis Stuart, did nothing for two months, hoping for news that never came that a further rebellion had broken out in southern England. His hesitation was critical, when he finally landed in Scotland on 22 December all further hope had been lost.             | Implies that James's tendency to procrastinate was an important aspect of his flawed leadership as his inaction resulted in a loss of momentum, fatally undermining the rising. |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the regency of the duc d'Orleans ensured French neutrality as he had a vested interest in preserving the Utrecht settlement which guaranteed his family's succession
- defeat at Preston signalled the end of a hoped-for British rising. This was significant, as was the extent to which Scottish assistance under William Mackintosh of Borlum's Highland contingent and the Earl of Carnwath's lowlanders was required to form the 'English' rising
- James leadership was lacking throughout the rising. Unaware of Mar's declaration at its outset, his late arrival and premature departure left a significant legacy which effectively ended his credibility as the military leader of the Jacobite cause.

| Point in Source B  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given             |
|--|---|
| . . . yet his tendency to over-officer the Jacobite force was noticeable, resulting in disorganisation . . .   | Argues that the Jacobite army proportionately had too many senior ranks which resulted in an imbalanced, confused fighting force. |
| . . . Mar delayed attempting to advance further from the Jacobite heartlands into Southern Scotland, waiting and waiting.                                      | Puts forward the view that Mar was indecisive.  |
| When at last Mar did commit to battle at Sheriffmuir it was with little effectiveness since he issued no orders and his cavalry became confused and separated. | Contends that Mar's leadership during battle was flawed because he issued no orders.  |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Mar's army was reliant on the support of Scotland's aristocratic families. This required the appointment of numerous magnates and their scions to officer ranks, many of whom had no military experience
- desertion was a problem both immediately before and after the battle of Sheriffmuir – Mar's diary noted 'Highlanders have one unlucky custom, which is they return home'
- Mar's failure to understand the undisciplined nature of a Highland army was underlined when, prior to battle he was unable to command his force to advance uphill in two columns, then reform into ordered battle lines. The failure to complete this simple manoeuvre ceded the higher ground to the Hanoverians.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- though European support was absent, the rising benefited from massive military strength drawn almost exclusively from Scotland, particularly but not exclusively the Highlands and the north-east
- the English Jacobites were particularly badly organised, and their efforts were largely half hearted and therefore provided no assistance to Mar. In the south of England rebellion was limited to Tory gentry gathering for a 'race meeting' which drew to a close without any armed rebellion taking place
- Mar's leadership was ineffective throughout. In addition to squandering a numerical advantage at Sheriffmuir, he was responsible for numerous other questionable decisions including dispatching sections of his army to Argyllshire and an unsuccessful attempt at capturing Edinburgh castle
- James also offered no effective leadership. In France until his cause was effectively lost his most notable acts once in Scotland were the burning of Scottish towns, and the rapidity of his return to France barely two months after his landing
- Argyll's leadership of the Hanoverian force was fairly effective – he advanced his army to Dunblane, placing them on the high ground of Sheriffmuir before Mar could. This left Mar with no alternative but to give battle on the ground of his enemy's choosing or risk the disintegration of his own army.

| <b>Historians</b>         | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|---------------------------|---|
| <b>Daniel Szechi</b>      | Emphasises the importance of continental support – ‘The great Jacobite rebellion of 1715 was an object lesson in the need to make sure such a rising was co-ordinated with unequivocal support from a European great power’.                        |
| <b>Rosalind Mitchison</b> | Underlines the limitations of the rebellion due to its reliance on a Scottish rather than truly British rising – ‘The rest of Britain’s Jacobitism showed itself as half-hearted as well as inefficient. The English force surrendered at Preston’. |
| <b>Tom Devine</b>         | Supports the traditional historiographical interpretation which lays much of the blame for the failure of rebellion on Mar’s leadership – ‘Mar as a general possessed a fatal combination of caution, timidity and ambiguity’.                      |
| <b>Andrew Mackillop</b>   | Suggests that the Hanoverian response was an important factor in the failure of the rising – ‘Mar’s opponent, John Campbell, second Duke of Argyll was an effective and daring soldier’.  |

### Question 23

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views that the candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source C |   | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance   |
|--------------------|---|--|
| <b>Author</b>      | Thomas Pennant, an Oxford graduate, famed naturalist, fellow of the Royal Society, influential writer and Hanoverian. | <p>Pennant gained a considerable reputation as an authority on the Highlands following the publication of his <i>Tour in Scotland</i>. A pioneering work, it became a classic piece of travel writing and paved the way for others including Boswell and Johnson.</p> <p>Pennant's reputation as a naturalist and writer helped his journal become a publishing success. Read widely, it helped challenge the negative stereotypes associated with the Highlands following the Jacobite risings. Pennant very much wrote as part of the establishment within Hanoverian Britain.</p> |
| <b>Purpose</b>     | To offer his view on the nature of highland society as he saw it during his travels.                                  | Although a member of Hanoverian society, Pennant produced a largely factual and fair description of Highland society undergoing considerable change. To offer reassurance to the Hanoverians that change was ensuing and there was no threat of further rebellion.   |
| <b>Timing</b>      | 1771  | Shows the state of the Highlands twenty-five years after Culloden, at a time when the forces of commercialisation and clearance were beginning to affect the region in earnest.  |

| Point in Source C  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance   |
|--|---|
| This may partly be due to the positive impact of the Disarming Act, as result of which the Highlanders' use of weapons and the clan chiefs' ability to assemble clans for war, which were both witnessed during the 1745 rebellion . . .   | The author writes approvingly of the effects of the Disarming Act making the Highlanders less of a threat to peace.   |
| As Highlanders have become less attached to their chiefs they migrate from their traditional lands to parts of the country where employment in new industries gives them much better protection than their chief now can.  | Pennant is praising the highlanders for their new sense of purpose and self-reliance and ability to see the realities of the new world they are living in and getting the best out of it. |
| . . . the trend of raising rents has now reached the Highlands. It is excessive. The clan chiefs squeeze the poor tenants. In much of the Highlands these actions are now showing a clear effect causing depopulation as large numbers of families have been obliged to give up the strong attachment the Highlanders have for their country and to exchange it for America. | Critical in the role of clan chiefs as they increased rents as commercial landlords leading to depopulation, clearance and overseas emigration.   |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the terms of the Disarming Act (1716) were restated by the Act of Proscription (1746). Central to the aim of pacification of the region, Highlanders were prohibited both from carrying arms and wearing traditional dress
- the dispersal of the Highland population and their assimilation into lowland society in the latter 18<sup>th</sup> century was partly due to choices made by individuals on the basis of income and employment opportunities available out with the region in tandem with the declining significance of the chief as the clan's duthchas (father)
- rental increases in the Highlands matched, and in many cases exceeded national rates. Representative were rents in Glengarry which increased 472% between 1768–1802 resulting in the emergence of a new commercial class of tenantry unconnected to the chief by clan allegiance.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- key to the impact of the Act of Proscription in terms of the pacification was the rigor with which it was enforced. Arrests were widespread particularly in the decade following the '45. Punishments included significant fines, imprisonment, forced conscription and transportation
- not all government intervention was focused upon pacification, e.g. the foundation of Ullapool in 1788 as a herring port by the British Fisheries Society
- proto-industrialisation, well underway by 1771 in the lowlands, was almost entirely absent in the Highlands. The disparity in incomes between the Highlands and the rest of Scotland was already pronounced, as evidenced by publications including the First Statistical Account and Johnson's journal
- Government intervention, the decline in clan values and clearance were important causes of social change in the Highlands. In terms of depopulation, some highlanders were forcibly evicted, others were compelled by financial necessity whilst some simply opted to leave.



| Historians          | Perspective on the issue   |
|---------------------|--|
| Tom Devine          | Argues that change in Highland society was a long-term trend accelerated by government intervention ‘Culloden and the aftermath . . . should be seen against an ongoing process of decline in clan values which had already developed deep roots before the 1740’s’. |
| Allan Macinnes      | Suggests that government legislation and its vigorous enforcement by Hanoverian troops following Culloden was pivotal in destroying traditional Highland society, the worst excesses of which he compares to ‘state sponsored terrorism’.                            |
| Christopher Whatley | Warns against generalisations, noting that there was some industrial based employment in the Highlands in the latter part of the 18 <sup>th</sup> century – ‘Argyll saw the development of fishing, tobacco spinning and various textile related operations’.        |
| John Prebble        | Emphasises the role of clan chiefs as being culpable for the forced clearance of Highlanders, arguing they were responsible for ‘a century of evictions, burnings and exile’.  |

## Question 24

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source D  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given                                |
|--|--|
| He was able to influence the greatest in the land through tactical alliances, thus expanding his control of elections.   | Suggests Dundas increased his control of elections by making deals with Scottish magnates, exchanging income for loyalty.                            |
| Faced with opposition from an MP he thought he could crush, his normal technique was to deprive the MP of the most minimal patronage, without which the unfortunate man lost income and standing in his constituency.  | Indicates Dundas was prepared to deny remuneration, employment opportunities and social standing to compel individual MPs to agree to his authority. |
| In 1793 the office of President of the Board of Control was created for Dundas. He might just as well have been called Secretary of State for India. His enormous influence enabled him to export his countrymen in large numbers to India in exchange for their allegiance. Indian patronage was very important indeed in binding together Dundas's political empire. | Implies Dundas' ability to award Indian patronage in exchange for faithfulness was vital in increasing his control over notable Scots.               |

### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- numerous examples of Dundas's ability to identify Scottish magnates who held political power over their constituency yet were also relatively impoverished. Famously Dundas gained control over the whole of Aberdeenshire through an alliance with the Duke of Gordon using this technique
- Dundas was famed for his preparedness to use tactics which were designed to intimidate MPs into forced allegiance. As a result of sustained 'trash talking', MPs became isolated and were compelled to surrender their loyalty
- Dundas's positions within the Dutch East India Company gave him unrestricted access to patronage opportunities in the British Empire to Scottish politicians and their families on a scale far beyond those available within Scotland.

### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- many middling and lesser magnates were denied the vote, as it was often feudal superiors rather than landowners who were enfranchised. In 1788 the 30 county MPs were elected by 2662 voters. Thus, Dundas had relatively few interest groups to establish relationships with
- burgh electorates were confined to a similarly small electorate – Edinburgh's electorate numbered 33. Again, burgh elections were characterised by widespread corruption
- candidates may comment upon the endemic corruption within Scottish politics, such as the creation of 'parchment barons' which lent itself to 'management', the technique of sourcing and distributing patronage, as used by the Earl of Islay prior to the ascendancy of Dundas
- e.g., the splitting of superiorities by landowners creating 'faggot' votes and pocket counties which they controlled, e.g., Sutherland, Buccleuch and Argyll
- Dundas secured further power through his close relationship with Pitt the Younger. This relationship greatly increased his power of patronage still further. By 1800 Scotland had obtained more than a quarter of all state pensions and a third of government sinecures whilst accounting for only a sixth of England's population
- this success ultimately caused a backlash in England against the volume of patronage enjoyed by 'greedy Scots', particularly those employed in lucrative positions in India.

| Historians    | Perspective on the issue   |
|---------------|--|
| Michael Fry   | Challenges the established view that Henry Dundas was corrupt and authoritarian, arguing instead that he achieved effective government within accepted political conventions of the age.   |
| John Prebble  | Suggests Dundas was able to secure favour amongst not only the aristocracy but also the emerging middle classes, gaining 'the unqualified support of most of the landed gentry and middle classes, and were well served by agents and informers'.  |
| Michael Lynch | Argues Dundas' reputation as the supreme manipulator of patronage in a corrupt electoral system is an oversimplification. Appointments lubricated the politics but were not guaranteed. He was the patronage broker for jobs in the church, universities, and government both in Scotland and the wider Empire.  |
| Tom Devine    | Maintains that much of Dundas' success was built upon the development of previously established and accepted practices used by such 18 <sup>th</sup> century luminaries as Sir Robert Walpole and the Earl of Islay 'in honing the techniques of political management he was able to comfortably control most of the Scottish electoral system in his interest'. |

## Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850–1865

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 25

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that there were successes and influence of the abolitionist movement:**

- influence of William Lloyd Garrison and ‘The Liberator’
- Frederick Douglass’ rise to prominence after escaping from slavery and becoming one the leading abolitionists of the period. Douglass travelled to Britain to spread the word of abolitionism
- support for Liberty Laws of some Northern states
- impact of the novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin
- emergence of the Republican Party
- support for the case of Dred Scott
- northern reactions to the case of Anthony Burns
- reaction to the attack led by John Brown.

**Evidence which supports the view that there were limitations and problems within the abolitionist movement:**

**Lack of interest:**

- limited appeal of the group in the free states
- complete failure of the movement in the South
- background of Northern hostility towards blacks
- Southern fears.

**Lack of unity:**

- one of several reform movements at the time, e.g., temperance, women’s rights
- several Abolitionist organisations in existence ranging widely in their approach
- aims of the movement were divided – immediate versus gradual approach
- influence of and attitudes towards William Lloyd Garrison and ‘The Liberator’
- ‘The Liberator’s’ circulation did not exceed 3,000, of which 75% were free blacks
- role and influence of Frederick Douglass
- attitude of anti-slavery societies towards blacks.

**Political limitations:**

- ‘Gag rule’ limited the political impact of abolitionism
- lack of political forum to achieve their aims
- 1850 Fugitive Slave Act
- lack of Liberty Laws in some Northern states
- the failure of the Dred Scott Case which ruled against the abolitionist case
- failure to win the support of either Whigs or Democrat Parties
- limited impact of the Liberty Party.

| <b>Historians</b>                         | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|---|---|
| <b>Gilbert Barnes and Dwight Drummond</b> | Take the view that most abolitionists had a simple and straightforward approach. The moral attack, not the violence of Garrison or Brown, convinced a majority of Northerners to join the side of the abolitionists and emancipation came in a violent struggle with the south.                           |
| <b>Nathan Huggins</b>                     | Takes the view that Frederick Douglass was a pragmatist at work. He argued for the need to gain the franchise and the need for economic assistance for the freedman in order for him to secure his future.  |
| <b>Charles Beard</b>                      | Takes the view that saw the role of the Abolitionists as insignificant since, in his view, slavery was not the cause of the conflict between the North and the South.   |
| <b>James Freehling</b>                    | Takes the view that the practical implications of abolitionist strategy made it unworkable. The Federal Government had limited powers, states' rights were seen as sacrosanct, and autonomy was fiercely guarded. As long as slavery was maintained in 15 states, it could not be abolished by amendment. |

## Question 26

### Candidates might refer to:

#### Evidence which supports the view that compromise was impossible:

- in 1860, the Republicans and Lincoln ran on a platform of non-extension of slavery; many in South interpreted this as abolition of slavery. Lincoln was a sectional candidate representing Northern views
- Republican platform was almost entirely focused on Northern issues
- Lincoln only achieved votes in Northern states. His name did not appear on the ballot paper of a single Southern state
- Southern press hostile to all Northern actions e.g., portrayal of Republicans as the party of the black, which would encourage social and racial chaos
- Lincoln portrayed as a direct threat to the social/economic status of the South, and this justified immediate secession if he were to be elected
- the movement for secession had gathered pace before Lincoln had come to power. This made Lincoln's task of appealing to the Southern states incredibly difficult when in office
- Lincoln was however, accused of alleged inactivity between his election and inauguration
- regardless of his views, Lincoln as a Republican would also be linked to pledge to reverse Dred Scott decision
- Lincoln's theme during his debates with Douglas in 1858 was not just slavery's immorality or the danger of it spreading but the continuing danger of a malignant conspiracy against the North. The Southerners could not ignore this following Lincoln's election
- 'House Divided' speech had widened the gap between the sections
- Abolitionists, John Brown and Harpers Ferry. Northern approval meant point of no return, many in South pushed for secession before a Republican administration acted aggressively
- the South Carolina Ordinance consisted of a list of the ways in which the non-slave-holding states had violated the rights of slave-holders
- role of abolitionists and fire eaters in keeping the pot boiling
- the intransigence of Buchanan and Congress, in the period after the 1860 election, who demanded that the incoming Republican administration would have to make all the concessions.

#### Evidence which supports the view that compromise was still possible following Lincoln's election:

- Lincoln did denounce John Brown's raid and offer assurances to the South that he was not an abolitionist
- Lincoln reassured the South that he would not interfere with slavery where it already existed
- Northern Democrats and representatives from the Upper South in particular were hopeful of achieving a compromise
- House Committee of 33 and Senate Committee of 13 were established to explore a potential compromise
- compromise plans were drawn up with Senator John J Crittenden's attracting most attention proposal; permanence of slavery in the states was to be guaranteed; federal compensation to be paid to owners who did not recover their fugitive slaves; Missouri Compromise line was to be re-established (slavery prohibited north of 36 30' and protected south of it) would be discussed as a potential compromise
- support for secession by no means unanimous in the South
- Virginia Peace Convention met in February 1861 was attended by 133 delegates and explored options which would encourage the seceded states to return to the Union.

| <b>Historians</b>       | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|-------------------------|---|
| <b>David Potter</b>     | Takes the view that compromise was impossible from the start.   |
| <b>William Gienapp</b>  | Takes the view that Lincoln was slow to grasp depth of crisis after his election as President in 1860.  |
| <b>Peter Geyl</b>       | Takes the view that Lincoln showed greater wisdom by his appreciation of the inevitable tragic events.  |
| <b>James Macpherson</b> | Takes the view that while President Buchanan set the agenda for possible compromise after the November 1860 election, his message to Congress was inflammatory and made impossible demands of the incoming Republican administration. |

## Question 27

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that the wartime economy faced problems from the outset:**

- the South was overwhelmingly rural and dependant on cotton
- limited industry and urbanisation in the South
- problem of moving from cotton cultivation to food cultivation
- the Confederacy had few gold reserves – most of its wealth was in land and enslaved people
- collecting taxation had been a state power. It was difficult to initiate national taxation given southern traditions. High and direct taxes would have been resented and counter-productive
- unlikely that a fully comprehensive fiscal programme could have been established in 1861/1862.

**Evidence which supports the view that there were other reasons for economic difficulties:**

**Confederate mismanagement:**

- failed to develop an appropriate taxation policy as a means of raising revenue
- loans resulted in massive debt, e.g., Erlanger Loan, January 1863
- the role of Memminger in the Confederate Government as Secretary of the Treasury
- paper money resulted in massive inflation
- attempts to fix prices added to inflation
- confederate bonds had limited success
- informal embargo on cotton exports resulted in stockpiles of cotton, which may have been an invaluable source of income at the start of the war
- failure to supervise the railroads meant supplies often failed to reach troops
- Impressment Act, March 1863 and Taxation-In-Kind-Act, April 1863 were unpopular and caused resentment
- many of the successful initiatives were arguably achieved by private enterprise rather than the Confederate Government, e.g., Tredegar Iron Works, Richmond.

**Union initiatives which created obstacles for the Confederate economy:**

- Union naval blockade prevented the south selling cotton
- Union naval blockade led to shortages of basic commodities
- crucial raw materials were steadily lost to Union forces
- counterfeiting was encouraged by Union forces and contributed to inflation.

### Historians

### Perspective on the issue

**Peter Parish**

Takes the view that the Southern people could not adapt quickly or efficiently enough to the new ways thrust upon them. Despite the upheavals of war, the Confederacy remained a predominantly rural and agricultural society.

**Emory Thomas**

Takes the view that antebellum agrarian inertia proved a formidable obstacle for the South during the Civil War. The transformation of the Southern political economy was a temporary response to the demands of the war.

**David Donald,  
Jean Harvey Baker  
and Michael F Holt**

Take the view that Memminger mismanaged the Treasury Department. He failed to distribute funds efficiently, leaving the army unpaid and without food, clothing and shelter. He failed to raise sufficient revenue for the war effort, forcing the Confederacy into debt. He failed to persuade the Southern people of the importance of making sacrifices for the war effort.

**James McPherson**

Takes the view that Southern wartime taxation exacerbated class tensions and caused growing alienation of the white lower classes from the Confederate cause.



## Question 28

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that Lee's reputation has been exaggerated:**

- Lee's strategic vision was limited. He did not have the overall strategic vision as demonstrated by Grant
- focused excessively on the defence of the Virginian theatre
- neglected the western theatre, therefore the Confederacy lost the west and consequently the war
- Lee took the fight to the North, making costly attacks and losing key military figures
- a guerrilla war has been argued as a more effective war measure
- Lee nicknamed 'Granny Lee' or 'King of Spades' for his defensive earth works
- Lee demonstrated several weaknesses in his command that resulted in disastrous attacks, e.g., Pickett's Charge
- his tactics were dated – he struggled to take advantage of new technologies, e.g., minie-ball rifle
- Lee failed to give clear directions to his subordinates
- feuding in the Confederate Army.

**Evidence which suggests that Lee's reputation is not exaggerated:**

- Lee defended a less well armed and less populated Confederacy from Union attacks for four years despite being outnumbered in every major battle and campaign which he fought, Lee won many crucial victories
- victories boosted Southern morale
- without Lee, the Confederacy would have collapsed earlier
- Lee's offensive strategy almost brought outright Confederate victory
- Lee displayed great ability in a defensive campaign also, e.g., 7 days battle of 1862
- other generals who adopted a total defence strategy were disastrous, e.g., Joe Johnston
- Lee forced many Union commanders to retreat despite their superior numbers, e.g., McClellan from the Potomac or the Wilderness Campaign
- skilled and brave tactician, e.g., splitting his armed forces to great effect at 2nd Manassas
- Lee had excellent relations with both military generals and Confederate political leaders
- Lee's dignified surrender and refusal to blame impressed
- Lee realised that the defence of Virginia, the industrial heartland of the Confederacy was crucial
- Lee made excellent use of economic and geographical resources
- Lee made excellent use of the Confederacy's interior lines of communication.

| Historians                         | Perspective on the issue   |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Grady McWhinney and Perry Jamieson | Take the view that Lee was too attack minded. The confederacy bled itself to death in the first three years of the war by making costly attacks. Confederacy lost 97,000 men compared to 20,000 Union troops in 8 of the first 12 battles. |
| Douglas Southall Freeman           | Takes the view that Lee hesitated to give direct orders to subordinate commanders, preferring to suggest actions rather than to demand them.   |
| James McPherson                    | Takes the view that 'Of all the Confederate commanders, Lee was the only one whose victories had some potential for winning the war'.  |
| James Bevin                        | Takes the view that although Lee did not want to fight a defensive war, he was in fact more gifted in conducting one than he was at fighting offensively.  |

## Question 29

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which might support the view that superiority in resources was most significant:**

- superiority of Union industrial base
- three times the railway capacity
- nine times industrial capacity
- ability to produce superior naval strength; allowing the naval blockade to be imposed
- superior management of military supplies by Stanton, Gideon Welles etc ensured this advantage.

**Evidence which may consider other reasons for victory:**

**Political Leadership:**

- Lincoln's abilities as a war leader
- strength of Northern political system to manage crises
- superior diplomacy on the part of Union politicians
- criticisms of Jefferson Davis.

**Military Leadership:**

- role of Grant and Sherman
- total war strategy
- exploitation of manpower and resources of the Union
- strategy aimed at destroying the South's will to continue the war
- refusal of Grant to retreat after reverses, e.g., Cold Harbour and the Wilderness
- excessive Confederate military focus in the Virginian theatre
- Confederate generals too attack minded.

**Manpower:**

- 22 million Northerners gave them a substantial population advantage over the South who had 9 million of which only 5.5 million white
- 7 million men of fighting age versus 2 million men of fighting age in the South. Eventually the South were forced to use their slave population to balance the sides a little more
- the pockets of unionism that existed within the Confederacy proved an advantage to the North. The area around the Appalachian Mountains was loyal to the Union but in Confederate territory
- West Virginia's split in favour of the Union added to the Northern manpower at the expense of the Confederacy as did the relatively large numbers of slaves that fled to the North during the Civil War.

**Divisions/Difficulties within the Confederacy:**

- weaknesses within the Confederate government
- issues of states' rights
- failure of King Cotton diplomacy to win foreign recognition
- collapse of Confederate morale
- increasing desertion from Confederate armies
- South as being too democratic
- bankrupt treasury
- escaped slaves
- lack of will within Confederate ranks.

| <b>Historians</b>      | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|------------------------|--|
| <b>Richard Current</b> | Takes the view that in assessing the statistics of Northern strength (population, railroad capacity, industrial production, naval supremacy) 'surely in view of the disparity of resources, it would have taken a miracle . . . to enable the South to win. As usual, God was on the side of the heaviest battalions'. |
| <b>Shelby Foote</b>    | Takes the view that 'The North fought the war with one hand behind its back . . . if necessary; the North simply would have brought that other arm from behind its back. I don't think the South ever had a chance to win that war'.   |
| <b>Frank Owsley</b>    | Takes the view that on the tombstone of the Confederacy, the epitaph should read 'Died of States Rights.' The role of Governors Brown of Georgia and Vance of North Carolina in particular should take the blame for fatally crippling Davis and the Confederacy in their attempts to wage war.                        |
| <b>Merton Coulter</b>  | Takes the view that the Confederacy lost because 'its people did not will hard enough and long enough to win'.   |

## Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850 – 1865

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 30

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source A   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given   |
|---|---|
| The most common punishment was whipping, and it was a rare slave who totally escaped the lash. A whipping could be a formal occasion – A public, ritualised display in which the sentence was carried out in front of an assembled throng – or a casual affair in which the ‘unruly’ slave was impulsively chastised. | Argues that there were a range of different punishments for enslaved people, but whipping was the most common.  |
| . . . the despotic power of master over slave inherent in slavery, which was a result of the close contact between master and slave, meant it was simply too easy for whites to react to the innumerable annoyances that slave relations produced by striking out at those in their power.                            | Takes the view that absolute control that was wielded by the owner over enslaved people often resulted in violent outbursts. Slave owners would often strike out at their slaves. |
| . . . most dreaded form of interference in slave life, however, was the forced separation of family members.  | Contends that moving enslaved people away from their families was a common punishment. Enslaved families could be broken through sale.  |

#### Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- enslaved people could be sold, punished, sexually exploited and even killed by their owners
- firm discipline was the norm. Enslaved people considered to be disobedient were flogged or branded
- ‘Sold down the river’ was a significant and real threat to enslaved people. Up to 25% of enslaved family units broken by forced separation.

| Point in Source B  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given              |
|--|--|
| . . . a distinctive slave culture not merely survived but prospered. Music, dance, song and story offer rich evidence of the separate, independent life which slaves lived alongside their other existence of dependence upon their owners which fostered a sense of community amongst the slaves: in their songs and spirituals it was possible to uphold cherished values. | Argues that enslaved people created a unique and thriving culture in a variety of different ways, despite the severity of slavery. |
| Christianity, spiced with elements of the African religious legacy, developed into a distinctive African-American religion . . .   | Contends that a unique blend of Christianity emerged combining with traditional African beliefs.                                   |
| . . . slave prayer meetings which were often held away from the eyes and ears of the whites, and which were quite separate from the ‘official’ religious services provided by the master. This all   | Argues that prayer meetings were held away from white control which helped to sustain a unique slave culture.                      |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| contributed to the survival of a distinct slave culture. |  |
|--|--|

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- spirituals and singing featured heavily in enslaved worship, as did a combination of church and secret worship ceremonies
- enslaved people used spiritual hymns to express anger and sadness, joy and love, resentment and desire for freedom
- through song and story, enslaved people detached themselves from daily life, inspired hope, used their creative energies, depersonalised themselves from their surroundings and fantasised about a better future
- religious services retained African elements such as rhythmic dance, call-and-response songs and fast music; enslaved peoples believed that joyous worship provided a stronger connection with God
- by singing and dancing with the rest of their community, enslaved people felt a part of something out of their masters' control; indeed, they believed God and African folk magic to be more powerful than their masters
- however, in the state of Georgia, e.g., owners attempted to eradicate African customs by forbidding enslaved peoples musical instruments, as they feared they could be used to organise an enslaved people rebellion
- traditional beliefs were prevalent on plantations. Voodoo e.g., combined many different African religions, and the presence of a 'spiritual leader' on most plantations allowed enslaved peoples to access these beliefs freely.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- a unique blend of American and African traditions led to a distinctive subculture, combining traditions from their past and present
- the prevalence of slave folklore hints at the survival of traditional African customs – the oral continuation of myths and legends, usually featuring animals. In the famous tales of Brer Rabbit, small heroes triumph over their larger enemies with cunning and logic, showing the enslaved peoples' fascination with weakness overcoming strength, and their desire for freedom
- there is evidence of the continuing prevalence of African dialect in the English language, particularly in the South
- slave owners often encouraged family units but this varied widely across the south
- enslaved people usually worked longer hours than free Americans
- clothing was issued annually but was not appropriate for the heat of summer and the cold of winter
- by 1850s, few enslaved people were granted freedom
- lack of enslaved people's revolts shows the reality of the situation. Impossible to organise; enslaved people not allowed to meet or to own weapons
- extremely limited potential for successful escape, therefore severe punishment to escapees
- some enslaved people were granted their freedom on the death of their owner
- it has been argued that a paternalistic relationship existed between enslaved people and master
- evidence of health care for enslaved people.

| <b>Historians</b>         | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|---------------------------|---|
| <b>David Blight</b>       | Takes the view that a lack of hard evidence led Fogel and Engelman to speculate and over generalise, e.g., stats related to enslaved people whippings.  |
| <b>Kenneth Stamp</b>      | Takes the view that the cruelty was endemic in all slave-holding communities. Fear among enslaved peoples of being sold on by their master. Enslaved people unhappiness as shown by acts of resistance and sabotage, but not open rebellion. The typical plantation was an area of persistent conflict between master and enslaved people.  |
| <b>John W Blassingame</b> | Examines a view held by some in the 1960s that a communalism born of oppression led to an emphasis on mutual cooperation, camaraderie, humour, respect for elders, and an undisguised zest for life. The enslaved people's culture bolstered his self-esteem, courage, and confidence and served as a defence against personal degradation. |
| <b>Stanley Elkins</b>     | Takes the view that enslaved people were dependent on the mood of an authoritarian master.  |

### Question 31

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source C  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given   |
|--|---|
| . . . leading many northerners to believe that it showed that the South always got what it wanted whatever obstacles were put in its way.  | Northerners had become convinced that all decisions in Federal government favoured the South.   |
| . . . the results of the 1854 mid-term elections revealed the true extent of Northern feeling as the Democratic Party suffered severely, losing control of the House of Representatives.                           | Divisions within the Democrat Party and their campaigns led to a decline in votes for the Democrats in the midterm elections while support for the Republicans increased.                           |
| Those who in the past had voted for the Whig Party, galvanised by their complete opposition to the Democrats, now had the option to give their vote to the various other political movements that emerged in 1854. | The divisions in the Whig Party and the emergence of other political movements in the North, such as the Republicans, gave traditional Whig supporters an alternative option in the 1854 elections. |

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the North perceived the Kansas Nebraska Act as a plot to ensure that the remaining territories become slave states
- Kansas and Nebraska territory opened up to popular sovereignty following repeal of 1820 Missouri Compromise. Potential for slavery in the territory despite the 36 30 agreement
- serious threat to the Union. Part of the slave power conspiracy to allow the South to dominate and spread its slavery. Northern outrage
- Anti-slavery Democrats, Whigs and Free Soilers had already met in Ripon, Wisconsin to propose the formation of a new political party based on opposition to the spread of slavery. The early movement had no leader, no real national organisation and little direction. The name anti-Nebraska was suggested but also Opposition and The People's Party. The Republican Party emerged as a rainbow coalition of differing views across the North.

#### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Emigrant Aid societies established to support the movement of free settlers to the region to impact on the vote in the territories. Bleeding Kansas followed as a result
- Douglas believed the Kansas-Nebraska Act would provide the absolute solution to the issue of slavery in the territories
- the Act was viewed as offering something to both North and South as a means of providing a compromise on the organisation of the territories
- Douglas hoped that the Act would heal the divisions within the Democratic Party and unite them as a national party
- most accepted that Kansas and Nebraska would emerge as free states given their climate and geography
- initially kept Southerners happy through repeal of ban on slavery in Nebraska
- allowing popular sovereignty was a miscalculation as it was open to sectional abuse for voting
- Douglas did admit however that repealing the Missouri Compromise and introducing popular sovereignty may 'cause a hell of a storm'
- in the 1855 Kansas election problems lead to two rival Governments
- nativist concerns in North progressively overshadowed by slavery issue and concerns over Kansas-Nebraska
- 'Bleeding Kansas' re-emphasised slave power conspiracy in North and led to extremists being sanctioned on both sides, e.g. — Lawrence raid and Potawatomie Creek
- other events emerged as a consequence of Kansas Nebraska, e.g., 'Bleeding Sumner', again linked to Slave Power Conspiracy

- 1856 Presidential Election Buchanan (Democrat) for Kansas-Nebraska and Fremont (Republican) against = more North/South split
- the Act became a focus for Lincoln-Douglas debates 1858.

| Historians        | Perspective on the issue  |
|-------------------|---|
| James McPherson   | Takes the view that 'Even more important than the Fugitive Slave issue in arousing Northern militancy was the Kansas-Nebraska Act which was passed by Congress in May 1854. Coming at the same time as the Anthony Burns case, this law may have been the most important single event pushing the nation toward civil war'. |
| Hugh Tulloch      | Takes the view that the Kansas-Nebraska Act erased the stability of Missouri Compromise. The Republican Party, born as a result of the Kansas-Nebraska Act attracted those opposed to Southern determination to maintain slavery.   |
| Alan Farmer       | Takes the view that Douglas did not predict Northern outrage and so weakened his party, damaged own presidential ambitions and revived North-South rivalry.   |
| Brian Holden Reid | Takes the view that slavery was central to the sense of cultural divergence between the North and the South. Rise of sectional northern party dedicated to restriction of slavery signalled an end to a desire for compromise.  |



## Question 32

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D |  | Possible comment on the provenance of the source   |
|--------------------|--|--|
| <b>Author</b>      | Frederick Douglass.                      | Leading abolitionist. Escaped from slavery to the North in 1838 and became a leading and respected figure in the abolitionist movement. Colleague of William Lloyd Garrison from 1841 leading him into public speaking and writing. As an African American he understood the desire amongst African Americans to fight for the Union in the Civil War. |
| <b>Purpose</b>     | An article in <i>Douglass' Monthly</i> . | To put pressure on Lincoln to allow African Americans to fight in the Civil War and therefore to fight for the end of slavery. This emphasises the pressures that the black community were trying to bring to bear on Lincoln to advance their status.   |
| <b>Timing</b>      | September 1861                           | Douglass wrote this article 5 months into the war when the urgency of the situation was apparent, and it was known that the Confederacy was already using enslaved people labour to strengthen its military capacity. Right from the onset of the war pressure was being brought to bear on Lincoln to consider emancipation.                          |

| Point in the Source D   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance  |
|---|--|
| Washington, the seat of Government, after ten thousand assurances to the contrary, is now positively in danger of falling before the rebel army.  | Confederate raids threatened Washington several times during the war. Lincoln was under pressure to ensure that the capital was well defended. Douglass stressed the urgency of the situation by using the phrase after ten thousand assurances.   |
| 'Men! Men! Send us men!' they scream. So why does the Government reject the Negro? Is he not a man? Can he not wield a sword, fire a gun, march and counter march, and obey orders like any other? We want to tell the President that this is no time to fight with one hand, when both are needed. | Lincoln was under pressure from the outset of the war to allow Black soldiers to serve in the Union army. This would strengthen the North and further weaken the Confederacy. By using rhetorical questions and language such as vehemence and scream Douglass is emphasising the intensity of his demands. Throughout the piece, the passion of his beliefs is obvious. |

| Point in the Source D   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance   |
|---|---|
| I believe that such soldiers, if allowed to take up arms in defence of the Government and made to feel that they are hereafter to be recognised as persons having rights, would set the highest example of order and general good behaviour to their fellow soldiers. | Here Douglass turns his attention to asserting the rights of Black soldiers and by his respectful comments on their potential as outstanding examples to other soldiers. They would therefore be justified in demanding emancipation. |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- emancipation would provide a psychological and ideological boost for North and a blow to the South
- as the war dragged on, recruitment was always an issue for the Union. White volunteers were less willing thus emancipation would make wide scale use of Black people as soldiers more acceptable. Lincoln argued that they were 'a resource if vigorously applied . . . will soon close the contest'
- Lincoln's administration was under constant pressure from Abolitionists to introduce emancipation.
- Radical Republicans put considerable pressure on Lincoln. There were a number of differing reasons for their view, but all agreed that it would weaken the Southern war effort
- Lincoln had adopted a pragmatic approach to slavery. He was aware that there were a range of views on slavery and therefore he believed in gradual emancipation. This approach was always under pressure from the more radical elements of the Republican Party
- an Emancipation Proclamation would allow Lincoln to relax his stance on the recruitment of Black people to the Union army
- aimed to weaken the Confederacy's manpower if enslaved peoples fled to Union lines while swelling Union ranks with former enslaved peoples
- southern economy based on slavery – emancipation would potentially weaken the South's ability to fight.

**Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- would Black soldiers have been as willing to take risks in battle without emancipation? Lincoln was under pressure from Seward to delay announcement until some military success is achieved
- foreign involvement; Emancipation would ensure that the war remained a domestic conflict and essentially a war of attrition
- actions of Generals Butler, Fremont and Hunter in the border states regarding the treatment of runaway enslaved peoples put pressure on Lincoln to announce a single Union approach to runaway and captured enslaved peoples
- Lincoln was always under pressure to transform the Union war aims from 'Union as it was' to 'Union as it should be'
- congressional action against slavery, e.g., Johnson/Crittenden Resolution, First and Second Confiscation Acts, Militia Act
- Lincoln didn't have the constitutional power to abolish slavery therefore he was under pressure to use it as a war measure
- Lincoln was personally against slavery but perhaps not as an abolitionist.

| <b>Historians</b>       | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|-------------------------|---|
| <b>Barbara J Fields</b> | Takes the view that the actions of the Black people themselves in both North and South put pressure on Lincoln leaving him with no option but to issue a proclamation in effect recognising the legality of the existing circumstances. |
| <b>Kenneth M Stamp</b>  | Takes the view that Lincoln was reluctant to emancipate the enslaved peoples, but the war demanded such drastic action.   |
| <b>Hugh Tulloch</b>     | Takes the view that Lincoln's actions were those of a politician having to change tack due to the evolving nature of the conflict. In this case, Lincoln's actions are viewed not only as necessary but also as just.                   |
| <b>La Wanda Cox</b>     | Takes the view that Lincoln's actions looked towards long-term racial equality.   |

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 33

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that pressure from Perry was the most important external force for change:**

- Perry arrived in 1853 with a third of the American navy – left the Tokugawa feeling threatened
- delivered a letter from President Fillmore demanding Japan open its ports to American ships – Japan given a year to respond but there was the implication of military action if their response was not favourable
- pressure from America to open its ports left the Tokugawa Bakufu in a genuine state of uncertainty – approached Imperial Court for their opinion – marked a huge turning point in their control as they had never before consulted the Emperor on issues to do with the state
- all Daimyo consulted for their advice – a further e.g., of administrative paralysis in the face of the threat posed by Perry
- resulted in the signing of the first Unequal Treaty – the Treaty of Kanagawa – opening up ports to American ships
- further led to the Harris Treaty with the USA which began to impose trading benefits for the USA, this was the trigger event for other countries to then push for their own versions of Unequal Treaties
- with regards its dealings with America, the Bakufu had disregarded Imperial opinion – further fuelled their demands for some form of restoration of the Emperor – who was still the theoretical head of the Bakufu's control system. Tokugawa regime was accused of usurping imperial power
- enemies of the regime took up the cry of 'Sonno Joi'
- West supplying weapons to Satcho Alliance.

**Evidence which supports the view that pressure from Perry was not the most important external force for change:**

- important to see the external threat as internationalist in nature – it wasn't simply the act of Perry's arrival that opened the door to the west – it is important to zoom out and see the growing internationalist threat upon Japan
- pressure from the Americans had been growing. They were heavily involved in whaling industry in seas around Japan and desperately wanted access to Japanese ports for refuelling and protection for shipwrecked soldiers
- Commodore Biddle had approached Japan in 1846 but had been sent away without receiving any concessions
- the signing of the Treaty of Kanagawa with America opened the doors for further Unequal Treaties with Britain, France, Russia and the Dutch, which in turn weakened the control of the Tokugawa
- Bakufu's members became divided over how far to adhere to traditional policies and how far to adapt to the changing environment – the threat from America made them seem incapable of decisive action.

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-----------------------|--|
| <b>Thomas Huber</b>   | Contends that the 'it was Perry's arrival which finally made it possible for serious reformers in Choshu and elsewhere to convert their theoretical understanding into an urgent public demand for change'.  |
| <b>Harold Bolitho</b> | Argues that the foreign crisis after 1853 made it clear the Tokugawa government, entrusted with the duty of protecting the emperor and empire from foreign aggression, was unable to do anything of the kind.  |
| <b>Peter Kornicki</b> | Believes 'it is commonplace to assert that it was Commodore Perry who was responsible for 'opening' Japan, but this is misleading. Japan was under pressure not solely from the United States, but from several nations whose territorial and other interests were leading them to converge in Japanese waters'. |
| <b>Richard Storry</b> | One main school of opinion which held the field for a great many years, believed that the Tokugawa system of governance might have continued unchanged had it not been for the forcible opening of the closed door by the United States and other countries.   |

## Question 34

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that the Emperor did possess real powers between 1868 and 1920:**

- as soon as the Restoration was announced, legal edicts, such as the Charter Oath, were issued in the name of the Emperor, which marked a huge turning point compared to the Emperor's neglected role during the Tokugawa period
- the position of the Emperor was arguably effective in uniting all the disparate domains of Tokugawa Japan, into a centralised political system
- the position of the Emperor was profoundly important as a source of legitimacy for the Meiji leadership
- the Emperor was physically relocated to the geographical political heart of Japan, to Tokyo
- the Constitution was a gift from the Emperor, bestowed upon the people of Japan
- the Emperor's position was legally established within the Meiji constitution, which formally declared his inviolability and granted him extensive, arguably theoretical, powers
- the Emperor was the Supreme Commander of the armed forces
- the Emperor had the right to declare war, make peace and conclude treaties
- the Emperor had extensive ordinance rights and could freely adjourn the Diet
- the army was answerable only to the Emperor
- the Imperial Rescript of Education placed the Emperor at the centre of education and taught the next generation of Japanese that the Emperor was a living deity
- Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors in 1885 according to which all military swore unquestioning allegiance to the Emperor.

**Evidence which supports the view that the Emperor's powers were symbolic rather than real:**

- Emperor Meiji was only 15 years of age when the Restoration occurred, so he was open to exploitation and manipulation by the new Meiji oligarchy
- arguably, real political power lay with clan leaders from the Satsuma and Choshu clans
- political power simply shifted from one political elite to another, as opposed to any restoration of the political power of the Emperor
- political edicts and rescripts issued in the name of the Emperor, but actually written by a member of the new Meiji oligarchy, e.g., the Charter Oath issued in the name of the Emperor, but actually written by Kido Koin
- the new political constitution was largely written and shaped by Ito Hirobumi
- the Emperor's position as a living deity exploited as a means of political control, to push through reforms and edicts written by those in position of authority within the Meiji regime, to ensure minimal opposition
- to the new regime, the Emperor was more useful as a symbol, to be invoked against opponents, as if he were detached from everyday politics
- Emperor's approval for new laws and edicts was only used as a very last resort
- Ito Hirobumi's argued that the Emperor's function was not to rule, but to define and preserve by his superior authority the framework within which the government worked
- the constitution suggested that the Emperor was a symbol of imperial lineage, stretching back beyond the state itself to the time of Japan's creation
- Meiji concept of the family state, with the Emperor as the head of the nation family, helped reinforce this symbolic role, one above politics
- refocus on Shintoism and Shinto Shrines helped reinforce symbolic position.

| <b>Historians</b>      | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|------------------------|---|
| <b>Richard Storry</b>  | Contends that after 1868 'the real controllers of power were men from much junior rank from the western clans', not the Emperor.  |
| <b>Anne Waswo</b>      | Highlights the 'impressive proclamations and edicts were issued in the Emperor's name calling upon people to support the building of schools, hospitals and factories and to render service to Japan'.      |
| <b>William Beasley</b> | Argues 'The Emperor's importance as a source of legitimacy for the Meiji leadership has never been in doubt'. To the Meiji leaders he was 'useful as a symbol and occasionally as a weapon of last resort'. |
| <b>Rebecca Wall</b>    | States 'At first the new government made a show of being open; soon, however, power was concentrated in the powers of the samurai from the western clans'.  |

## Question 35

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that the abolition of the caste system actually liberated individuals within Japan:**

- the caste structure was formally abolished in 1873
- this should have marked the liberation of all within Japan as previous opportunities had been dictated by the caste you were born into
- peasants now could leave their villages and move to towns and cities to take up new and different employment opportunities
- many peasants did leave the countryside and got jobs within growing industries within the towns – including many females in the textile industries
- Samurai privileges removed in 1876, e.g., sword bearing and right to punish disrespectful people. Only soldiers and police could carry weapons
- educational opportunities were no longer limited to the Samurai caste – opening up theoretical educational advancement to all
- Eta had legal discrimination abolished
- the visible privileges of upper class such as formal clothing and riding on horseback, were now open to all
- creation of a national army – into which all males could be conscripted – not just the Samurai
- former Warrior families given title Shizoku (1872) and given stipends to live on by the government. When this proved too expensive, given government bearer bonds in 1876. For some Samurai this meant a cut in income of up to 90%
- bond between Daimyo and Lord lost as former domains now administrative units
- many Samurai used skills acquired under Tokugawa to work in administrative roles. Under the new centralised structure there were more opportunities. Upper Samurai played key role in new government
- but many others unhappy (a dangerous 8% of the population) – felt the Bushido Code had been dishonoured
- the abolition of the old social distinctions created new opportunities
- many Samurai invested their cash payment in 1876 into industry and some of the developing Zaibatsu
- the abolition of the caste structure freed up educational opportunities for all – improving literacy and numeracy – a powerful skill to help further oneself.

**Evidence which challenges the notion that all individuals were ‘liberated’ by the caste system:**

- many Samurai felt betrayed rather than liberated – candidates could make reference to Takamori’s rebellion
- some believed that by abolishing the Samurai caste the new Meiji regime were undermining a system of control that had been rooted in honour, virtue and valour
- principles of Neo-Confucianism underpinned Meiji society, arguably reinforced through edicts like the Imperial Rescript of Education. These included filial piety and subordination
- liberated peasants often went to work in appalling conditions in factories. Girls often sold into contracts
- the situation of women across society arguably became more restricted, socially and politically, especially with edicts like the 1898 Civil Code
- women had no independent legal status; treated as a minor
- all legal agreements on her behalf concluded by male to whom she was subordinate – father, husband or son
- in reality, access to education was easier to the better off in society – and not the peasants
- widespread engagement with educational opportunities did not happen until the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.



| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|-----------------------|---|
| <b>Janet Hunter</b>   | Argues as a result of the abolition of the caste structure 'Individual members of society were encouraged to work to the best of their abilities. Some flourished in this enthusiasm for individual improvement. Others proved unable to cope with the rapidly changing conditions with which they were faced'. |
| <b>Andrew Gordon</b>  | Contends 'taking this step was a major undertaking, many of those who had supported the restoration drive felt betrayed by former comrades now running the Meiji government'.   |
| <b>Richard Storry</b> | Believes 'in this upheaval both the Samurai class and the peasantry endured much hardship. Indeed, the condition of the peasantry actually deteriorated for several years after the abolition of feudalism'.  |
| <b>Thomas Smith</b>   | Highlights 'Thus, although modernisation generated new attitudes destructive of tradition, and greatly affected some important aspects of agriculture, the countryside remained a vast and populous hinterland of conservation'.  |

## Question 36

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that the concerns over Korea were the main cause of war between Japan and China:**

- long-standing concerns over the strategic importance of Korea – it was the closest area of the Asian mainland to Japan and the main area from which an attack could be launched
- described as ‘dagger pointing into the heart of Japan’ – Japan’s imperial actions were planned to try and secure control here
- Korea was a semi-autonomous kingdom over which China exercised a significant amount of influence, which made Japan uncomfortable and supports the idea that they wanted to do something to increase their strategic control in the area
- in early Meiji era there were imperialistic designs on Korea which were revealed in Saigō Takamori’s plans to launch a campaign against Korea – again highlighting Japan had clear intentions to secure their own interests – and not China’s – in the region
- success during the Formosa Incident increased Japanese confidence over China
- in 1876, Japan persuaded Korea to establish diplomatic relations and accept The Unequal Treaty providing equal rights for Japanese in Korea which in turn saw Korea asking China to intervene, thereafter both nations agreed to inform one another if they were to dispatch troops to Korea. Arguably, such actions highlight a clear plan to always ensure Korea acted in Japan’s interest – and that action would be resultant if they did not
- violation of this agreement was a key trigger for war. In June 1894 a number of local revolts broke out in Korea, organised by anti-Western groups, Tong-Haks. The Korean king called upon China for help, which was quickly sent – but in violation of previous treaty
- Japan keen to ensure that Korea was completely independent of any foreign power except themselves
- there was growing concern regarding expanding Russian influence in Asia. If Japan secured Korea, it would prevent this happening there.

**Evidence which supports other reasons for the causes of the war between Japan and China:**

- war was motivated to try and gain an overseas empire, to become more like the west
- the continued desire for treaty revision underpinned the desire for success in war. Indeed, the fact that extra-territoriality was overturned soon after victory, indicates partial success in this arena
- lack of natural resources demanded Japan become aggressive in its foreign policy
- Japan wanted access to overseas markets
- Japan had an expanding population and wanted additional land overseas to accommodate them
- Japan wanted to replace China as the leading Asian nation
- the scale and speed of military and naval reform and expansion by Meiji oligarchy could be used as evidence to highlight that the new regime was building up for war
- creation of a national army and navy increased Japanese confidence at instigating a war
- the threat of attempted colonisation by the West still existed. Victory over China could help prevent incursion to Japan
- political and economic modernisation had begun to show results by the 1890s, leading to Japan’s growing sense of strength.

| <b>Historians</b>           | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| <b>William Beasley</b>      | Argues 'Japanese leaders of almost all shades wanted to draw Korea into the Japanese orbit'.  |
| <b>Janet Hunter</b>         | Contends that 'As Japan's strengths grew so did her ambitions on the Asian mainland and her ability to advance them'.   |
| <b>Bonnie B Oh</b>          | Argues 'For Japan, imperialism was a means of gaining equality with the west'.  |
| <b>Benson and Matsumura</b> | Suggest 'The European powers' growing interest in Asia could scarcely be overlooked and this encouraged Japan's development of a more aggressive foreign policy'. |

## Question 37

Candidates might refer to:

### Evidence which supports the view that Japan did benefit from World War I:

- Japan joined the conflict on the winning side, acquiring Germany's Chinese sphere of influence in Shantung, extending its control of Manchuria
- Japan tried to further extend its influence over China during WWI with the 21 Demands in 1915. If achieved, these demands would have essentially reduced China to a Japanese protectorate. Clear evidence of the increasing confidence of Japan
- as the West were preoccupied with the war, Japan did manage to enforce most of their demands upon China, emerging economically and strategically stronger
- from 1915 Japanese industry underwent considerable expansion because it was able to capture markets from European powers actively involved in the war, e.g., the Indian markets for textiles that had been dominated by Lancashire products before 1914
- there was an expansion of other Japanese industries, such as shipbuilding and heavy industries, which had previously been flooded with European produced products
- Japanese industry also responded to the insatiable demands of the Allies for war materials and other industrial goods. The resulting trade was valuable to the Allies and profitable to Japan
- exports quadrupled from 1913 to 1918
- Japan lost only 5 naval vessels during the course of the war, out of a total of 150
- Japan's merchant shipping dramatically increased
- Japan emerged on the winning side in 1918 virtually as a non-combatant and without having incurred any of the costs of war, unlike Britain and America
- the war also confirmed Japan's position as a westernised nation when she participated in the Paris Peace Conference – was a member of the League of Nations Council
- became a council member of the new League of Nations in 1920
- Japan took over trade routes in Asia that had been dominated by western powers prior to the war
- the number of merchant ships dramatically increased over the period of WWI, from 488 in 1900 to 2996 by 1920.

### Evidence which supports the view that Japan did not benefit from World War I:

- the international economy was also very unstable after the war and Japan was forced to trade in a very uncertain political world
- the growth that had taken place had only been possible because of the absence of competition and on the return to peace Japanese industry suffered severe dislocation
- not all workers benefited equally as wages had not risen as fast as prices and high food prices led to Rice Riots in 1918
- Japan's desire for racial equality clause as part of League of Nation's Charter was not accepted
- although they maintained their control of the former German Mariana Islands, it was through a League Mandate rather than outright ownership
- strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China, arguably weakening Japan as they lost any close strategic ally.

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-----------------------|--|
| <b>Kenneth Pyle</b>   | Contends that ‘the outbreak of World War One in Europe in the summer of 1914 provided extraordinary opportunities to advance the twin objective of empire and industry’.               |
| <b>Richard Storry</b> | Highlights that during this period ‘it was not long before Japan became a creditor instead of a debtor among the nations’.   |
| <b>Ayira Iriye</b>    | Argues ‘the Japanese were rewarded (for their involvement in the war) by being invited to the peace conference, the first time Japan attended a conference as a fully-fledged member’. |
| <b>Mikiso Hane</b>    | Suggests that ‘the Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided them with the excuse to enter the war but the real motivation was to take over the German concessions in China’.                   |

## Section 5 – Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 38

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source A   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>  |
|---|---|
| However, as the Daimyo's need for money increased, he made heavier demands on his peasants. Let us glance at some of the burdens on peasants in late Tokugawa society. The taxes ate up to 50% to 70% of produce, and there were countless other taxes, such as a tax on doors. | Highlights that a source of discontent in late Tokugawa regime was the increased burden of taxation on the peasants, meaning they were having to have over the majority of their harvests.  |
| In addition, with the penetration of the money economy into the countryside, the peasant could no longer obtain everything he needed purely by bartering.   | Further arguing that this discontent was exacerbated by the transition from a rice based to a money-based economy. The peasants struggled with this change as they had previously accessed goods via exchanging goods, as opposed to using money. |
| As the agrarian crisis became more chronic, revolts occurred with even greater frequency and violence, often embracing the peasantry of several districts and contributing to weakening the Tokugawa regime.  | Perspective here is that the increased number of peasant uprisings was a cause of the downfall of the Tokugawa, especially as they started to spread across Hans.   |

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Marxist-influenced historians have attempted to view the downfall of the Tokugawa as an expression of 'working class' discontent, through the increased expression of discontent from the peasants
- as the Daimyo started to indulge in more lavish lifestyles, many fell into debt. They attempted to pay off this debt through increasing the burden of taxation on their peasants
- the production of rice was highly taxed at different levels by their Daimyos, which resulted in fluctuating prices
- taxes were also imposed on many other aspects of life for the peasant, including cloth, sake, herbs, buildings and windows
- during the late Meiji period there were also periods of devastating harvests, such as during the Tempo era. The city of Osaka lost over a tenth of the population
- however, some historians argue that although there was an increase in the number of peasants rebellions, it is difficult to identify them as a cause of the downfall of the Tokugawa as they were localised in nature directed towards their own Daimyo, as opposed to the Tokugawa regime.

| Point in Source B  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given   |
|--|---|
| . . . socio-economic developments which saw the general weakening of the now redundant samurai, who became bureaucrats in practice but also ironically became idealised.         | Argues that socio-economic changes led to a shift in the position of the samurai, from warriors to administrators, which led to a feeling of discontent amongst some.                                   |
| However, there was the emergence of a powerful merchant class, with a new, vibrant, bourgeois culture centred on this group.   | Considers that the merchants began to emerge as a new powerful class – a new feature of society.  |
| . . . improved educational levels and critical thinking and through its emphasis on the emperor as supreme ruler it also raised questions as to the legitimacy of the shogunate. | Contends that the Shinto revivalist movement led to an improvement in literacy levels and a more critical approach to the Tokugawa regime, in particular the relationship of the emperor to the Shogun. |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- 250 years of peace had made the Samurai somewhat redundant as warriors, and they instead became administrators, largely supervising rice tax collection, leading to discontent amongst some
- this shift led to a movement away from the Bushido code usually followed by the Samurai, resulting in a more decadent and self-absorbed lifestyle. This weakened this group as a facet of Tokugawa social control
- many Samurai got into debt as a consequence of their shift in lifestyle. Some borrowed from the merchants, at times selling their sword-bearing privileges, leading to a weakening of the caste structure
- the state-sponsored Shinto revivalist movement backfired as rather than simply reducing reliance on Chinese ideas, it led to a re-focus on Shinto values and the position of the Emperor in society. It began to lead to a movement arguing that the Tokugawa Shogun had usurped power from the Emperor
- key individuals emerged as a result of the Shinto Revivalism movement, such as Hirate Atsutane. This later morphed into the Sonno-Joi movement with the extremists men of Shishi emerging in the Bakumatsu period.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- the decentralised nature of the Tokugawa regime, the fact they only had direct control over 25% of the land, meant that they regime was weakened from the outset and they found it difficult to stamp their authority over the entire country when dissent began to emerge
- alternate attendance led to the development of an infrastructure within Japan, which had the unintended consequence of stimulating internal commercial trade
- the Tempo period, and the failure of the Tempo Reforms, illustrated both the changing socio-economic changes occurring within Japan and the sense of inertia that the Tokugawa regime suffered from when reacting to these changes. The failure to implement their planned reforms also served to highlight the challenges they faced at the apex of a decentralised system.

| <b>Historians</b>        | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|--------------------------|--|
| <b>Janet Hunter</b>      | Argues 'the dynamic forces within society and the economy eventually came into conflict with a national polity that sought to avoid change'.   |
| <b>Harold Bolitho</b>    | Highlights 'in the countryside the authority of the Shogun and Daimyo alike was successfully flouted'. 'It had become plain that the Tokugawa system was no longer functioning properly'.              |
| <b>Thomas Huber</b>      | Argues 'the most essential and dynamic of these factors (which converged to bring about the establishment of the new Meiji government) was the group of men known to history as the Choshu activists'. |
| <b>Nicholas Henshall</b> | Contends that the rise of the merchant class . . . ultimately helped undermine Tokugawa policy. Clearly, a class system that placed merchants at the bottom was losing touch with reality'.            |



### Question 39

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source C |   | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance  |
|--------------------|---|---|
| Author             | Yamagata Aritomo.                         | Yamagata Aritomo instrumental in engineering army reforms.  |
| Purpose            | To introduce the new law on conscription. | The establishment of a national conscript army viewed as essential by the new regime – one of the reasons Tokugawa had to succumb to Perry's demands was the lack of a standing army. |
| Timing             | November 28, 1872                         | One year after the formal abolition of the caste structure, which allowed the new regime to introduce a national army.  |

| Point in Source C  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to the source content provenance</i>   |
|--|--|
| It is essential that we should now select only what is good in Western ideas and use them to supplement our traditional military system.                         | Highlighting that military changes were significantly going to be shaped by knowledge gained from the west, but stressing this was used selectively alongside traditional aspects of the Japanese military system. |
| It is also vital that we establish a national army and a navy, thus, the soldier is not the soldier of former days.  | Determining that the military changes would see the establishment of a national army and navy, thus a significant change to the previous definition of a soldier.  |
| We will order all males who attain the age of twenty – irrespective of class – to register for military service, and have them in readiness for all emergencies. | Direct focus on the need for military changes to include conscription, where all men aged 20 years, had to register for military service and be ready to respond to all national emergencies after that.           |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- French military theory adopted by the new Meiji Regime when they implemented their military reforms
- from the 1880s, military reform of the artillery was heavily influenced by the highly successful Prussian army
- Iwakura Mission crucial as a fact-finding mission – key focus upon collecting military knowledge
- reliance on French military knowledge gradually shifted to German following their defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War
- impact of the introduction of conscription – three-year service for 20-year-old men followed by four years subsequent service in the army reserve. Exemptions were highly limited. Impact upon many families
- impact of conscription upon Samurai, combined with abolition of caste structure, ended Samurai monopoly on warfare and undermined their warrior status
- conscription unpopular as it deprived families of their sons for labour
- conscription contributed to the development of a sense of nationalism as conscripts travelled the country for the first time
- impact upon women – military priorities meant that women were important as the bearers of sons who would fight in future wars
- the abolition of the Samurai caste was essential to establish a national army to allow soldiers to be recruited from all social groupings within Japan
- many Samurai were opposed to the abolition of their caste and the establishment of a conscript army.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- all military reforms were shaped by the principle Fukoku-Kyoei – rich country – strong army
- creation of National Army and Navy important priority for the Meiji and their survival – with all soldiers answerable to the emperor as opposed to their daimyo
- reforms aimed to create a centralised military force answerable to the central figure of the Emperor as opposed to decentralised Samurai warriors answered to their daimyo
- completed reorganisation and expansion of the armed forces from 1882 to 1884
- army consisted of infantry, cavalry, field artillery, engineers corps
- naval expansion highly influenced by the British
- promising naval officers were sent to England to study and often served 10 years on British ships
- the bulk of the early navy was ordered from British shipyards
- naval expansion plan of 1882
- schools of artillery and engineering trained officers in the technology of modern warfare were established
- the Emperor was put in supreme command of the armed forces
- spending of indemnity from war with China on further military reforms.

**Historians      Perspective on the issue**

|                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| <b>Janet Hunter</b> | Contends that ‘In the interests of both domestic unity and efficiency the new leadership decided to start afresh with the building of a conscript army’.  |
| <b>Ian Buruma</b>   | Argues ‘National unity was armed unity. National education was military education. The samurai virtues were now applied nationally. Loyalty and obedience to the emperor, who was paraded around in military uniform, was the highest form of patriotism. |
| <b>Rebecca Wall</b> | Believes that ‘the importance attached to the armed forces is shown in the fact that in the 1870s the Japanese government invested as much in the navy and twice as much in the army, as in industrial enterprises as a whole’.                           |
| <b>Takao</b>        | Believes it should never be forgotten that domestic politics, military policy and foreign affairs were intertwined in the most intimate fashion’.   |

## Question 40

The candidate may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source D   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given  |
|---|--|
| His overriding aim to be achieved was to secure for his country a position from which she could defend her mainland interests without outside help.   | One consequence was a move towards greater self-sufficiency with regards international affairs, as Japan was strengthened internationally.                     |
| Spelling this out, he had written in July 1904 that Korea 'must be brought effectively within the sphere of our sovereignty'. Japan gained Russian recognition of her freedom of action in Korea. | Korea was brought more closely within the Japanese sphere of influence – and Russia recognised this.   |
| She also secured the cession from Russia of the southern half of Sakhalin and took over the Russian lease of Liaotung.  | Japan also gained the territorial land of the southern half of Sakhalin and the important peninsula of Liaotung, which Russia had seized a 25-year lease over. |

### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the psychological impact of the Unequal Treaties and the fear of colonialism made Japan determined to gain strategic strength on the mainland to protect their security
- Korea was brought firmly under Japan's sphere of influence, and Russia and China now recognised their influence there and renounced their own
- Korea viewed as the 'dagger pointing to the heart of Japan', further control here was viewed as crucial in securing the safety of Japan
- this move was a further step along the path to the full annexation of Korea in 1911
- gaining control of the Liaotung peninsula was hugely significant. They had initially gained this following their defeat of China, but had been forced to relinquish control following the Tripartite Intervention, instigated by Russia.

### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- defeat of Russia forced the rest of the world to take notice of Japan. American President was especially impressed
- Japanese victory made other nations respect her
- victory and the Treaty undoubtedly contributed towards the overturning of the final vestige of the Unequal Treaties in 1911, and Japan's participation within the Paris Peace Conference
- but the source fails to mention the huge nationalist backlash against the Treaty of Portsmouth within Japan itself. September 1905 angry crowds rioted for 3 days in Tokyo against the Treaty of Portsmouth. Martial law was imposed for several days
- the nation had been whipped up into such a sense of patriotism and nationalism, fuelled by government propaganda, that they felt the Treaty was not harsh enough upon Russia. There was an overwhelming sense of betrayal
- the lack of indemnity was a particular bone of contention
- access to South Manchurian railway, formally controlled by Russia
- access to additional raw materials and markets.

| Historians           | Perspective on the issue   |
|----------------------|--|
| Conrad Totman        | Argues 'Tokyo's accomplishments were impressive: more territorial gains, an internationally accepted hegemonial role in Korea, opportunity to develop southern Manchuria, and victory over an imperialist rival that placed beyond doubt Japan status as a 'Great Power'.            |
| Benson and Matsumara | Contend 'Nonetheless, the failure to secure still better terms – . . . especially better financial compensation – in the Treaty of Portsmouth led to a great deal of domestic criticism, two days of unprecedented rioting in Tokyo, and the resignation of prime minister Katsura'. |
| Peter Duus           | Asserts 'The Russo-Japanese war rather than the Sino-Japanese war marked the take-off point of Japanese imperialism'.  |
| J N Westwood         | Maintains 'Victory in her first war with one of the European powers had the paradoxical effect not of reassuring Japan that she was now a major power . . . but instead convinced her of her continuing vulnerability and the need to strengthen further her military capability'.   |

## Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 41

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that Ebert effectively dealt with the challenges from the Left and Right:**

#### Challenges from the Left:

- Ebert-Groener Pact, Nov 10, 1918 provides background motivation for his actions
- in January 1919, the SPD-led government crushed the Spartacist uprising using the Freikorps and the army. Over 1,200 Spartacists were killed including the Spartacists' leaders Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Although the action seemed to have been effective in the short-term, by preventing a full-blown Communist revolution in early 1919, over the next four years, the government faced a series of threats from the extreme Left
- in the spring of 1919, the industrial areas of Germany were swept by a wave of unrest, expressed most seriously through strikes in the Ruhr mines, central Germany and in Berlin. The strikers demanded shorter hours, the nationalisation of industry, and government based on soviets. A mixture of government promises, and the use of the Freikorps and the army quelled the unrest
- Nov 1918–May 1919. The government faced a very serious problem in Bavaria. During this period a soviet republic was proclaimed in Bavaria by Kurt Eisner – the *Räterepublik*. In May 1919, the government decided to put an end to this challenge to its authority. The Bavarian Republic was suppressed, again using the Freikorps. Over 700 were killed
- March 1920. In response to the Kapp Putsch, the Communists formed the Ruhr Army, a force of 50,000 workers, to resist the putsch. This was the largest working-class revolt of the period 1919 to 1923. Ebert ordered the army to break up the Ruhr Army and in the ensuing action, 100 workers and several hundred policemen and soldiers were killed
- April 1920 to summer 1923. There were disturbances in Saxony and Thuringia throughout this period, most seriously in the summer of 1923 when there was a wave of strikes. The hyperinflation crisis encouraged the KPD to try to organise a German Bolshevik-style revolution to be based on Saxony where there was an SPD-KPD led government. In October 1923, government troops overthrew the Saxon government and restored order.

#### Challenges from the Right:

- Organisation Consul and the murders of Mathias Erzberger and Walther Rathenau
- Ebert's dealings with the Right-wing within the army, the civil service and the judiciary
- March 1920. The Kapp Putsch almost succeeded, but the government was saved by a general strike in Berlin and elsewhere, organised by the trade unions and by the Communists. In this attempted putsch, the army refused to support the government when ordered to suppress the putschists – Hans von Seeckt's 'Reichswehr does not fire on Reichswehr' statement
- Nov 1923. The Munich Putsch organised by Hitler and the Nazis. Although this was much less successful than the Kapp Putsch and was easily suppressed, Hitler and the Nazis gained a tremendous amount of publicity from it, publicity that benefited Hitler in the long-term.

## Evidence which supports the view that Ebert did not effectively deal with challenges from the Left and Right:

### Challenges from the Left:

- the crushing of the Spartacists did not bring about an end to Communist activity and for much of the period from 1919 to 1923, left wing uprisings or actions against the republic were Communist led
- Ebert's actions against the Left throughout the period ensured that the KPD and the SPD would never form a united front against the extreme Right, and this had serious consequences for democracy and the republic, not just in the period 1919 to 1923, but thereafter
- the fact that left-wing uprisings continued even after the crushing of the Spartacists in 1919 ensured that the middle classes were never really convinced about the republic's ability to prevent a Communist revolution in Germany
- the frequency of actions against the republic by the extreme Left meant that industrialists and businessmen had little faith in the republic
- questions of legal fairness and political bias were never fully solved between 1919 and 1923 and led to simmering resentment from the Left of institutional political bias in the republic.

### Challenges from the Right:

- the old elites, in the judiciary and civil service, remained in charge during the period from 1919 to 1923. 354 of the 376 assassinations during this period were carried out by right-wing extremists. Of the 22 murders carried out by the Left, ten were solved and resulted in trials, many of which led to executions. Of the 354 assassinations carried out by right-wing extremists, 326 were never solved and out this total of 354, only 1 right-wing criminal was sent to prison
- The Kapp Putsch highlighted the fact that, in spite of the Ebert-Groener pact, the army was as likely to undermine the republic as it was to support it, and certainly never really supported democracy. The leaders of the putsch faced lenient punishment
- The Munich Putsch, though a failure in the short-term, gave Hitler a platform from which he was able to present himself as a well-motivated German nationalist. He emerged from prison in much stronger position in the Nazi Party than before, and as a nationally known figure around whom, later on, the forces of conservatism and extreme Right coalesced. Here too, the leaders of the Munich Putsch faced lenient punishment.

| Historians      | Perspective on the issue  |
|-----------------|---|
| Ruth Henig      | Argues that the crushing of the Spartacists in January 1919 permanently split the Left in Germany. It could be argued that this split had disastrous consequences for the republic in later years. A Marxist revolution had been prevented, but the forces of reaction and strident nationalism made swift recovery and emerged by 1920 as the most potent enemies of the new republic. |
| Stephen J Lee   | Suggests that Ebert concentrated on steering the republic towards parliamentary democracy and was not afraid to use military action against extremists to achieve this. He achieved what he wanted. He shaped the republic's particular form of democracy and enabled it to survive.  |
| Richard J Evans | Recognises the efforts of the Republic under Ebert's leadership to maintain essential services, avert economic collapse, preserve law and order and secure parliamentary democracy. But the willingness of the SPD leadership to compromise with the old order was to cost the Republic dear in years to come.  |
| Eric D Weitz    | Sees Ebert's deal with Groener as one of the many compromises he made aimed at steering Germany from the chaos of defeat and revolution towards democracy and economic revival. And they were fateful compromises. The army and the other forces of the old order were willing to work with Ebert because they feared much worse.   |

## Question 42

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that Stresemann's foreign policy transformed Germany from being a 'distrusted outcast':**

### **Versailles:**

- at the core of Stresemann's diplomacy was the pursuit of the long-term goal of revision of Versailles, while at the same time seeking warmer relationships with the victors of 1918
- as the German Chancellor from August 1923, Gustav Stresemann took decisive action by calling off passive resistance in the Ruhr and ended Germany's hyperinflation crisis. This paved the way for new investments to flow into Germany following the Dawes Plan.

### **The Dawes Plan:**

- the Dawes Plan of 1924 seemed to be beneficial to Germany and the other western powers. The loans agreed under the plan helped to boost both the economies of Germany and Europe more generally, thus enabling reparations payments to be met. This began the normalisation of relations with former enemies
- the Dawes Plan aided Franco-German relations since it removed the threat of unilateral French invasion if reparations payments were not made
- following the Dawes Plan, 16,000 million Reichmarks came into Germany in loans from the USA, but only 7,000 million Reichmarks were paid out in reparations. This favourable balance of credit enabled industry to recover its pre-war level of output and to modernise factories and manufacturing. It also enabled reparation payments to be made in full and on time and began the process of normalising Germany's relations with former enemies.

### **The Locarno Pact:**

- the Locarno Pact of 1925 transformed Germany's status since it made France feel secure and therefore less likely to oppose German recovery
- Stresemann also achieved the early evacuation of Allied troops from the Rhineland. This is a sign that the transformation from 'distrusted outcast' was underway
- by accepting the settlement of its western borders, Germany was able to concentrate on revisions in the east
- in the wider context, Locarno represents the normalising of Germany's relations with the victors of 1918.

### **League of Nations:**

- Stresemann's foreign policies re-established Germany at the centre of European politics. Following the Locarno Pact and the pursuit of *Erfüllungspolitik*, Germany was readmitted to the League of Nations in the autumn of 1926
- their membership of the League of Nations Council gave Germany 'great power' status and with it, the power of veto over League decisions. Stresemann insisted that if Germany were to be accepted into the League then it must have a permanent seat on the Council of the League and veto powers. That is exactly what he managed to negotiate
- through membership of the League, Germany was able to use its position to raise matters of German interest with the League – e.g., the issue of German minority populations living in other states
- German entry to the League of Nations was a major step forward in strengthening Germany and restoring her to great power status. Their entry would not have been possible if Germany were still a 'distrusted outcast'.

### **Treaty of Berlin:**

- the Treaty of Berlin in 1926 also strengthened European relations because it helped to develop good relations between Germany another great European power, the USSR
- the treaty also enabled Stresemann to put pressure on the Allies to improve their relations with Germany in order to stop Germany moving closer to the USSR.

### **The Young Plan:**

- reparation payments were further revised in 1929 as part of the Young Plan to underwrite German economic recovery – The Young Plan reduced further payments by about 20%. By 1929, there was enough trust among Germany's former enemies to suggest that they were willing to negotiate over the issue of reparations.

### **Domestic Issues:**

- improvements in relations with foreign powers had domestic benefits. International trade improved and workers benefited. Wages increased and the workers' share of the national income was 10% higher in the mid-1920s than it had been before 1914
- warmer relationships, particularly with the USA allowed capital to flow into Germany and from this, the government was able to increase expenditure on welfare services – housing, health and education. 17 million workers were covered by the Republic's unemployment insurance scheme
- the transformation from 'distrusted outcast' enabled Germany to become an active participant in the growth of the European and world economy from 1924 to 1929.

### **Evidence which supports the view that Stresemann's foreign policy did not transform Germany from being a 'distrusted outcast':**

#### **Versailles:**

- Stresemann's policy of *Erfüllungspolitik* still meant accepting the humiliating 'Diktat' of the Allies which were laid out in the terms of the Treaty of Versailles
- indeed, there were no revisions of any of the terms of the Versailles peace settlement
- Germany was not allowed to have the military power to insist on a revision of the territorial terms of Versailles.

#### **The Dawes Plan:**

- the Dawes Plan of 1924 had less to do with the transformation of Germany from a 'distrusted outcast' and owed more to the fact that the USA needed Great Britain and France to re-pay their war loans. To achieve this, Germany would need to make reparations to these nations to facilitate Anglo-French repayments to the USA. The original sum of 132,000 million marks, set in 1921, was re-confirmed. At no point were Germany's former enemies willing to negotiate over this
- illustrative of the lack of trust, under the terms of the Dawes Plan of 1924, Germany was forced to allow the Allies to control its railways, the German central bank (*the Reichsbank*), and customs rates
- either through loans from the USA, or by use of its own finances to pay reparations, the fact remains that Germany was heavily indebted, even by 1929, and forced to continue reparations payments. The removal or revision of these had been a central policy of Stresemann and in this, the Allies were not willing to negotiate.

#### **League of Nations:**

- although Germany was admitted to the League of Nations in 1926, their requests for an unconditional withdrawal of Allied forces were rejected. Foreign soldiers were still on German soil, even by 1929
- Germany was not trusted to participate in collective military action against any member state who broke the rules of the League. By 1929, Germany had still not been allowed equal army, naval and air capabilities compared to the UK or France.

#### **The Young Plan:**

- the Young Plan of 1929 mortgaged future generations of Germans. Progress in advancing relations never reached a point where the Allies were willing to cancel reparations payments. Although reparations were scaled back to 37,000 million Marks, payments were extended for a period of 58 years, up to the mid-1980s
- the terms of the Young Plan led to significant domestic opposition to Stresemann's policies. As a result, German nationalist, Alfred Hugenberg, began forging an anti-Young Plan alliance with Adolf Hitler.



**Domestic issues:**

- despite some improvements in relations with foreign powers and improvements in international trade, Germany's overall economic growth remained sluggish throughout the period 1924 to 1929. When compared to the growth of the economies of the UK and the USA, Germany's economic performance showed minimal improvements
- by the time of Stresemann's death in October 1929, reparations were still being paid, the Rhineland was still de-militarised, and millions of ethnic Germans still lived in foreign lands.

**Historians****Perspective on the issue****Jonathan Wright**

Argues that Stresemann hoped for a stable and peaceful international order because he understood Germany's dependence on its great power partners. From his pragmatism, there developed a strong commitment to European peace.

**John Hite and Chris Hinton**

Believe that Stresemann did indeed transform Germany from being a distrusted outcast to being actively involved in European diplomacy. However, the concrete gains from his diplomacy were not great.

**Marshall Lee and Wolfgang Michalka**

Argue that crucial to Stresemann's strategy was the development of close German-American co-operation, which benefited Germany's revisionism against French desires to maintain the status quo.

**Sally Marks**

Proposes that in his six years as Foreign Minister, Stresemann liberated the Ruhr and the Rhineland, twice secured reductions in reparations and had transformed Germany from an outcast state to the pre-eminent member of the European family of nations.

## Question 43

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that propaganda was highly significant in the achievement of power and Hitler's appointment as Chancellor:**

- the Nazis had a highly effective propaganda machine under the direction of Josef Goebbels who was himself a superb propagandist
- close attention was paid to local propaganda. Key individuals in local communities were targeted and won over, the idea being that these influential local people would then go out and spread the word
- propaganda was also highly focused – e.g., it highlighted the iniquities of Versailles in areas closely associated with border changes
- Nazi organisations – for youth, for women, for workers – were also used as vehicles for propaganda
- perhaps most important, the entire SA, for all their violence and thuggery, were also deployed in the propaganda campaigns. They projected an image of strength, order and youthful dynamism, and of tough anti-communism, and at the same time assisted at soup kitchens and other welfare projects run by the Nazis. Propaganda by deed
- propaganda was crucial and, in particular, the projection of the image of Adolf Hitler as the 'strong man' which the country needed, proved to be highly successful
- Hitler's speeches were also propaganda and he used these very effectively to target Germans' specific grievances and tailored his message to whichever audience he was addressing
- other Nazi speakers were also effective. They were always trained speakers (over 6,000 by 1933)
- rallies, torchlight parades, leaflets and posters were also used to disseminate the Nazi message
- the swastika banner was effective in giving the Nazis a clear, striking visual symbol that everyone recognised
- technology was used effectively to create the image of Hitler as the man of the hour, especially during the 1932 presidential election campaign when Hitler was flown around by plane so that he could reach lots of places quickly, but also to convey the idea of him as a messianic figure descending to earth from heaven – the 'Führer over Germany' campaign
- role of and use of the press and media: relationship with Hugenberg and the DNVP.

**Evidence which supports the view that propaganda was not the principal factor in the achievement of power and Hitler's appointment as Chancellor:**

- charismatic leadership. He was indeed an excellent orator who was especially good at identifying his audiences' emotions and expectations and aligning himself with them. His insistence on the *Führerprinzip* meant that his authority could not be challenged
- Nazi party organisation was also important. The party was organised into a series of *Gaue* (districts/regions) each headed up by a *Gauleiter*, working downwards to those Nazis who worked to persuade people in local streets and blocks – *Blockleiter*
- specific Nazi organisations were set up for different groups in society – from youth to lawyers to factory workers and agricultural workers
- the Nazi party were highly effective as a campaigning organisation with a powerful message
- the Nazis were also helped by the economic collapse of 1929 to 1932. For Germany, the effects were catastrophic. Levels of unemployment also reflected levels of support for the Nazis
- the Nazis were helped too by hatred of the Treaty of Versailles
- the Nazis were helped by the fact that the Weimar Republic seemed to be completely incapable of keeping Germany free of economic and political crises. This was the second financial disaster to befall the republic in the space of six years
- division on the left – the inability of the KPD and the SPD to work together – ensured that the Nazis were never seriously opposed in the Reichstag, even as their representation in it increased
- the miscalculations of the political elite – notably Hindenburg, von Papen and von Schleicher – led to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor

- although the Nazi Party was close to bankruptcy by November 1932, Hitler had the backing of some leading industrialists including Fritz Thyssen. Thyssen along with Bosch, Krupp and Hjalmar Schacht petitioned the President to appoint Hitler as Chancellor. This gave Hindenburg the impression of a far wider base of support among businessmen than Hitler actually had propaganda mobilised those already inclined to support the Nazis, more than it affected those who were politically committed to another party.

| Historians           | Perspective on the issue   |
|----------------------|--|
| Frank McDonough      | Argues that a key factor that greatly contributed to the Nazis' rise to power was effective propaganda. Nazi propaganda was centrally controlled and organised by Josef Goebbels. It is no coincidence that the great surge in Nazi electoral support took place in the period after Goebbels took control of Nazi Party propaganda.                   |
| Jill Stephenson      | Believes that Nazi propaganda was a powerful weapon, particularly when it was deployed utterly unscrupulously, with mutually irreconcilable promises made to different social or regional groups at the same time, but in different locations. But what enabled the NSDAP to disseminate its propaganda was the growing strength of its organisation.  |
| Roderick Stackelberg | Argues that the depression led to the breakdown of the SPD and DVP governing coalition in March 1930. Moreover, the Nazis' left-wing opponents were divided by the feud between the SPD and the KPD, which had its main source in the repression of the Communists' revolution by the SPD-led government shortly after the end of the First World War. |
| Stephen J Lee        | Contends that the Nazis' success depended on the vulnerability of the republic caused by the economic crisis from 1929. Hitler succeeded in collecting much of the electorate that had become disillusioned with the republic.   |

## Question 44

### Candidates might refer to:

#### Evidence which supports the view that Hitler was a strong dictator:

- as a strong dictator, Hitler moved quickly after his appointment as Chancellor. Within a matter of months, he was the leader of a one-party state
- he subordinated the SA in the 'Night of the Long Knives' (June 1934) and on the death of Hindenburg (August 1934), fused the roles of President and Chancellor and secured the loyalty of the army
- Hitler had no qualms about using terror to underpin his rule
- the exclusion of Jews and political opponents from professional organisations, the enforced sterilization of people with supposedly hereditary diseases, and the suppression of independent organisations and civil rights, all reinforce the view of Hitler as a strong dictator. However, the implementation of these policies may also be indicative of others 'working towards the Führer'
- in foreign policy, Hitler showed boldness and cleverness when others were more cautious; he successfully remilitarised the Rhineland (March 1936) and then achieved the Anschluss of Austria (March 1938), the destruction of Czechoslovakia (September 1939), before invading Poland
- although Hitler's style of leadership created fierce rivalry among his underlings, this was a calculated policy of divide and rule. People were dependent on Hitler's approval and so his intentions were decisive. This marks him as a strong dictator
- without Hitler's backing, policies such as those on women and youth would have been far less successful than they were.

#### Evidence which supports the view that Hitler was a weak dictator:

- the view of Hitler as a strong dictator was merely the result of successful propaganda; it was part of the 'Hitler Myth'
- in reality, Hitler was not interested in the details of policy or the processes of government and allowed others to make key decisions because he was unwilling to make decisions himself
- Hitler was lazy and preferred to spend time in his mountain retreat rather than get involved with the routine business of government. These habits caused confusion and resulted in contradictory policies and chaotic government. He often slept late, and key government ministers were often kept waiting for hours for a brief audience with the Führer
- what appeared to be a divide and rule policy towards his underlings disguised the fact that Hitler relied on them, not they on him
- people such as Göring or Himmler were able to build up personal power bases. They were engaged in a constant struggle for influence and position, and Hitler's tendency to wait to see who came out on top and then to support the winner, resulted in him rubber stamping others' decisions rather than initiating policy by himself.

#### Evidence which suggests that Hitler was more a strong leader than he was a dictator:

- his charismatic leadership was in fact enhanced by the chaotic structures of power that resulted from his inaction
- the competing and overlapping centres of power within the regime meant that he was the final arbiter in disputes between his subordinates and thus the final authority
- Hitler was so conscious about his image that he distanced himself from day-to-day decision making so that he could maintain his popularity upon which the notion of his 'strong leadership' rested
- the decision making and policy initiatives that sprang from the process of 'working towards the Führer' indicates that Hitler had enormous personal authority and a hold over his subordinates which stimulated them to act without the need for his specific orders
- Hitler's prejudices set the tone and the aims of the regime, and his method of working meant that he could operate as the supreme authority at the centre of a polycratic state that was chaotic.

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-----------------------|--|
| <b>Hans Mommsen</b>   | States that Hitler was personally insecure, and he was unwilling to make decisions. Hitler was unwilling to act, frequently uncertain, exclusively concerned with upholding his prestige and personal authority, influenced in the strongest fashion by his current entourage, in some respects a weak dictator. |
| <b>Ian Kershaw</b>    | Argues that Hitler's influence in Nazi politics was such that calling him weak is difficult to accept; there are no examples of major policy decisions by Hitler being successfully opposed by subordinates or the Party.  |
| <b>Mary Fulbrook</b>  | Believes that the complexity of the regime that resulted from Hitler's leadership meant that his will alone was the only decisive factor. For the most part, Hitler was able to have his own way on ultimate goals such as racial and foreign policy.  |
| <b>Martin Brozsat</b> | Highlights that the Hitler state was chaotic and polycratic and he had to operate against a background of changing structures and institutional circumstances.   |

## Question 45

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that the churches were the only major obstacle to the Nazi Party's attempts to control German society:**

- despite the 'Nazification' of the German state in the form of *Gleichschaltung* and the punishment of individuals critical of the state, groups and individuals within the German churches opposed and resisted the regime between 1933 and 1939 and were significant obstacles
- 95% of Germans in the 1930s identified as Christian and resistance to the regime from the churches had considerable potential, outwith state control, to mobilise public opinion
- in July 1933, the Nazi government indicated that it supported the creation of a Reich Church to unify the various branches of Protestantism. Pastor Martin Niemöller, although initially supportive of Hitler's aims, began to resent state interference in the church and became one of the leading voices in the Confessional Church, along with Dietrich Bonhoeffer
- two days after Hitler's installation as Chancellor, Dietrich Bonhoeffer delivered a radio broadcast warning Germans of the dangers of blindly accepting the cult of the *Führerprinzip* and further criticised the Nazis as anti-Christian – his radio broadcast was cut-off
- in April 1933, in the wake of a Nazi-organised boycott of Jewish shops, Bonhoeffer was one of the first voices arguing for church opposition to the Nazis' anti-Jewish policies. He argued that the church must not 'bandage the victims under the wheel, but jam the spoke in the wheel itself.' The state-organised boycott was not formally repeated
- attempts to control the Protestant churches met with opposition and in September 1933, over one-hundred Protestant pastors created a breakaway movement, which in October 1934, set up the Confessional Church (*Bekennende Kirche*)
- eventually, 7,000 of Germany's 18,000 Protestant pastors joined the Confessional Church
- the Barmen Conference, involving members of German Protestant faiths – Lutherans, Reformed and United Churches – met in May 1934 and issued the 'Barmen Declaration'. This document urged their followers to worship God, rather than Hitler and Nazism
- despite a Concordat being signed between the Nazi regime and the Roman Catholic Church in July 1933, the relationship quickly became strained. In 1934 the Catholic Bishops' Conference issued a pastoral letter declaring that religion cannot be based on 'blood, race or other dogmas of human creation, but only on divine revelation'
- in June 1936, hundreds of Confessional pastors were sent to concentration camps and their funds confiscated following their letter criticising Nazi ideology (May 1936 letter denouncing the de-Christianising of German life)
- Bishop Clemens von Galen, Catholic Bishop of Munster, initially supported the nationalistic policies of the Nazis but became very critical of the Nazi racial policies and from 1934 preached many sermons against the regime (he latterly became known for his opposition to the Nazi euthanasia programme from 1941 but was seen as too popular to be arrested)
- despite the July 1933 Concordat, Pope Pius XI still spoke out against Nazi doctrine and brutality
- in March 1937, the text of *Mit Brennender Sorge* (With Burning Grief) written by Pope Pius XI was read out on Palm Sunday across Germany. It criticised the Nazis for breaking the Concordat and for their harassment of priests, as well as Nazi worship of the state and race
- in November 1937, faced with a backlash of public opinion, the Nazis withdrew their plan to remove crucifixes from Catholic schools
- the Roman Catholic Church was able to resist the Nazis' attempts to take over their newspapers and communal organisations
- the majority of Gestapo reports on religious dissidents were on Roman Catholics, with 400 priests detained in Dachau
- the view that the churches were the only major obstacle can be seen in the Nazis' crackdown on leading church spokesmen such as Niemöller and in their efforts to undermine support for religion e.g., the 'Church Secession Campaign' which encouraged Germans to abandon their churches. Such was the level of opposition from Germany's Christian churches that, in an effort to undermine the church, Nazi propaganda embarked on smear campaigns against the churches to tarnish their respect amongst the public (sexual and financial allegations resulted in show trials)
- the Nazis remained cautious in dealing with popular leading churchmen such as Galen – despite his criticism of the regime

- regular church activities continued between 1933 and 1939 and the Nazi regime and its methods were still denounced from the pulpit
- political opponents such as the Communists and Social Democrats were quickly targeted by the regime, and most of their activities were driven underground (e.g., SOPADE). With their parties banned and their leaders in custody, the political differences between the Left rendered most of their opposition divided and un-coordinated
- youth opponents of the regime were spurred on mainly by political apathy. The groups (*Swing Jugend* and *Edelweiss Pirates* etc) were inexperienced, numerically insignificant, disparate and were never likely to pose a serious threat
- leading military figures, while suspicious of Hitler's aims, were duty-bound by their oath and this proved a significant obstacle to their opposition.

**Evidence which supports the view that that the churches were not the only major obstacle to the Nazi Party's attempts to control German society:**

- the notion that the churches were not the only major obstacle can be seen from the viewpoint that opposition from religious groups was limited. The churches were unable, or unwilling, to cooperate to resist Nazism, not least because of the differences between the Christian faiths
- the Churches were deeply divided over, and confused about, what to do about the Nazi regime. Both the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches tended to look after their own interests and so came to terms with the regime
- the limited nature of resistance from Germany's churches was also caused by the fact that the Nazis were prepared to use the instruments of the state – police, SS and Gestapo – even against the clergy. Religious leaders knew that resistance would be severely punished and therefore, most kept silent and did not criticise the regime
- concentration camps were never hidden from public view by the Nazis. On the contrary, they made every effort to make sure that the concentration camps were being used to deal with anyone, religious figures included, who opposed the regime
- in general, it was easier to infiltrate Germany's Protestant churches than it was to infiltrate the Roman Catholic Church. The Protestant churches were smaller, greater in number and based within Germany itself
- it is also true that many Nazi policies were popular with religious groups and their congregations. Nazi economic policies, e.g., seemed to bring about genuine benefits
- Nazi foreign policy was also well-received and in 1936, one of the regime's staunchest critics, Bishop von Galen of the Catholic Church, preached a message from the pulpit thanking the Nazis for remilitarising the Rhineland
- in addition, it is also the case that there was broad sympathy for many of the Nazis' other policies, especially where these concerned nationalism and ethnicity
- although driven underground, political opposition from the SPD in exile (SOPADE) managed to smuggle literature critical of the regime from their base in Prague. The KPD formed underground cells, including in the DAF
- active popular opposition was also at the root of workers' absenteeism, slow-downs, and other forms of industrial sabotage
- among some of the traditional elites, there was considerable discussion of replacing Hitler. General Helmut von Moltke's Kreisau Circle centred on a group of army officers and professionals who came together to oppose Hitler from 1933
- there was opposition to the regime from senior military commanders. General Beck's plan to have Hitler arrested was only thwarted by the success of the Munich Conference in 1938. There was also opposition from German military intelligence (the *Abwehr*), led from 1935 by Admiral Canaris
- even within government circles, to begin with, there were some critics. Von Papen spoke out for greater freedom in June 1934 and Hjalmar Schacht was critical of the Nazis' anti-Semitic violence in August 1935.

| <b>Historians</b>                         | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|---|---|
| <b>Ian Kershaw</b>                        | Argues that the German Christian churches showed they were not prepared to tolerate Nazi aggression against them passively. However, their opposition was purely self-defensive, not political.   |
| <b>Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham</b> | Believe that the German Christian churches were the only institutions with an alternative ideology to Nazism and retained some support from the people. The churches were a major obstacle to the Nazis' attempts to take complete control. |
| <b>John Hite and Chris Hinton</b>         | Argue that the German churches were more concerned about protecting their own institutions and beliefs than in speaking out about the nature of the regime.   |
| <b>Martyn Housden</b>                     | Argues that the most significant efforts at resistance came from the establishment sections of German society, that is to say the minor nobility, civil servants and, most notably, members of the officer corps.                           |



## Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 46

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source A   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given.                             |
|---|--|
| Article 54 stated that the Chancellor and Reich Ministers required the confidence of the Reichstag . . .  | If the Chancellor lost a vote, they and their cabinet would have to resign, and a new government selected (not necessarily by a general election). |
| It was based on the principles of universal suffrage.   | Every adult was given the right to vote.   |
| There was even a device in Article 48 which could be used to safeguard democracy through the use of emergency presidential powers, should these be necessary. | Article 48 was originally designed to preserve democracy by using the powers of the President.   |

#### Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the President appointed the Chancellor and could dismiss them if they lost a vote of confidence in the Reichstag
- Article 23 – the Reichstag was to be elected by universal adult suffrage (over the age of 20) every four years. In many respects, the constitution was more democratic in 1919 than that of the UK, where men had to be 21 to vote and some women were given the franchise over the age of 30
- under the system of proportional representation, 60,000 votes were required for one seat in the Reichstag
- Article 48 gave the President the power to safeguard public order and safety, using the armed forces if required, should the republic be endangered. The Reichstag did hold the power to overrule the President's actions, if it felt the President had acted against the best interests of the republic.

#### Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

#### Candidates may offer positive and negative commentary on the democratic nature of the constitution:

- there were two parts to the constitution – part one Structures and part two Rights and Duties
- the constitution created 17 *Länder* (state legislatures). However, in the balance of power, state law could be overruled by federal law. The issue here is that elected *Länder* could have their legislation overruled by Berlin
- voting was using the list system of proportional representation. This led to coalition governments. Coalitions would be formed from parties who had never had to take responsibility for their actions, and who had never worked together constructively
- Article 25 – the President had the power to dismiss the Reichstag and call fresh elections
- the inability to produce stable administrations lay in the combined effects of Articles 52 and 54 of the constitution. Article 52 stated that the Reich government would consist of the Chancellor and the Chancellor's cabinet. Article 54 stated that the Chancellor and cabinet would be duty-bound to resign if they lost the confidence of the Reichstag – if more than 50% of Reichstag members voted against them. In Weimar Germany, this resulted in lengthy spells of crisis and deadlock
- the President was to be elected once every seven years through a run-off whereby the candidate who received the fewest number of votes was eliminated from each round

- under Article 47, the President was the head of all of Germany's armed forces. This created an issue in that the loyalty of members of the armed forces was to an individual as their Commander-In-Chief, rather than to the republic itself
- Article 48 was used several times by Ebert in his time as President of the Republic (1919 to 1925), and he used it exactly as it was meant to be used – to restore public order and security when these were disturbed – deliberately – by extremist groups intent on destroying the Republic and democracy. With the election of Hindenburg as President in 1925, Article 48 was increasingly used to bypass the Reichstag – used 66 times in 1932 alone
- the Chancellor and cabinet were to be appointed by the President
- Article 60 stated that there was to be an upper house – the *Reichsrat*. It was to be elected every four years; however, its powers were merely advisory
- the architect of the constitution, Hugo Preuss, had been an advocate of British-style democracy where parliament was the most important element. However, in 1919, it looked to the middle-class liberal Preuss that a Socialist/Communist grouping might hold permanent power in the new Republic. He feared an authoritarian state in reverse. It was thought that a strong national President, around whom the people could rally, would prevent this and thus his thinking reverted to giving extended powers to the President under Article 48.

| Historians      | Perspective on the issue   |
|-----------------|--|
| Richard J Evans | Argues that Ebert's use and misuse of Article 48 widened its application to a point where it became a threat to democratic institutions. It was widely used against perceived threats from the Left but went unused against what many perceived to be a far greater threat from the Right. |
| Detlev Peukert  | Suggests that the writers of the Constitution, headed by Hugo Preuss, wanted to accommodate mutually antagonistic social pressures, organised pressure groups and competing political ideologies and sets of values.   |
| Ruth Henig      | Believes the constitution was an ambitious and complex document; it sought to lay the basis for a modern parliamentary democracy, in which people would enjoy far-reaching political, social and economic rights.  |
| Klaus Fischer   | Proposes that the final document was in many ways a mirror image of the social dissonances of German society. It was a mixture of principles drawn from left-wing and liberal agendas; it represented so much confusion.   |

## Question 47

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source B  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given  |
|--|--|
| Hitler's government claimed that the fire in the chamber of Germany's parliament, six days before the country was due to vote in yet another general election, was an act of terrorist arson, the opening act of a Communist uprising, which necessitated swift action.  | The source suggests the Nazis were able to claim that the fire was the prelude to a full-blown Communist/KPD uprising and enabled Hitler to declare a state of emergency and exploit the situation.  |
| The following morning, seizing the emergency, the Cabinet passed, and Hindenburg signed, an executive order known formally as the Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State, and informally as the Reichstag Fire Decree, giving the government the power to crack down on opponents and arrest thousands of people across the country. | Argues that seizing on this emergency, the Reichstag Fire Decree gave Hitler legal power to take whatever actions he liked to 'protect' Germany. Explains that in the immediate aftermath of the fire, the security services and police used the fire as an excuse to round up thousands of known opponents of the regime. Many of these opponents were known political adversaries. |
| The Reichstag Fire Decree became the legal foundation for Hitler's twelve-year dictatorship, which some have called the constitution of Hitler's Reich.  | Argues that the Reichstag Fire Decree gave Hitler and the Nazi Party quasi-legitimate powers which they exploited.   |

### Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- prior to the fire, on 4 February 1933, Hindenburg gave the police wide-ranging power to break up political meetings and shut down any media outlets they so desired
- on 14 February 1933, Berlin police officers ransacked the Reichstag offices of the KPD and on 24 February, the KPD's Berlin offices were permanently closed down by the police
- five days before the fire, on 22 February 1933, thousands of Nazi SA and SS members were enrolled as auxiliary police officers
- shortly after the fire was discovered, twenty-four-year-old Dutch stonemason, Marinus Van der Lubbe was discovered in the building, shirtless and sweating. Recent research claims he could not have set the fire due to being 80% blind as a result of an industrial accident. Nonetheless, he was executed on 10 January 1934
- the Reichstag Fire Decree cancelled democratic freedoms enshrined in the Weimar Constitution such as; freedom of speech and assembly, the confidentiality of post and telegraphic communications and freedom from arbitrary searches, arrest and detention.

| Point in Source C   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given                             |
|---|---|
| . . . Hitler introduced the long-planned measure that would enable the Reich Chancellor to prepare laws that deviated from the Constitution without the approval of the Reichstag and without reference to the President. | Argues that under the Weimar Constitution, the President had the power to issue emergency decrees. This Act now transferred that power to Hitler. |
| With the Enabling Act now in force, the Reichstag could effectively be dispensed with.  | Argues that this meant Hitler could rule without consulting the Reichstag.  |
| From this point on, Hitler and his cabinet ruled by decree, either using President Hindenburg as a rubber-stamp, or bypassing him entirely . . .  | Argues that Hitler could have his own way without the need to consult the President.  |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the 'Day of Potsdam' on 21 March 1933 (shortly before the Enabling Act) marked the marriage between the old and new Reichs. Hindenburg and Crown Prince Wilhelm attended. It helped win over more conservative elements in Germany
- the Vice-Chancellor, Franz von Papen was a leading figure in the *Zentrum*, Catholic Centre Party, and the 74 votes of his party were won by reassurances given by Hitler
- in an illegal move, Göring, as the Reichstag's Presiding Officer, reduced the required quorum from 432 to 378 by not counting the KPD deputies who had been legally elected. This made it easier to secure the two-thirds majority required to change the constitution
- only the SPD voted against the Enabling Act
- it was passed by 444 votes to 94
- the Enabling Act was renewed in 1937 and again in 1939.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- during the period of the Nazi consolidation of power between 1933 and 1934, political opposition was crushed, and trade unions destroyed
- by the end of March 1933, 20,000 Communists were in prison and by the summer of 1933, 100,000 Communists, Social Democrats and trade unionists were in a similar position. The arrest of the parties' leadership limited their effectiveness and facilitated the Nazi consolidation of power
- the creation of the Gestapo, the Secret State Police, in April 1933, aided the Nazi consolidation of power
- on 13 March 1933, Goebbels was appointed as Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment. The Nazis took complete control of the press, radio, cinema and all artistic output
- on 7 April 1933, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service banned Jews and non-Germans from employment in public service
- trade unions were abolished on 2 May 1933 and replaced shortly after with the German Labour Front (DAF), headed by Dr Robert Ley
- as an element of the policy of *gleichschaltung* (Coordination), the KdF (Kraft durch Freude) – Strength through Joy organisation was created by the DAF. It aimed to win over workers by improving their leisure facilities and was important in the overall consolidation of power for the regime by appeasing those who could have opposed this
- on 22 June 1933, the SPD were banned and shortly after, other political parties dissolved themselves
- on 14 July 1933, The Law Against the Formation of New Parties was passed. With parties now either banned or having declared themselves defunct, Germany effectively became a one-party state
- the Reichstag was dissolved on 14 October 1933 and in the subsequent elections on 12 November, the Nazis achieved 92% of the vote. The parliamentary list contained only the names of Nazi candidates and further consolidated the regime's hold on power

- the Nazis also consolidated their power through popular policies, e.g., in October 1933, Hitler withdrew Germany from both a Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. Germans had resented the discriminatory nature of armament levels since Versailles
- the establishment of the 'People's Court' in April 1934 ensured that 'treasonable offences' were dealt with harshly. The range of treasonable offences was extended and acted as a deterrent, further consolidating Nazi power
- although Hitler had avoided early whole-scale changes to the administration he inherited, by 1934, potential political opponents Hugenburg and von Papen had been marginalised. This aided the overall Nazi consolidation of power
- in January 1934, elected state assemblies were replaced with new Nazi-appointed state governors. This had originally been enacted on 31 March 1933 when each state government had been ordered to disband. These were re-convened in January 1934 under the control of a Nazi-appointed governor. Their membership reflected the one-party system now in place and the governors (Reichsstadthalter) had the power to fully implement Nazi policies in their regions
- in January 1934, the upper house of the Reichstag, the Reichsrat, was abolished
- on 30 June 1934, the Nazis consolidated their power during the 'Night of the Long Knives', using the power of the SS. This destroyed internal opposition [from the SA] and won support from the army for Hitler
- by the summer of 1934, it was clear that the ageing Hindenburg was terminally ill. On 1 August 1934, the Law Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich was passed. It merged the offices of Chancellor and the President into the combined title of 'Führer and Reich Chancellor'
- on 2 August 1934, the 87-year-old Hindenburg died. With his presidential powers, Hindenburg had retained the legal right to remove Hitler. With his death, the final obstacle to the Nazi consolidation of power was removed
- as President, Hindenburg had been Commander-in-Chief of Germany's armed forces. This power now passed to Hitler
- the question of the combined office of Führer and Chancellor was put to the German people in a plebiscite on 19 August 1934. In the vote, 89.9% of Germans voted in favour of the merged titles. Shortly afterwards, it became compulsory for both members of the armed forces and civil service to swear an oath of loyalty to Hitler.

## Historians

## Perspective on the issue

### David Welch

Argues that the Nazi consolidation of power essentially consisted of three elements – using the legal authority of the state, through terror and coercion and through propaganda.

### Martin Collier and Philip Pedley

State that after the passing of the Enabling Act in March 1933, the Weimar Constitution was dead.

### Richard J Evans

Believes that the Enabling Act gave the cabinet the right to rule by decree without reference either to the Reichstag or the President. Together with the Reichstag Fire Decree it provided the legal pretext for the creation of a dictatorship.

### Roderick Stackelberg

States that the Enabling Act furnished the legal basis for Hitler's dictatorship by conferring full legislative powers upon the chancellor for four years. In essence, the Reichstag now became a rubber stamp.

## Question 48

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D |   | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance  |
|--------------------|---|---|
| <b>Author</b>      | Robert Ley.                                     | Ley had been appointed as head of the DAF (the German Labour Front) in April 1933 at the behest of Adolf Hitler.  |
| <b>Purpose</b>     | An address to workers and employees in Germany. | It explains the purpose of the DAF. The address aims to reassure workers about their rights and conditions of work and that the regime wishes to cooperate with workers. Ley's address is an example of Nazi propaganda aimed at winning over the working classes to the Nazis' aims. |
| <b>Timing</b>      | 2 May 1933.                                     | This was the day after trade union offices had been taken over by the Nazis and all unions in Germany had been forcibly abolished. The DAF was formally established four days after the speech – 6 May 1933.  |

| Point in Source D  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance   |
|--|---|
| We have power, but we do not yet have the whole nation, we do not yet have you workers 100 per cent, and it is you whom we need to help Germany recover. We will not leave you alone until you give us your entire and genuine support.                        | Stresses the desire for total loyalty from the workforce to this regime. His view is that although the Nazis are in government, they do not yet have the unqualified support of the workers. And this is what the Nazis desired. Above all, the Nazis needed the cooperation of the workforce and they would be relentless in achieving this. |
| Mass assemblies are to be arranged for all trade union members and at these, it will be explained to you that the rights of the workers and employees are wholly guaranteed. Workers, I swear to you that we shall preserve everything which currently exists. | The author sincerely promotes the promise that the Nazis will look after them. That existing union rights will be respected, and employment conditions will be honoured.  |
| As soon as possible, we shall build up even further the protection of the worker's rights, so that he can proudly enter the new National Socialist State as a completely worthwhile and respected member of the national community.                            | Emphasises the extent to which workers are respected and valued by the regime. His view is that existing rights will be further improved so that the worker can proudly take their place as a member in the National Community – the Volksgemeinschaft.   |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- in April 1933, Ley was appointed as head of the DAF (*Deutsche Arbeiters' Front*) which aimed to incorporate union activities as part of a wider programme of co-ordination, or *Gleichschaltung* and the DAF formally started on 10 May 1933
- the overall aim of the DAF was ultimately to break the links between workers and their traditional loyalty to the SPD and KPD
- on 21 April 1933, Ley had issued the order to Gauleiters across Germany to deploy the SA and SS on the 1 May 1933 holiday and forcibly take over all union offices
- 1 May 1933 had been transformed from the International Labour Day into the Nazified 'Day of National Labour'
- the purpose of the DAF was primarily to maintain industrial peace and to facilitate the Nazis' overall goal of self-sufficiency, or autarky. To achieve this, there was a combination of propaganda and if necessary, coercion
- in November 1933, the *Kraft durch Freude* (Strength through Joy) organisation was established. Subsidised holidays, sports and leisure activities were available and by 1938, 10 million people had taken a KdF holiday
- the economic recovery after 1933 created around 6 million jobs and was vital in attracting the working class to the regime and its ideology
- thousands of workers got jobs in public works schemes, labour service or, after 1935, in the army
- the Beauty of Labour (*Schönheit der Arbeit*) organisation was set up in 1934 to persuade employers to improve the conditions of workers. By enticing the workforce, Ley further hoped this would destroy workers' traditional party loyalties
- most workers enjoyed increases in real wages after 1933 and skilled workers prospered with a return to full employment by 1936
- in a further enticement to the workforce, the regime increased the number of paid annual holidays from 3 days in 1933 to 6–12 by 1939
- in 1938, the DAF coordinated the Volkswagen (People's Car) programme. In an attempt to win over the workforce, subscribers made weekly contributions of 5 Marks with the promise of a car in the future. No worker ever received a Volkswagen.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- policies were also directed at persuading the *Mittelstand* to embrace Nazi ideology. Cut-price competition between businesses was banned; the state and party agencies gave preferential treatment to small businesses; the establishment of new department stores was banned on 12 May 1933; the state made available low interest loans and a share of confiscated Jewish trade. The policy of rearmament after 1936 favoured big business and the small craft industries could not compete. The number of self-employed craft workers – the backbone of the *Mittelstand* – fell by half a million between 1936 and 1939
- the Nazis attempted to create a policy of *Blut und Boden* (Blood and Soil) in an attempt to protect a healthy and economically-secure rural community. Tariffs on imported foods were increased and farmers' debts were cancelled; an attempt was made to safeguard small and medium sized farmers by the Reich Entailed Law of 29 September 1933 which identified farms of 30 acres as being hereditary farms which had to be passed on to the eldest son without being broken up. As a result of such interventions, farming income did recover from post-1929 levels. However, from 1937 it fell again as labour costs rose while prices remained fixed
- Nazi ideology stressed that women should be confined to the domestic sphere. On 10 May 1933, Robert Ley announced the creation of the Women's Front. In the first years of the regime the number of women in employment generally remained low, but this number crept up as war approached and by 1939, stood at 14 million employed women – 3 million more than in 1933
- the Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service, April 7 1933, banned all Jews from government employment. Hindenburg insisted on some exceptions – Jews who had fought in the Great War
- in June 1935, the *Reichsarbeitsdienst*, The Reich Labour Service (RAD) was established. Six months' labour service was made compulsory for males aged 19 to 25. This was extended to females in 1939. The aim of the RAD was to 'educate youth in the spirit of Nazism'. Most workers were employed in agriculture or in public works, such as the *Autobahns*

- a series of laws between June and October 1938 banned Jewish workers from having Aryan clients – law, medicine and dentistry and Jews were excluded from some commercial activities
- the Decrees for the Exclusion of Jews from Economic Life of November 1938 banned Jews from bidding for public business contracts and from most aspects of wider German economic life
- by 1936, there were growing signs of workers' discontent expressed in, e.g., go-slows, absenteeism and a rapid turnover of staff
- by 1936, there were increasing levels of boredom, mistrust and indifference to the regime among the workers. Unlike the trade unions it replaced, the DAF was not involved in wage negotiations. The DAF is illustrative of how independent organisations, like unions, were replaced by Nazi-controlled ones
- although there was economic recovery, workers increasingly resented the regimentation of their lifestyle and did not trust state propaganda
- workers' real incomes were affected by compulsory contributions to the DAF and to other schemes such as *Winterhilfe*
- generally, the German workforce lost some freedom, but gained some improved facilities.

| Historians        | Perspective on the issue   |
|-------------------|--|
| K D Bracher       | Argues that what 'the DAF offered as a substitute for freedom (e.g., appeals to national pride) . . . could not alter the fact that employer and employee continued to stand in opposite corners'.                                       |
| Timothy W Mason   | Argues 'the regime mounted a sustained, ingenious and multi-faceted effort to destroy the basic solidarities of working-class life with the aim of transforming labour from a social activity into a political duty for the individual'. |
| William Jannen Jr | Argues that 'far from creating a docile and infinitely malleable man the Nazis were inhibited from imposing essential labour policies for fear of resistance'.   |
| Richard J Evans   | Argues that this new system of industrial relations represented a major victory for the employers, backed by Hitler and the Nazi leadership, who badly needed the cooperation of industry in their drive to rearm.                       |



**PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES**

**Question 49**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which supports the view that the legacy of the Boer War was the driving policy:**

- Milner's policy of reconstruction sought to maintain British supremacy while appeasing Afrikaners aggrieved by war. Aim was a British society
- Transvaal, Orange Free State and northern Cape financially ruined by war
- deep rooted hatred of British, worsened by scorched earth policy and concentration camps
- British vilified internationally for 'methods of barbarism' arguably sought to redeem reputation
- victory in the Boer War was not decisive – Boers had to be promised internal self-government as soon as possible
- reconstruction set out in part through British reparations in the Treaty of Vereeniging: investment, increased mine production, compensation to Boers for war damage
- Britain could not afford another South African War (tension growing in Europe as evinced by arms race)
- British security interests – naval base/foothold in South Africa.

**Evidence which supports the view that other factors were driving policy:**

**Economic factors:**

- British aim to solve labour problems, maintaining cheap labour, through encouraging migration of Chinese and Mozambicans. 60,000 Chinese immigrants entered mines by 1904
- Africans increasingly used for cheap labour in mines
- expansion of rail network, transport system, unified taxation and weights and measures to improve trade between colonies
- many Afrikaners and some British deeply suspicious of Milner's 'capital investment' – anti capital feeling ran high on the Rand
- widely recognised that mining was the lifeblood of the union. The importance of gold as a source of revenue
- post-war reconstruction administration had worked towards union to bolster the economy
- Liberal desire to maintain economic advantage from mining to help fund social welfare reform post 1906
- Milner needed Boer agriculture to provide food for urban areas and ensure economic stability
- Milner believed in efficiency through unity in order to overcome post-war economic problems
- increase in existing trade between four colonies in the likes of skins/cloth. 'Self-help' belief.

**Social factors:**

- Treaty of Vereeniging described as a 'White man's peace' (Barber)
- drive to increase British majority in electorate in Transvaal through immigration policies serves to anger Afrikaners
- denationalisation of Dutch as speaking the language banned in public schools and courts
- no uniform racial policy post-war between the four colonies. Many Afrikaners concerned about 'soft' British attitudes. Not helped by Bambatha rebellion in 1906
- preserve white control when a demographic minority.

**Political factors:**

- Milner, 'known for his hawkish expansionist goals' (Barber) appointed his 'kindergarten' to administer post-war South Africa
- Liberal Party grants instant self-government to Boer colonies rather than a long drawn-out process as Milner had planned
- within 5 years of the war, two Boer regions are self-governing again. Selborne supported movement for union, partly to avoid disputes between colonies
- restriction of franchise post 1906 in Transvaal to ensure English speaking working class was not dominated by Afrikaners, though British calculated wrongly
- growing Afrikaner nationalism evident in local elections in Transvaal and Orange Free State where Het Volk and Orangia Unie secure victories
- even in the Cape, anti-imperialists came to power in 1908 backed by 'Afrikaner Bond'
- by 1908 only Natal sympathetic to British imperial interests
- increasing tension in Europe saw Liberals more prepared to give more power to the region
- Milner sought union in the hope it would be attractive to all whites.

**Historians****Perspective on the issue****James Barber**

Argues that the Boer war and Vereeniging were instrumental in shaping British policy in South Africa, resulting in a British U-turn over issues of race including the franchise for blacks and facilitating the extension of segregation in the pre-Union years.

**Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido**

Argues that the Milner government post-war 'was determined to transform all black tenants into wage labourers', prioritising mining interests in the post-war years.

**Albert Grundlingh**

Argues that British policies in South Africa were shaped by the bitter legacy of the Boer War and that Botha and Smuts faced an uphill struggle to 'sell' union to Afrikaners embittered and scarred by war.

**Denis Judd and Keith Surridge**

Argue that the legacy of the Boer War, and the fact that the Afrikaners were not 'a beaten army' forced the British to be more conciliatory towards Afrikaners in terms of reparations and fostering white unity.

## Question 50

Candidates may refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that alienation of white workers (socio-economic factors) cost Smuts the 1924 election:**

- impact of post-war recession on white workers economic situation and wages
- Hertzog discusses redistribution of mining profits to workers/rural communities rather than to the British
- 1913 and 1922 strikes over low pay
- Rand Revolt of 1922 saw Smuts put down workers with artillery leading Hertzog to describe him as 'a man whose hands dripped with the blood of his own people'
- influx of Afrikaners into towns/surrounded by wealthy English speakers and felt their jobs threatened by black workers
- increase in trade unions fostered growth of nationalism
- influx of black workers into cities increased fear of 'black swamping'
- NP emphasis on Afrikaner interests – rural focus
- NP/Labour Pact attracts trade unionists and farmers
- money provided to British navy reduces expenditure on social provisions
- SAP strategy appeared to combine suppression of white workers with meeting some of their needs through increasing segregationist policy
- Riotous Assembly Act ostracised the working class to protect the economy of the mines, banning all public protests deemed 'dangerous'.

**Evidence which supports the view that political factors cost Smuts the 1924 election:**

- Afrikaners admonish Smuts for being too pro mine owners – exaggerated by SAP merger with Unionist Party after the 1920 election
- SAP need to maintain Unionist Party supporters after 1921 election victory against growing National Party support
- Afrikaners increasingly pro NP rather than SAP
- unpopular connections of Smuts to the British
- 1921 election – SAP/Unionist merger fails to satisfy Afrikaners/white workers. Merger broadens party and increases factions
- NP manifesto to promote South Africa's prosperity, focus on social issues and move away from the Empire
- different attitudes towards Smuts' promotion of a 'single white nation' and one which develops in 'parallel streams' (Hertzog)
- Botha and Smuts regarded as 'creatures of the Empire' according to Hertzog
- Pact Government enticing: NP ideas of autonomy and Christian Nationalism, whilst Labour Party helped poor whites with voting rights
- Malan brings together interests of Afrikaner wine and fruit farmers, wool farmers and Afrikaner business interests in the Cape.

### **Evidence which supports the view that military factors cost Smuts the 1924 election:**

- most damage arguably caused by Smuts' support for Empire in WWI – some Afrikaners supported the Germans. Many of these poor whites had of course recently lost a war against the British
- rebellion by some troops when ordered to attack Germans in North Africa – 190 rebels killed, seen as Afrikaner heroes. Benefits NP due to Hertzog's appeal for them to receive pardon
- Smuts' contribution to the war internationally recognised but he is seen by poor whites to have neglected domestic concerns. Hertzog accuses Smuts of being 'out of touch'
- force used against African tribes causes resentment amongst liberal politicians
- some Afrikaners still hoping to regain independence openly rebelled/went over to the Germans. Many were poor whites. The rebellion fuelled the mythology of growing Afrikaner nationalism
- SAP further undermined as a result of clashes with blacks which led to accusations of incompetence from the NP (e.g., Action against African Millenarian sect, Bulhoek Farm near Queenstown, 1921 – 163 killed)
- response to SANNC-sponsored resistance campaign against Pass Laws on the Rand
- demonstrations broken up by police using considerable force
- Smuts called in the Active Citizen Force in the Rand, 1922. This resulted in the bombing of white suburbs in Johannesburg and the death of 2,000 people.

| <b>Historians</b>      | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|------------------------|---|
| <b>James Barber</b>    | Argues that the main challenge to the government at the time 'came not from blacks but from militant white labour'. The SAP did nothing to help Afrikaners.   |
| <b>Herman Giliomee</b> | Highlights the suppression of the Rand Revolt as throwing the SAP back onto a shrinking support base of mostly richer and older Afrikaners. The result was that Hertzog and the NP captured half the Afrikaner vote as early as 1915. |
| <b>Merle Lipton</b>    | Argues that 'Hertzog outbid Botha and Smuts on issues such as the imperial connection'.   |
| <b>Nigel Worden</b>    | Describes the limitations of the SAP's legislation in alleviating hardships suffered by many poorer white workers, both in industry and in agriculture.   |

## Question 51

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that demands for a permanent supply of Native labour explained the introduction of apartheid:**

- apartheid as a means of extending the benefits of the migrant labour system to the manufacturing industry
- decentralisation of industry would enable manufacturers to exploit cheap labour from the reserves
- gradual relocation of industry to the fringes of the reserves (pursued with greater vigour after 1959)
- reserves unable to support bulk of Africans any longer therefore other methods discussed such as tighter influx controls
- influx controls not readily enforced
- 1952 Urban Areas Act, particularly section 10 constraints – pragmatic approach rather than total separation
- the ‘ambiguous’ content of the Sauer Report
- commercial farmers would be guaranteed a ready supply of labour from the reserves.

**Evidence which supports the view that other factors led to the introduction of apartheid:**

**Political/ideology:**

- apartheid as a policy of self-preservation. White/Afrikaner fear that equality of the races would lead to eventual disappearance of the white nation in South Africa
- NP justified policy as not only protecting whites but safeguarding the Bantu by allowing them to develop as separate people
- details of 1950s legislation such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, Population Registration Act, Immortality Act, Separate Amenities Act, Group Areas Act, Bantu Authorities Act
- establishment of SABRA (South African Bureau for Racial Affairs)
- apartheid policy fuelled in the early years by Afrikaner academics including Cronje who advocated racial superiority to ensure long time survival of Afrikaners
- early legislation associated with the Dutch Reformed Church (Malan, Verwoerd and Eiselen)
- influx control would protect interests of white workers threatened by lower wages of black workers
- influence of the FAK and the 1944 Volkskongres on Afrikaner racial policy
- fears of social miscegenation.

**Fear of black uprisings:**

- influx control legislation would restrict process of black urbanisation which had grown rapidly in the 1940s and threatened to create an urban proletariat
- growing unity of resistance and mobilisation of grass roots discontent e.g. in the Alexandria bus boycotts and pass burning of the 1940s
- 1946 blacks made up 79% of the population. This continued to rise resulting in an increased fear of ‘die swart gevaar’ (‘black menace’)
- resistance to apartheid grew in townships which developed after the Native Resettlement Act of 1954.

| <b>Historians</b>      | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|------------------------|--|
| <b>Dan O'Meara</b>     | Argues, as a Marxist historian, that the notion of 'total separation' was never taken seriously since this would have disrupted the process of capital accumulation. The Sauer report aimed to protect economic interests of Afrikaner capitalists, especially farmers.  |
| <b>Deborah Posel</b>   | Argues it was forces beyond Afrikanerdom that drove apartheid as the National Party could not agree in the 1940s on such issues as the long-term need for African labour. Therefore, the development of apartheid was influenced by external factors such as the English-speaking business community and black extra-parliamentary opposition. |
| <b>Harold Wolpe</b>    | Argued, as a radical historian, that apartheid ideology was a way of justifying the extension of cheap labour to manufacturing, extending the provision beyond the mines and agriculture based on the changing nature of the economy.  |
| <b>T Dunbar Moodie</b> | Emphasises the negative aspects of apartheid ideology whereby racial integration was seen as sinful since it defied God's will, whereas racial separation represented the Divine Will.   |

## Question 52

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that entrenchment of apartheid in the 1960s was due to more radical African resistance to the state:**

- ANC's campaign of limited violence (Umkhonto we Sizwe or MK reject all-out violence against the white community). Aims were unstaffed targets such as electricity pylons
- ANC/PAC banned and forced underground, developing bases outside South Africa
- government repression or 'granite response' with 90-day detention law
- real attempts to develop Homelands policy to provide outlet for African aspirations and, perhaps, to assuage international opinion
- Africans burning pass books, stay at home protests
- young Africans left South Africa to train as guerrillas in China, USSR and independent African states
- 18,000 arrests following emergency regulations post Sharpeville and active recruitment of additional police forces
- mobilisation of Active Citizen Force
- government increased borders security and raided into areas that were still British protectorates
- new police reserve created in 1961
- Defence Act (1961) extended the period of military training
- police infiltration of CPSA and at least one high profile political trial every year after 1965
- 1968 BOSS – Bureau of State Security established.

**Evidence which supports the view that entrenchment of apartheid in the 1960s was due to demands of the economy:**

- economy suffered following Sharpeville. Emigration by professional white workers who feared civil war
- investors increasingly taking money out of South Africa after Sharpeville. Government imposed currency restrictions
- gold and foreign exchange reserves had collapsed from R315m in June 1960 to R142m in June 1961. Need to rebuild economy after recession. Dramatic recovery by the late 1960s
- demand for labour (economic boom in late 1960s) saw ineffectiveness of attempts to increase restriction of residential rights and relocation of industry
- large squatter villages appearing
- economy quick to recover in the wake of government repression and control
- growing Afrikaner wealth, international investment after 1961 (including British) – importation of heavy machinery, technical innovations.

**Evidence which supports the view that entrenchment of apartheid in the 1960s was due to ideology:**

- Republican Referendum, October 1960 and leaving the Commonwealth the following year
- Verwoerd initially refuses all calls to modify apartheid in early 1960s
- relaxation of immigration controls to allow more English-Speaking whites to move to South Africa
- Publications Control Board established to prohibit importation of materials considered subversive (socialist/radical)
- South African Broadcasting Corporation required to openly support the government
- Legislation to encourage the relocation of industry to Homelands (unpopular with many industrialists)
- forced resettlements from squatter camps increased discontent
- removal of all control of local issues from local councils
- restriction of African presence in white areas by restricting residential rights even further, encouraging labour migrancy
- 1968 saw creation of Coloured Persons' Representative Council
- creation of Transkei as first Bantustan self-governing state, 1963.

| <b>Historians</b>       | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|-------------------------|---|
| <b>Herman Giliomee</b>  | Argues that the Separate Development policy of the National Party seen as a way of nurturing identity of the different peoples of South Africa.   |
| <b>James Barber</b>     | Argues that policies of the 1960s were primarily through necessity as previous apartheid policies were not working. 'Instead of finding a clear path ahead, the government had marched into a cul-de-sac'.  |
| <b>Peter Clements</b>   | Argues that while the economy suffered in the early 1960s as a result of Sharpeville and the international response, the 1960s marked the most confident years of apartheid with an economy driven to recover in the wake of government repression and control. |
| <b>Ian van der Waag</b> | Sees the 1960s, as a military historian, as a period of 'Hot War' in South Africa as the government faced dealing with newly militant resistance organisations. Consequently, security of the state was prioritised.  |



## Question 53

Candidates might refer to:

### Evidence which supports the Cold War's influence on South African foreign policy:

- in context of Cold War, the West saw South Africa as a valuable ally
- after 1979 both the Reagan administration and Thatcher government shared the determination to oppose the spread of communism in Africa
- influence of Cold War in limiting Western pressure on the South African government – failure of arms embargoes related to Cold War
- large amounts of Western capital – over \$26 billion – invested in South Africa
- Labour government, 1970s and the USA veto sanctions and largely follow pro South African policy allowing capital and investment in the country
- successive South African governments worked hard to convince the West only a stable, white minority government could resist communism getting a hold in South Africa
- USSR supplying arms to resistance movements but her involvement may have been exaggerated as a result of Cold War paranoia
- US sought 'constructive engagement' with the South African government who they saw as a key player in the struggle against the USSR (especially under Reagan)
- only in the 1980s, during détente, did coverage of township violence and the brutality of the security forces result in significant change from the West. The South African government fought hard to prevent Western disinvestment by starting to moderate the regime – Botha's 'adapt or die'.

### Evidence which supports external pressures influencing South African foreign policy:

- Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' speech, 1960 highlighting changes through Africa
- transfer of power to African nationalists in all British territories in West Africa
- French relinquished control of their colonies in west and central Africa in 1960 and the Belgians withdrew from the Congo
- 1960–1964 British transferred power to Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia. Only prevented in Rhodesia by the Smith government's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965)
- by 1970, African led governments controlled much of Southern Africa
- Portuguese grant independence to Angola and Mozambique, 1975. South Africa virtually surrounded by African states, all potentially hostile to apartheid. Corresponds with rapid increase in defence spending
- South African control of Namibia had incurred increasing hostility of the United Nations, culminating in 1977 Security Council vote in favour of arms embargo against South Africa
- Vorster conceded South Africa had few diplomatic links in Africa and that 'some bridges had collapsed' arguably leading to Botha's 'total national strategy', partly in response to the situation in Africa
- aims of South African government in forming an anti-communist constellation of southern African states dashed by refusal of Lesotho, Swaziland and Basotho joining
- increasingly coercive policy – in Namibia military operations against SWAPO stepped up at same time the government started to provide support for the anti-FRELIMO Mozambique National Resistance
- frontline states economically dependent on South Africa (railways, labour), limiting their capacity to threaten South Africa directly
- Churches and Christian based organisations spreading awareness. Sporting questions like Basil D'Oliveira affair encouraged white sympathies
- role of the ANC in exile. MK raids from Mozambique in the early 1980s
- pressure from the United Nations including in 1968 – General Assembly requested all States and organisations 'to suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime and with organisations or institutions in South Africa which practise apartheid'.

**Evidence which supports domestic pressures influencing South African foreign policy:**

- economic concerns including the falling price of gold, rising price of oil, the balance of payment crisis and rising inflation. Emphasis placed on need to sustain international trade
- changes within South African economy leading to demands for a more stable and urbanised workforce – shapes relations with neighbouring countries supplying over 250,000 migrant workers
- growth of powerful Trade Unions
- unrest in the townships (including Soweto) along with the rapid growth of the African urban population in squatter camps
- impact of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commission reports
- introduction of National Service
- black resistance increasingly dominated by the non-racialism of the ANC/SACP in the early 1980s
- formation of the National Forum and the UDF in 1983.

**Historians****Perspective on the issue****James Barber and John Barratt**

Argue that 'Pretoria's regional policy was in tatters. From the tatters a new policy emerged but it was a reaction to adversity not the government's chosen path'.

**Leonard Thompson**

Emphasises the threat posed by Marxist, or apparently Marxist governments, in many of the frontline states which determined Pretoria's harder line regional policy in which South African commandoes carried out undercover operations against every one of its neighbours between 1981 and 1983.

**Saul Dubow**

Argues that the arrival of the Cold War on South Africa's doorstep created 'the spectre of the country being surrounded by hostile states directed by Moscow'. This provided opportunities for South Africa's reformers to downplay apartheid as a system of racial rule by emphasising the country's commitment to the defence of Western interests.

**Merle Lipton**

Writing in 1985, argues that 'The Trend (among capitalists) is towards increasing opposition (to apartheid) and it has been accelerating'. Capitalist interests in South Africa were already working to undermine apartheid by the late 1970s and early 1980s.

## PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

## Question 54

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source A |  | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance   |
|--------------------|--|--|
| <b>Author</b>      | South African Native National Congress.                                  | Early resistance organisation designed to challenge segregationist legislation. Active in challenging legislation through legitimate means so informed participants in resistance.   |
| <b>Purpose</b>     | Statement of opposition to the consequences of the 1913 Native Land Act. | Organisation clearly objected to extension of segregation and Sol Plaatje directly attacked the consequences of the Land Act in his 1916 <i>Native Life</i> . Aim to challenge the act on humanitarian grounds though limited pressure on government.                            |
| <b>Timing</b>      | 1916.  | 3 years after the introduction of the Native Land Act when consequences were beginning to bite for non-whites living in Reserves. Experiencing impact of other early legislation and pressures of the war so useful in reflecting growing opposition but limitations of methods. |

| Point in Source A  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance  |
|--|--|
| As a result, the Executive Committee is instructed to immediately launch a campaign for the collection of funds to finance this resolution against the Natives Land Act.   | This shows a greater sense of urgency by using the words 'immediately launch'.<br>Useful as it shows greater strategy and organisation of SANNC to finance campaign as a result of previous financial weaknesses restricting protest.  |
| A further measure that should be taken is that this resolution must respectfully be sent to the Governor-General, the Missionary Societies and other interested bodies, and to the Anti-Slavery Aborigines Protection Society. | Useful as it shows they intend to send their resolution to important decision makers to make them aware of how they feel. The source suggests this was still done in a very 'respectful' and deferential way which was criticised by many feeling progress was slow as a result. |

| Point in Source A   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance  |
|---|--|
| Also it is vital that the Chief Executive appoint a deputation of three to place this resolution before the Union Government at the earliest opportunity. . . | Useful as the SANNC believes it is key to send a delegation to express their grievances in person and this strategy is seen in subsequent years. Use of 'vital' displays sense of urgency and gravity of request but weakness of resistance given scale of deputation/action urged here. |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the nature of white rule in South Africa and the social, economic and political difficulties of resistance
- the extension of state and employer control made resistance much harder
- early leadership disdainful of popular agitation and so failed to link with other aspects of resistance. Many leaders mission educated
- early rural resistance is local and not capitalised on by ANC/other organisations
- early leadership of resistance organisations criticised as being middle class, elitist and out of touch with the masses
- early methods deemed 'gentlemanly' and lacked impact such as delegations sent to Versailles. Focused on deputations and petitions
- early leaders did not expect to gain power and hoped the justice of their cause would change White men's attitudes. Aimed for equal opportunity, not political power, or African domination
- some leaders, including Dube, were reluctantly prepared to accept rural segregation as long as there was a just distribution of land
- ANC policy of working with those who had political power bound them more closely to the ruling class.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- the 1920s exposed the divisions within the ANC
- for much of the 1930s the ANC was divided with Africanists and Communists
- under Gumede ANC developed close links with Communist Party – increased factions and criticism
- ANC radicals in Western Cape mounted civil disobedience campaign to achieve native republic, further exacerbating splits within the ANC
- opposition to Hertzog's Native Bills was led by the All African Convention, not the ANC
- financial scandals and disputes destroyed the ICU
- by 1930s ANC membership did not exceed 1,000. The more radical ICU was far more significant in the 1920s because they attempted to establish a mass movement, although this was not the view of the ANC
- women played little part in the early ANC
- diversity of African resistance movements and lack of agreement about aims and methods
- black intellectuals maintained support for education and working within the existing system (despite impact of the WW1 post-war recession and later the Great Depression)
- ANC leadership accused of being preoccupied by petit-bourgeois interests such as obtaining a free market
- ANC leadership bitterly divided and split into warring cliques
- trade union activities not capitalised on by resistance organisations.

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-----------------------|--|
| <b>Nigel Worden</b>   | Argues that 'The national political organisations (the ANC) failed to identify with the kinds of struggles and grievances being faced by the majority of South Africans'.  |
| <b>Andre Odendaal</b> | Argues that the ANC and resistance organisations mistakenly pursued a policy of 'hopeful reliance on the common sense of justice and love of freedom so innate in the British character'.  |
| <b>Tom Lodge</b>      | Argues that resistance was ineffective on account of leaders being middle class men who feared 'being thrust back into the ranks of the urban and rural poor'.   |
| <b>Saul Dubow</b>     | Assesses the role of the ANC within resistance more leniently than other historians: 'The resort to oral suasion was a pragmatic strategy that had to be exhausted before being abandoned'. Nevertheless, Dubow describes the ANC as 'moribund' by 1936. |

## Question 55

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source B   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the interpretations in the source  |
|---|--|
| . . . stirred Afrikaner emotions more between the Anglo-Boer War and the Second World War than the symbolic oxwagon trek of 1938.                                   | Centenary of the Great Trek celebrations saw outpouring from many Afrikaners as it emphasised their heritage and shared history. Emotional response of Afrikaners to Afrikaner symbolism of trek celebrations. |
| The Afrikaner Broederbond, who had planned and organised it, had already established many organisations to foster Afrikaner culture and socio-economic improvement. | Broederbond credited with organising and arranging activities to foster Afrikaner nationalism.   |
| Deep down the Afrikaners wanted unity, feeling increasingly oppressed by non-Afrikaners . . .   | Desire of Afrikaners for unity emphasised by Trek. Afrikaners increasing feeling oppressed by non-Afrikaners, effectively 'circling the wagons' to defend themselves.  |

### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- cultural explanation of reasons for the growth of Afrikaner Nationalism focus of the source
- Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK) role in promoting Afrikaner culture and identity
- Eufees celebrations of 1938 and Malan's 'Blood River' speech – a tenth of Afrikaners attended celebrations
- Ossewabrandwag (1938) – cultural organisation which grew out of the Voortrekker celebrations
- role of Dutch Reformed Church
- Broederbond aim of creating a total Afrikaner dominance – increasingly successful in recruiting Afrikaner elite
- Afrikaner literature, music and culture grew as likes of Gustav Preller published in Afrikaans as the 'populariser of history'.

### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- new Afrikaner institutions including SANTAM and SANLAM
- FAK also organised the Volkskongres, 1939 to investigate poverty among Afrikaners
- impact of devaluation crisis and Great Depression on Afrikaners. Falling demand for exports led to overcrowding in the reserves and black squatter communities on the edge of towns
- growing awareness of the inequality of poor Afrikaners and Malan's commitment to the poor white question
- establishment of Afrikaner relief fund to support poor whites
- growing urbanisation of Afrikaners (half in towns by 1936)
- establishment of Afrikaner Trade Unions to win allegiance of Afrikaner workers such as the Spoorbond for railway workers in 1934
- Nationalist propaganda including Die Burger and Die Huisgenoot
- distrust of Fusion and the formation of the United Party
- changes in leadership of Afrikanerdom as those of the Purified National Party young, urban intellectuals, unlike older rural Afrikaners in support of Hertzog
- United Party find it increasingly difficult to counter or ignore increasingly well organised nationalists
- findings of 1932 Carnegie Commission on poor whites revealed extent of urban poverty.

| <b>Historians</b>        | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|--------------------------|--|
| <b>Albert Grundlingh</b> | Argues that the foundations of growing Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s were actually laid during the Boer War. The impact of the Depression mobilised Afrikaners as a result of longstanding grievances which were articulated by the National Party under Malan. |
| <b>Dan O'Meara</b>       | Emphasises the significance of the Great Depression in developing class consciousness amongst poor white Afrikaners, enhanced by growing levels of urbanisation. These ethnic economics he labelled 'Volkskapitalisme'.  |
| <b>Lindie Koorts</b>     | Argues that Malan is instrumental in the development of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s through his leadership of the Purified National Party and the likes of his Blood River Speech.  |
| <b>Leonard Thomson</b>   | Argues that the weakness of Afrikaner unity was the cult of leadership prior to 1934. The subsequent growth of nationalism arose due to politicians mobilising common grievances.  |

## Question 56

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source C  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given  |
|--|--|
| . . . created by literacy and town living, there was room for a different kind of politics in which ideology and comradeship would to an extent replace obedient respect for tribal leaders. | Contends that growing urbanisation and literacy levels reduces ties to patrimonial leaders. This leads to greater mobilisation of resistance forces due to living in close proximity and less under 'control' of tribal leaders in cities. |
| Teachers, priests, and journalists spread its messages.  | Highlights the view that the message of self-help was actively encouraged by prominent members of black society. Black Consciousness message spread by many including teachers, priests and journalists.                                   |
| . . .the University Christian Movement with 3,000 members, mainly black by 1968, were probably the most influential agency of Black Consciousness during the early 1970s.                    | Argues that the Influence of the large, black University Christian Movement was most influential, that these larger organisations also spread the message of Black Consciousness.  |

### Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Steve Biko was the acknowledged leader of the Black Consciousness movement in South Africa, initially involved with NUSAS but later helped form SASO (South African Students Organisation)
- Biko argued that the Africans' struggle within South Africa necessitated both psychological liberation and then physical liberation
- Philosophy of Black Consciousness: by seeking to emulate whites, blacks were belittling themselves, be proud to be black
- South African Students Organisation, and Biko as the figurehead, became the leading voice of opposition to apartheid within South Africa.

| Point in Source D   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given  |
|---|--|
| . . . a period of recession which led to black protest and renewed labour conflict.   | Argues the importance of the response of black workers to the economic downturn, that growing labour conflict between blacks and whites was as a result of the recession.                |
| . . . strikes broke out at factory level in response to specific grievances.  | Argues that resistance was linked to the increasing strikes in factories as a result of grievances, that growing levels of unrest on account of worker discontent influenced resistance. |
| In Natal the high incidence of strike action, which was supported by Buthelezi, was explained by the ease of communication between workers in various different factories who commuted from the nearby KwaZulu Natal. | Contends that the homelands policy and workers travelling to and from factories as a result facilitated greater solidarity/communication.  |



**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- emergence of a vigorous black labour movement – Increasingly dynamic Trade Unions
- by 1979 there were 27 illegal democratically organised African Trade Unions
- numerous strikes, mainly locally organised, involving large numbers of workers
- the Wehahn Commission by 1979 recommended that African Trade Unions be recognised, and appropriate legislation subsequently passed demonstrating the effectiveness of this form of resistance in the revival
- influence of Black Consciousness Movement in the strikes of 1972–1973.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- by late 1970s ANC increasingly focussing on urban areas and building mass organisations
- Black People's Convention – Biko as honorary President by 1972
- connection between BCM and the Soweto Uprising
- Soweto Uprising increases development of 'protest culture'. Increasing number of young whites identifying with the movement
- beyond South Africa the ANC and PAC attempted to build external organisations directed against the South African government. 1970s saw the further development of funding from China and the USSR and the development of training camps outside of South Africa
- Inkatha was revived in 1975, a movement based largely on KwaZulu ethnicity. Claimed to have 300,000 members by 1980
- Azanian People's Organisation formed in 1978, bringing together the BPC, BCP and SASO, all organisations which had been banned in 1977 after the Soweto riots
- the spread of Black Consciousness ideas among the ANC in exile as large numbers of activists joined ANC training camps
- despite the BCM, black resistance was dominated by the late 1970s by the non-racialism of the ANC/SACP
- 1970 Black Communities Programme, establishing self-help groups for communities
- mid 1970s onwards there was a marked increase in MK sabotage activities
- Soweto Uprising 1976 and death of Biko in police custody 1977. International reactions.

| Historians   | Perspective on the issue  |
|--------------|---|
| Saul Dubow   | Argues that the Soweto Uprising was key in the revival of resistance as the government would never again regain control over the black population. 'It heralded the demise of white supremacy and made real the possibility of liberation for the first time'.  |
| Nigel Worden | Highlights the impact of the economic recession of the late 1970s as generating greater resistance, particularly from trade unions and in the shape of urban unrest.  |
| Gail Gerhart | Assesses the importance of developing African nationalism through Lembede's ANC to Biko and the BCM. However, Gerhart believes that Black Consciousness was not sufficiently in touch with pressing political and economic problems and had therefore 'outlived its usefulness'.  |
| Francis Meli | Relates the emergence of Black Consciousness to the broader international student protests in the late 1960s/early 1970s, as well as to the process of decolonisation occurring at the same time. As an ANC historian, Meli is critical of the contradictions within the BCM, emphasising the contribution of the ANC in the 1970s. |

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 57

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view of economic difficulties as the main factor for the decline of the Tsarist state:**

- wages for urban workers doubled between August 1914 to January 1917 but prices quadrupled, leading to dramatic decline in living standards of working class and lower-middle class families
- food shortages grew worse from 1914 – January 1917 as the transport system experienced major difficulties as railways were commandeered by the Military for the war effort. Civilian economy under strain as transport system breaking down in late 1916
- Government banned vodka sales in 1915 which severely reduced state income from alcohol taxation
- food exports stopped due to German and Ottoman Turkey blockade of Baltic and Black Sea ports leads to a decline in revenue for the Tsarist state
- 1916 saw severe shortages of food supplies, fuel for the northern cities and queues for basic supplies lengthened in a very severe winter
- peasant economy still producing food but peasants refused to market grain due to lack of industrial products from cities to meet demands of peasantry for metal-based products
- peasant commune resorting to self-sufficiency and withdrawing from the market by late 1916
- rouble inflation leading to severe decline in urban workers living standards as Government withdrew from the Gold Standard to pay war bills
- labour and fertiliser shortages caused large estates to reduce production in 1915 and in autumn 1916
- peasants fed grain to farm animals in expectation of higher prices for meat or turned grain into home-made vodka
- 1915 saw strikes break out with workers demanding higher wages, shorter hours and political reforms. Anti-German riots in Moscow and Petrograd as well as anti-Semitic riots in Moscow with connivance of Governor leads to destabilisation of social peace
- workers in Petrograd factories of ‘New Lessner’ and ‘Renault’ came out on strike in October 1916 for higher wages and fought with the police. Soldiers of 181st Infantry Regiment refused to shoot strikers – signs of the disaffection of the military that would be evident in February 1917
- food queues in Petrograd, Moscow and Kiev took on political aspects as discontent over food leads to demands for political change
- late 1916 widespread lack of fuel and raw materials leads to factory closures and workers being locked-out. Discontent rising in the cities due to increased unemployment
- Tsarist regime was inefficient in organising rationing of food supplies to ensure there was enough food to ensure living standards were kept to an acceptable level in 1916 – January, 1917 for urban workers and families – ‘it all began with bread’.

## Evidence which considers other reasons for the decline of the Tsarist state:

### The impact of the Great War:

- military defeats lead to casualties of 2 million dead, 3.5 million wounded or POWs by late 1916
- defeats at Tannenberg, Masurian Lakes by Germans in 1914 and 1915 'Great Retreat' adds to military difficulties for Tsar's government. Military defeats leads to decline in support for autocracy (parallels with 1905 Revolution)
- Tsarist government cannot defend the Empire. By late 1916 Russian Poland lost, Lithuania and western Ukraine under threat. Western provinces in danger of invasion by German and Austrian armies. Russian army more successful against Ottomans in the Caucasian Front
- regular Imperial Army officers suffer 60,000 casualties from 1914–1915 and are replaced with men who have little loyalty to traditional military ethos of unquestioned support for the Tsarist regime. Former Students and Peasants fill a large proportion of junior officer posts who have some sympathy for revolutionary demands in February 1917. 66% of trainee officers from Peasant background in non-Guard/Cavalry regiments are given war-time commissions
- loss of support from Generals by late 1916 – refusal of Army Commanders to back Tsar Nicholas in February 1917, even Tsar's cousin, Grand Duke Nikolaevitch, commander in the Caucasus asks him to abdicate. Military elites lose faith in Nicholas II ability to successfully prosecute war to a victorious conclusion
- evidence of increasing discontent from 1914 – January 1917 from all sectors of society due to strains from defeats in the war, huge casualties and 3.5 million POWs.

### Political discontent:

- alienated elites in Duma— Oktobrists and Kadets refusing loyalty to the Tsarist regime in 1916 as Government refuses to work with Duma to mobilise more effectively to win the war
- working class discontent as Mensheviks and Bolsheviks gain new members and supporters in the Shop Stewards Committees in the cities as strikes increase and political discontent exhibits itself in the demonstrations by workers
- alienated intelligentsia/elites especially due to the role of Rasputin and Tsarina. Prince Felix Yusupov—Tsar's cousin – plot to kill Rasputin in late 1916 as a desperate measure to save the autocracy from itself in December, 1916
- 'Progressive Bloc' in Duma alienated from government as it refused to work with them to aid war effort as the sole prerogative of defending Russia was for the government
- Union of Towns and Zemstvos called the Imperial Government in late 1916 as 'being run by occult forces . . . and leading Russia to ruin'
- Tsar leaves Petrograd for Stavka HQ on 22 August 1915 and leaves Tsarina Alexandrina in charge of the home front. Leads to increased resentment of German-born Alexandrina and increases the power of Rasputin which causes increased lack of respect for Autocracy
- 'Ministerial leap—frog' in late 1915/16 when there are four Prime Ministers appointed, five Ministers of the Interior, three Ministers of War, three Foreign Ministers and two Ministers of Agriculture. Government bureaucracy starts to become unworkable and begins to cease to function. Rasputin influences Tsarina to sack and appoint unworthy men to senior posts
- Milyukov's speech in Duma, 14 November 1916, criticises the government's failures as being 'Stupidity or treason?' – loud cheers from all sides of the political divide
- November 27, 1916 – Purishkevich, anti-Semitic, right-wing Russian nationalist denounces corrupt ministers in a Duma speech blaming the government for failing to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion. Demonstrates the complete isolation of Tsarist regime from all sections of society – even those who were natural supporters of Tsarism.

**Social dislocation:**

- Mass desertions from Army running at 100,000 men per month in 1916. Leads to increase in crime and violence in both countryside and in cities as armed deserters steal and kill
- lack of available manpower due to conscription, fertilisers and draught animals impede agricultural production even further as the state cannot support agriculture
- refugees flee to Petrograd/Moscow from occupied western lands leads to increase in typhus, crime and over-crowding in capital city. Approx. 250,000 refugees living in cities
- Gendarmes, Police officers and Okhrana agents resigning in 1916 due to low morale and increased popular resentment against forces of law and order
- Council of United Gentry were reconsidering their support for Tsar Nicholas by late 1916.

| Historians         | Perspective on the issue  |
|--------------------|---|
| Laura Engelstein   | Argues that economic problems were the root cause of the decline of Tsarism. The regime could not organise the home front in time of war to ensure stability. |
| Richard Pipes      | Contends that the village was quiet, but the cities were raging. The danger of riots spiralling out of control was growing.                                   |
| Robert McKean      | Argues that the Great War acted as the spark which set the combustible of mass discontent alight. Long-term grievances were now coming to the fore.           |
| Dimitri Volkogonov | Considers that the failings of the Russian government to prosecute the war led to revolution. Incompetence leading to revolt.                                 |

## Question 58

Candidates might refer to:

### Evidence which supports the view that Whites were not presenting popular policies:

- Whites wanted to maintain the territorial integrity of the Empire – ‘Russia: one and indivisible’. Not recognising national aspirations of subject peoples who were already breaking free of Russian control even before October Revolution
- Whites denied the rights of National Minorities to secede from Russian control unlike Reds who offered freedom at least in theory, e.g., Sovnarkom decree 31 December 1917 recognises the independence of Finland
- workers were alienated by Whites seeking to restore private industry and bring back subservience to managers and owners of factories which had been disappearing after February 1917 revolution
- peasants were alienated as Whites were seen to return land back to landlords negating the peasant gains of October Revolution. Denikin guilty of this practice especially
- Cossacks reluctant to leave ‘stanitsas’ due to Whites viewed as nostalgia for former Tsarist empire. Ukrainians and Baltic states seek independence not on offer from Whites
- White message for the future political direction of Russia and non-Russian minorities was unclear as they contained monarchists, republicans or sought restoration of Constituent Assembly
- White movement violently anti-Semitic – carry out pogroms in Jewish settlements in Ukraine and blame Jews for the October Revolution. Reds too had anti-semitic pogroms – 1st Cavalry Army in Ukraine commit atrocities
- Denikin’s Special Council in effect the government was run by General Lukomsky who had no political experience. Politics traditionally viewed by Army officers as a ‘squalid business’
- January, 1920, Denikin’s policies changed to give land to peasants and toiling Cossacks but it was too late as they were forced back into Kuban by Red Army and were on the retreat
- Wrangel’s policies of land reform in 1919 show too late an awareness of the need to promote popular policies to gain support from peasantry.

### Evidence which supports other reasons for the defeat of the Whites:

#### Geography:

- ‘Sovdepiya’ had control of the Railway network and the hubs of Moscow and Petrograd allowing supplies and reinforcements to be sent to different fronts. Trotsky’s train used to boost Red Army delivering supplies, propaganda and impact of Trotsky’s motivational speeches
- Whites on periphery of Russian heartlands and were unable to co-ordinate attacks against Reds
- population locations of ethnic Russian peasantry available to Reds to conscript into Red Army. Armaments factories in Petrograd, Tula and Moscow all available to equip expanding Red Army
- Tsarist arsenals available to the Red Army in order to rapidly arm and clothe new Red Army unlike Whites who had no such pre-existing resources to draw upon
- Tsarist army training depots, barracks and cadet schools all in Red Army control. Able to begin formation of a professional army in 1918.

#### Red Strengths:

- Trotsky’s leadership positive factor as he reorganised Red Army in early 1918 along traditional military fashion – ranks, saluting and employs 35,000 ex-Tsarist officers – e.g., ex-Guards Officer Tukhachevsky. Also, 125,000 ex-NCOs from the Tsarist-era army – leads to promotion of men such as Budyenny, Timoshenko and Frunze who rise through ranks to become leaders both in Civil War campaigns and in the future
- Bolsheviks able to portray themselves as patriots who are defending Russia against foreign aggression – leads to ex-Tsarist officers joining Red Army such as General Alexei Brusilov in 1920 due to Russo-Polish war
- Reds appeal to Russian peasantry as defenders of the October 1917 land settlement while White associated with *Sharaban* – returning to landlord control peasant lands in the wake of White army advances
- use of ‘Red Terror’ effective against class enemies, socialist opponents and recalcitrant peasants who refuse to provide food for cities as well as striking factory workers. Cheka wields power of oppression maintains order in the Bolshevik rear

- Lenin's War Communism policies kept the economy functioning enough and so Red Army supplied with necessary supplies to ensure victory by 1920
- Reds policies able to appeal to those who had no desire to return gains of October, 1917 – workers, peasantry and to a lesser extent national minorities who were promised self-determination by the Bolsheviks.

#### **Foreign Intervention:**

- Whites received support from Allied nations who were allies of Russia before October 1917. Foreign nations divided and suspicious of each other's motives
- Britain supplies money, arms and supplies worth £100 million. Churchill seeks to destroy Bolshevism but Prime Minister Lloyd George wants to limit intervention to focus on restoring trade relations with Russia
- France and USA send forces but limited in number and do not seek to overthrow Reds. French forces in Odessa experience mutinies and unrest. France more interested in seeking payments of Tsarist-era loans and recovering property nationalised by the Bolshevik regime
- Japan sends 45,000 troops to seize eastern Siberia which alarms the USA. American military involvement in Siberia is to counter Japanese expansion not primarily to overthrow Bolshevik regime
- Foreign Intervention used by Reds to portray White leaders such as Denikin, Kolchak and Yudenich as 'attack dogs of the capitalist powers'
- trade unions in Britain and France agitating for their respective nations to withdraw from Russia. Labour Party/Trade Union Congress 'hands off Russia' campaign in Britain draws support, e.g., London dockers refused to load 'Jolly George', a ship carrying munitions to Poland in 1920.

#### **Evidence of other problems Whites faced:**

- Green insurgents were able to change sides easily, but they were more likely to be anti-White than anti-Red due to peasant land policies. Makhno's forces were attacking Denikin's rear to protect Peasantry from Whites seeking to return to pre-revolutionary land ownership pattern
- Czech Legion were a threat to Reds, but they were seeking to leave Russia for the Western Front to fight for national freedom not to aid White campaign. Czech not ideologically committed to supporting White cause
- national minorities who had Allied support were able to secure freedom – Baltic states but Ukraine and Caucasus were soon back under the control of Reds by 1920. Finland has civil war where Mannerheim used German support to destroy Red revolt in Finnish cities and Russian military garrison areas. Finland wins independence.

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-----------------------|--|
| <b>Evan Mawdsley</b>  | Argues crucial to victory that Reds had Aladdin's cave of Tsarist arsenals and depots.   |
| <b>Robert Service</b> | Contends Trotsky's leadership of vital importance for Reds winning Civil War.  |
| <b>Geoffrey Swain</b> | Takes the view that the civil war was between White Generals and the Reds. Whites unable to mobilise population to fight for their cause.  |
| <b>Orlando Figes</b>  | Argues that Reds were able to mobilise more men who were motivated to defend the Revolution of October 1917 than those who fought for the Whites who had little to offer the majority of the population to support them. |

## Question 59

Candidates might refer to:

### Evidence which demonstrates the aims of industrialisation:

- huge economic growth to create a 'Soviet America'
- the USSR needed to industrialise to survive a potential European war
- 'We are 50–100 years behind the advanced countries . . . ' Stalin 1931
- some Marxists believed the Wall Street Crash was evidence of the final collapse of Capitalism, but by 1933 it was evident this was not going to happen
- to move toward a socialist society/ideology
- to secure Stalin's power base in the Party, Government and among the people
- Russian patriotism 'In the past we didn't have and couldn't have a fatherland. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in our hands, the people and we have a fatherland and we will protect its independence.' Stalin 1931
- to improve standards of living wages by 1928 had just reached pre-war levels in the towns. Unemployment persisted until the end of the 1920s due to 'orthodox' economic monetary policies of Soviet government
- housing was a major problem in towns and cities after depredations of world war, two revolutions and civil war
- to resolve chronic agricultural problem of not being able to feed urban population with regularity. Collectivisation of agriculture takes place alongside industrialisation to secure food for increased proletariat and to provide Capital for Industrialisation by exports of produce.

### Evidence which demonstrates the features of industrialisation:

- Gosplan – state planning organisation worked out production needs, top-down method of management
- party via government set priorities for plans and targets
- People's Commissariat worked out detail in 4 main areas: heavy industry, light industry, timber and agriculture
- workers control receded, TUs told not to interfere, focus on productivity. Piece Work increases as does wage differentials from unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers. Increase in stringent labour discipline to encourage ex-Peasants to conform to factory norms
- senior party officials appointed and dismissed planners, often done for political not economic reasons
- consumer industries downgraded and citizens sacrificed standard of living for long-term objectives
- Stalin and Supreme Economic Council; Vesenkha take control
- huge agricultural; construction projects – the Stalingrad Tractor Factory, the Rostov-on-Don agricultural machinery plant and Magnitogorsk.

### Focus of the Five Year Plans:

- 1928–1932: coal, steel, iron focus because infrastructure needed
- 1933–1937: move to consumer goods but quickly moved to defence because of rise of fascism in Europe
- 1938 onwards: arms production increases because of build up for war.

### **Evidence which supports the view that industrialisation was a success:**

- considering situation of appalling backwardness – therefore unrealistic targets designed to achieve the impossible and drive people forward. Resources were directed to key industries
- amazing achievements – even if Soviet estimates grossly falsified
- largest rises: coal, iron, electricity
- smaller rises: steel, chemicals (esp. fertilisers)
- providing machinery for agriculture – tractors and harvesters
- plans declared achieved one year ahead of time – better than West, psychologically beneficial to demonstrate the superiority of Socialism over Capitalism. Time of Great Depression in the West
- new industrial centres; Magnitogorsk, Kuznetz – most east of Urals in strategically safer areas of the USSR
- ‘Gigantomania’: Dnieprostroi Dam, Moscow Metro and Volga Canal
- foreign involvement – e.g., Ford designed cars in Gorky. Vickers designed arms factories in Ukraine
- shock workers exceed targets – rewarded with higher pay, better working conditions food supplies, housing, celebrated in newspapers and on work notice boards. Stakhanovite Workers see material benefits.

### **Evidence which considers the view that there were problems and limitations created by industrialisation:**

- command economy major weaknesses: unrealistic targets, use of bribery, corruption, crooked deals to achieve targets, major shortages and products of dubious quality. Failure to produce enough for agriculture
- reports of large projects ruined by workers’ ignorance
- ‘*Target mania*’, Gosplan’s targets had started off optimistic, but increased by astonishing amounts, e.g., coal up from 35 to 75 million tons – seemed unachievable to many. High targets put strain on industry – some parts underproduction due to shortages; other parts over production (wastage) and sub-standard products
- not well organised or planned – costs could have been avoided priority to heavy industry Urban standards of living never improved – in Leningrad and Moscow, 1929–1933, meat, milk and fruit consumption declined by two-thirds, shortages of water, shops and catering facilities, queues. Consumer goods, chemicals and transport and consumer goods neglected
- forced labour creation of the Gulag in mining, timber and forestry in Siberia and Arctic North of the Soviet Union
- 1940: absenteeism became a crime, 2 offences = imprisonment; no striking
- 1938 onwards – labour books and internal passports issued
- skilled workers were at a premium so competition for them meant bonuses introduced; egalitarianism in wages abandoned by 1931. Socialism in retreat?
- intimidation and terror used by NKVD on Managers and Directors of enterprises as scapegoats for alleged ‘Wrecking’ – decline in production or failing to raise production levels
- ‘Quicksand society’ (Moshe Lewin): peasants forced off land by collectivisation; poor discipline and punctuality, resentful, high rate of absenteeism
- the fabled Stalingrad Tractor Factory rolled out its first tractor with much fanfare in June 1930, but instead of the projected 2,000 tractors expected by September a mere 43 were produced. And these began to fall apart after seventy hours of operation!

### **Evidence which considers the importance of propaganda in regards to industrial success:**

- shock-brigade campaigns (e.g., Dams), socialist competition, Stakhanovite movement, recordmania, names – Ogorodnikov, Chernysh, Bogatyrenka, Tischenko
- wartime patriotism emphasised as USSR begins to mobilise for war from 1937 onwards. Red Army doubles in size from 1935 to 1939 with economic production geared to military growth.



| <b>Historians</b>         | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|---------------------------|--|
| <b>Chris Ward</b>         | Argues that Soviet economy fundamentally transformed, did what it intended.  |
| <b>Alec Nove</b>          | The economy was generally quite inefficient, resources were concentrated in key area so got job done, considering USSR's situation in 1930s, good policy to stop economic impasse. Without rapid industrialisation for industrial base, no success for USSR in the Second World War. 'Targets were far beyond practical possibility . . . caused great disorganisation'. |
| <b>Sheila Fitzpatrick</b> | Contends that it was ' "gigantomania", the worship of size for its own sake'.  |
| <b>Norman Stone</b>       | Argues that there was no master plan, rather a process of 'simply putting one foot in front of the other as he went along'.  |

## Question 60

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence, both in support and critical of the improved status of women through social policies:  
Stalinist Social Policy: 1936 Family Code – Great Retreat?**

- upheavals caused by Industrialisation and Collectivisation saw a return to values of pre-revolutionary society
- 1936 Family Law Code returns to more traditional family structure – abortion made illegal as the state wants to promote population growth and stable families. Divorce made more expensive – to stop men leaving families
- childbearing promoted by generous family allowance payments and medals for mothers of large families
- creches and kindergartens made available in factories and workplaces
- illegitimate children stigmatised unlike those born in 1920s
- fines for divorce increased from 50 roubles to 300 for third divorce
- divorce declines from 1936 onwards, birth rate increases although marriage rates decline
- men faced legal penalties for not paying alimony for their children, stigmatised in factory newspapers and Party meetings.

**Lenin's Family Code of 1918 – as a way of comparison for candidates:**

- family seen through prism of Marxism – oppressive, bourgeois and patriarchal
- divorce made easier for man and woman – either party could terminate marriage easily. Men took advantage to end marriage – 1927 70% divorce applications made by Men, only 7% joint applications
- 1920 abortion allowed due to straitened social circumstances/economic misfortune. Never allowed as a right to control body
- abortion more popular in cities with younger women, peasants had little access to services in countryside
- impact on women negative – they were left to bring up children with little support from ex-husbands
- Soviet government was unable to provide support such as canteens, laundry-services and creches due to a lack of funds.

**Evidence, both in support and critical of the improved status of women through economic policy:**

- industrialisation meant huge numbers of women were entering the industrial workforce. Mostly at low-paid, unskilled level in factories
- 1928 – 28% Industrial workers women, 1935 – 42% Industrial workers women (industry expanded massively since 1928)
- Central Planners – developed industries along gender demarcation – retail, transport, education, healthcare, cleaning – high concentration of female employees with low wages and males employed in managerial roles
- 1939 – Leningrad doctors 65% female but only 4% female senior doctors were female
- 2nd Five Year Plan – 75% of new workers are female from urban background – allows state to slow down peasant migration by internal passport and purge non-proletarian elements from urban workforce who are a source of potential disloyalty
- younger, urban, educated Komsomol-background women given access to higher education and technical education in 1930s
- women working 8–10 hours per day and then looking after family doing domestic chores
- women queuing for food, consumer goods as rationing endemic in Soviet society
- urban women used for labour force would compensate for falling male wages and no need for building largescale housing developments in established cities
- grandmothers – Babushkhas – crucial for family life in 1930s as so many women worked in factories and childcare facilities were limited
- as male peasants left the countryside to work in urban areas women were likely to be left behind to work on the land and to look after children.

**Evidence, both positive and negative of political change and its impact on the status of women:**

- 1930 – Zhenotdel abolished by Stalin as ‘the women problem solved’. Founded by Alexandra Kollontai and Inessa Armand – Bolshevik feminists
- all-Union Trade Unions were determined to maintain male wages and status in factories especially skilled jobs in heavy industry, metallurgy and mining
- elite wives took on role associated with pre-revolutionary elite – charity, social improvement, anti-alcohol and domestic harmony
- males seen as building socialism in 1930s with women portrayed as duty of being wives and mothers to build up the soviet family to support the state
- younger women offered paramilitary training in Young Pioneers and OVOSIAKhIM alongside male peers – shooting, parachuting, dealing with chemical attacks
- Soviet family becoming focus of discipline and order – children taught to respect their elders even when they were not in sympathy with Socialist ideals.

| Historians         | Perspective on the issue   |
|--------------------|--|
| Sheila Fitzpatrick | Argues that the new message was that family came first. The liberated woman was no longer in favour.   |
| Beryl Williams     | Considers that traditional gender roles were maintained. High-Status Proletarian was male who was building socialism.  |
| Sarah Davies       | Argues women were likely to be low-paid, less literate and low-skilled in the factory. Trade unions male dominated.  |
| Wendy Goldman      | Argues that women in the 1930s were used to accumulate capital to support state industrialisation by working for low wages and to supplement family income as males’ wages fell in the first Five Year Plan. |

## Question 61

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may be used to consider the role of Stalin in the victory:

**Supporting his leadership as a main cause of victory:**

- Stalin able to rally population as a figure-head – Soldiers cried '*For Stalin, For the Motherland*' when going into battle. His direction of information/propaganda – posters, newspapers and cinema was effective. This compensated for the mistakes made in ruthless purging
- STAVKA (General Staff) set up 23 June 1941 – responsible for military operations
- 30 June GKO (State Committee of Defence) – highly centralised control over military, political and economic life
- he remained in Moscow rather than move with the rest of the government
- Becoming Generalissimo – appoints effective Generals who have demonstrated skill in modern warfare by mid-1942 – who are competent and are equal to German opponents in armoured warfare strategy and tactics: Zhukov, Chuikov, Vasilevsky
- Stalin had able individuals such as Molotov (diplomacy) Voznesensky (GOSPLAN – economic planning), and Khrushchev (administration).

**Criticisms might include:**

- Purges of the Military in 1937/38 leads to weaknesses and undermines professionalism. By 1941 Red Army still not recovered. Officer corps loses 25,000 men as well as leading thinkers such as Tukhachevsky who had developed 'Deep Battle' theory that was equivalent to Guderian's Blitzkrieg tactics
- Stalin unquestioned ruler of USSR by end of 1930s. There was no alternative ruler to replace him in 1941 when Nazi attack begins, and early disasters take place for Red Army
- Head of National Defence Council from 1941 onwards. Unwilling to allow Generals an innovative thinking until late into the war.

**Evidence which supports the strength of political system as a reason for Soviet victory:**

- Stalin's rule never challenged in the Party, Military or Economy during the war years
- Communist Party rule held firm in the unoccupied areas of the USSR. No alternative possible
- NKVD-used repression against possible disloyal elements in rear and in armed forces – 'Smersh' units, 'disloyal' national minorities – e.g., Chechens deported in 1943 to Kazakhstan suppressed. Gulag system activated to help war effort by military production or inmates serving in penal battalions where casualties were enormous – some units lost 75% of personnel in combat
- Soviet authorities had no 'fifth column' operating – due to effectiveness of the 1930s Purges and NKVD vigilance?
- political system was able to tone down ideological appeal and to appeal to especially Russian patriotism and Russian history of love of the 'Rodina' – the Motherland. Ethnic Russians the heart of the population to whom the system mobilised and motivated. Non-Russians proved less-motivated to patriotic appeals.

**Evidence which may consider the strength of economic developments as a reason for victory:**

- Planned Economy proved resilient to wartime emergencies – Endangered Factory re-location in 1941/42 to Siberia effective in re-starting production within three to six months
- food supplies to Red Army and Cities maintained – Collective Farms able to provide enough to keep people fed – only just
- large-scale industries able to out-produce Germany by 1943 in tanks, sub-machine guns and aeroplanes due to 1930s policies of Industrialisation
- women take increased role in factories and Collective Farms as men drafted for military service. By 1943 – 70 % of Collective Farmers were women
- large-scale industrial projects such as Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk offer large-scale production facilities for military production beyond Nazi air attacks.

**Evidence which supports military strengths as a reason for victory:**

- Red Army able to weather massive defeats of 1941/42 where losses were of three million men
- by late 1942/43 lessons of modern armoured warfare being learned by commanders such as Zhukov, Vatutin and Vasilevsky
- Red Army developed elite 'Guards Armies' who were better paid, equipped and led which were used to be effective units e.g., 2nd Guards Tank Army used at Kursk to blunt Axis Panzer strike and so win the battle in 1943
- weapons such as PPSH-41 sub-machinegun, T-34 tank and Sturmovik attack aircraft were efficient and mass-produced to equip Army
- defeat of German 6th Army at Stalingrad was a turning point of the war in the Eastern Front. Red Army now on the offensive in 1943 onwards
- traditional ranks and uniforms restored to emphasise Russian military traditions and professional Officer ranks and privileges restored in 1943.

**Evidence which supports civilian strengths as a reason for victory:**

- Partisans effective in Belorussia especially, attacking German supply columns and railways. Soviet partisans able to remind those in the occupied lands that Soviet power still existed. By 1943/44 Partisan divisions operating with co-ordination with regular Red Army operations
- women – Soviet Union had women taking a full role in wartime. Army units composed entirely of women such as the 558th Night Bomber Squadron, named the 'Night Witches' by the Germans. Others fight as snipers, medics and communication troops. 15 women awarded title of Hero of the Soviet Union from 1941–1945.

**Evidence which considers the impact of forces outside Russia as a reason for victory:**

- Western Allied help – food, boots, trains, weapons, raw materials, trucks and jeeps assist Red Army to victory. Lend-Lease criticised by Stalin
- Allied Invasion of Western Europe in 1944 coincided with Operation Bagration to destroy Army Group Centre. Germans unable to effectively reinforce eastern front in June/July 1944
- Luftwaffe units taken from Eastern Front to protect Germany from increased Allied bombing campaign in 1943 onwards
- Operation Barbarossa too ambitious to realistically succeed in six months campaign of 1941
- the terrain – German military ill-equipped for the muddy season and the harsh winter which followed
- trucks and tanks could not survive the terrain and trains were stuck due to rail track differences.

| Historians     | Perspective on the issue  |
|----------------|---|
| Roger Reese    | Argues Soviet victory was bought at the expense of mass casualties due to inept commanders and a lack of concern for human life.  |
| Richard Overy  | Argues Stalin was an effective war leader by 1943 as he trusted commanders such as Zhukov to plan operations that were successful, e.g., Operation Saturn in late 1942. |
| Stephen Kotkin | Contends that the strength of the political system allowed the Soviet Union to prevail against the Nazis compared to Tsarist regime in 1917.                            |
| John Keegan    | Contends that Soviet victory was ensured by Allied aid that allowed the Red Army to fight on and conquer Axis powers in 1943–1945.                                      |

## PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

## Question 62

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source A |   | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance   |
|--------------------|---|--|
| <b>Author</b>      | Alexander Kerensky.   | Former leader of the Provisional Government who had been Minister of Justice, Minister of War and had been vice-chair of the Petrograd Soviet.                 |
| <b>Purpose</b>     | To outline the difficulties the Provisional Government faced in 1917. | Kerensky seeks to outline the social, political and military weaknesses the Government tried to deal with.   |
| <b>Timing</b>      | 1932.   | Fifteen years after Kerensky was forced from power by the Bolsheviks and lived in exile firstly in Europe, notably France until 1940 when he moved to the USA. |

| Point in Source A   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance  |
|---|--|
| . . . avoid the danger of civil war breaking out in Russia, an ever-present danger due to the tensions unleashed by the Revolution which overthrew the Monarchy.  | Kerensky identifies the potential danger of civil war which could be unleashed by the tensions of the time highlighting his feeling that there was a great threat of civil war in the country. This is shown in phrasing 'an ever-present danger'. |
| The Workers and Peasants wanted their demands to be met immediately despite the trying conditions we found ourselves in due to the war with Germany. This was the cause of the huge strain our nation was under.          | Highlights the significant and indeed 'huge strain' the nation was under in trying to meet the demands of the workers and peasants.  |
| The Army of ten million men was dangerously divided between the Peasant-soldiers who drifted leftwards and Officers who were of mostly of bourgeois origin and as a result the Army was becoming increasingly fragmented. | Stressed the danger of the fragmentation of the Army which was split between upper and middle-class Officers and the other ranks of mostly Peasant soldiers. The phrase here is 'dangerously divided'.   |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the Russian Army under Order Number 1 lost the traditional obedience due to commanders by the other ranks as the soviet took control
- the Tsarist Gendarmes, Police and Okhrana were deliberately destroyed by the revolution and were not replaced by the Provisional Government
- Kornilov revolt of September 1917 led to increased disaffection of the Army from the Provisional Government
- Radicalised Workers, Peasants and Soldiers were seeking radical solutions for the various social/economic issues in summer and autumn 1917.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- Provisional Government lacked legitimacy as it was not elected by the people after the revolution
- The Soviet in Petrograd was the focus of aspirations from Workers, Soldiers and Peasants
- Lenin's return in April 1917 and his demands of non-cooperation with the Provisional Government led to the Bolsheviks being the only party not associated with the failures of the government
- 'Peace, Land and Bread' and 'All Power to the Soviets' were very powerful and simple Bolshevik policies that had broad-based appeal
- The Summer Offensive was a failure – 400,000 casualties – and led to the July Days uprising in Petrograd – demonstrated the Bolshevik appeal to those of the Kronstadt naval base which will be useful in October. Lower-level Bolshevik members organising these events
- Kerensky's government never able to deal with so many conflicting demands and the war was always going to be a drain on resources and popular dissatisfaction
- economic decline accelerated post February 1917 as prices and inflation spiralled out of control. Workers demanded wage increases which only further increased prices of goods
- Provisional Government never carried out its promise of land re-distribution, national elections and unable to stop National Minorities unrest
- September 1917 Bolshevik majorities in both Petrograd and Moscow city soviets as moderate socialist of the SRs and the Mensheviks losing support
- Trotsky elected in September as chairman of the Petrograd MRC began agitating for an armed takeover of power
- Kornilov coup damaged Kerensky's authority and raised that of the Bolsheviks whose Red Guard were armed by the Provisional Government. Weapons used in October coup
- unrest in countryside increased from July 1917 as radicalised soldiers returned from the front with arms and took the lead in attacking landowner's property and persons
- army officers alienated from Provisional Government after failure of Kornilov coup as they believed Kerensky had betrayed Kornilov.

| Historians     | Perspective on the issue  |
|----------------|---|
| Richard Pipes  | Argues that it was only a matter of time before Kerensky was overthrown by someone able to provide firm leadership.   |
| Robert Service | Believes that for most of the year the Provisional Government survived on guile and rhetoric with little power and diminished authority.                            |
| Orlando Figes  | Contends that Soviet power was the driving force for popular discontent with the Provisional Government as workers and soldiers in garrisons becoming more radical. |
| Douglas Boyd   | Argues the war-weary soldiers were determined to have peace at any price. Lenin offered them that hope.   |

### Question 63

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the interpretations given |
|---|---|
| His successful command of the Red Army during the Civil War made him easy to cast as a potential threat to taking power by using the military to launch a coup, which the Bolsheviks took seriously from the example of Napoleon who became the despot following the French Revolution. | Argues that his leadership of the Red Army was perceived as a potential threat.   |
| Trotsky was not a natural organiser of political factions, being impatient sarcastic and contemptuous of those he considered less intelligent and cultured than himself.  | Argues that some of Trotsky's personality traits alienated people.  |
| His colleagues in the Politburo thought he was out for the leadership role and this made it easy for rivals such as Kamenev and Stalin to jointly work against him . . .  | Argues that others were suspicious of his ambitions and motivated them to conspire against him.                           |

**Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Trotsky's background a Menshevik, a late recruit to Bolsheviks and Jewish seen as a problem
- Arrogance of Trotsky alienated potential allies and strengthened enemies such as Stalin Kamenev and Zinoviev
- 'Triumvirate' able to unite against a perceived threat from Trotsky, if only temporarily
- concerns that Trotsky could use his military status as a stepping stone to creating a power base.

| Point in Source C   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the interpretations given  |
|---|--|
| Stalin's power grew from his total control of the Party apparatus in the provinces of the Soviet Union. As chairman of the Secretariat, and the only Politburo member in the Orgburo, he could promote supporters in the provincial leadership of the Soviet Union and obstruct the careers of opponents. | Suggests that Stalin's power was due to his ability to use Party organisations to secure loyalty of officials as he controlled them.   |
| Most, like Stalin, were from humble origins from the factory floor or peasant village. Mistrustful of intellectuals like Trotsky and Bukharin, they preferred to place their trust in Stalin's practical wisdom, with his simple calls for party unity and discipline.                                    | Argues that Stalin's appointments were of men from a similar background to himself humble; uneducated backgrounds, unlike Trotsky who was from a very comfortable, Jewish, educated middle class family. |
| Trotsky by promoting 'Permanent Revolution' was not able to gather support due to fears of war with the capitalist world.   | Argues that Trotsky was not able to get support for his policies as they were too risky for an exhausted population.   |



**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Stalin's power over Nomenklatura was a source of his power in the Party
- 'Lenin enrolment' of 1924 brought in a million new members who were from humble non-intellectual background
- 'Socialism in one country' was viewed as being practical and promoting soviet patriotism. Trotsky seen as a dangerous adventurer by lower-Party members.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- Trotsky was very loyal to the Party and he would never use his role of Red Army commander to take power for himself
- Stalin benefited from the refusal of the Party leadership to read out Lenin's Testament' to party congress
- Trotsky had questioned Lenin's decision in the past while Stalin had never done so
- Trotsky spent too much time writing books and pamphlets while Stalin was able to build alliances and appear personable to provincial leadership who are his core support
- November 1924 – Stalin's speech which made Trotsky appear to be anti-Leninist
- Trotsky did not attend Lenin's funeral this may be due to being misled by Stalin but was a failure for Trotsky to be a main mourner
- Trotsky's ruthless side shown in Civil War and this was known to his rivals in the Party
- Stalin more appealing as he was a team player whom the leadership knew as an old Bolshevik
- Lenin appointed Stalin as General Secretary of the Party in 1922 to add to his other roles as an addition to Orgburo, Secretariat and Politburo. Was he already too powerful to stop after 1924 when Lenin died?
- candidates may consider the merits of the other candidates such as Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov and Bukharin; as well as the two main contenders
- Stalin seen as 'Lenin for today'. His speech at Lenin's funeral was very powerful – 'We will guard the unity of the party as the apple of our eye, as Comrade Lenin wished us to do'.

| Historians         | Perspective on the issue   |
|--------------------|--|
| Chris Ward         | Argues that 'Socialism in One Country' appealed to most people in the Party.   |
| Orlando Figes      | Contends that Trotsky was international and cosmopolitan in outlook unlike Stalin and his followers.                     |
| Dimitri Volkogonov | Argued that Stalin's campaign was aided by Trotsky's isolation. This was the decisive event leading to Trotsky's defeat. |
| Richard Pipes      | Believes that Stalin was in an unrivalled position that assured his future career for some time before Lenin's death.    |

## Question 64

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source D  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given  |
|--|--|
| . . . voting politburo members had the right to nominate someone else as the top secretary of the party. His faction in the Politburo had stood by him through thick and thin, but would 'the voting nine' continue to be loyal? Even so, these considerations of personal power alone . . . | Stalin purged the party because his position within the party hierarchy depended on keeping on getting voted in, and he wasn't sure if his nine faithful supporters would always vote for him. |
| . . . for him, terror constituted a form of rule, a matter of statecraft.  | It was a straight-forward ruling strategy, to simply keep everyone in terror of him, and what decisions he might take next; terror was implemented because it worked.                          |
| Stalin stated that he was building socialism against all manner of class enemies and that the class struggle sharpened as the country got closer to the full victory of socialism.   | The triumph of Socialism depended on recognising and dealing with a whole range of class enemies. This threat was getting more acute as Socialism neared victory.                              |

### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Kulaks repressed from 1929 onwards as Collectivisation imposed on unwilling peasants
- Gulag penal system already established in the 1920s and was expanded in the 1930s
- Communist Party culture was one of fighting enemies and violence well-established
- Stalin wished to destroy any opposition – whether real or perceived.

### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

#### Social Evidence:

- population were able to use the Purges as a way of social advancement, revenge on family, colleagues by denouncing others
- Purges caused submission to and fear of the regime that made resistance impossible to organise within party or from wider population – Kulaks, Whites, non-Bolshevik socialists
- lower and mid-ranking party officials were denounced as 'wreckers' and 'counter-revolutionaries' under encouragement from the Government to deflect criticism from failings of the economy
- Government worried they were losing support from the population due to forced collectivisation and the quicksand society of the Five Year plans
- role of Yezhov as head of the NKVD in expanding Purges from 1937–1938 when he was himself purged and replaced by Beria. Yezhovschina-era driven by his excessive desire to please Stalin.

#### Political Evidence:

- December 1934 – Kirov murder was used by Stalin as an excuse to purge Leningrad party of supporters of Zinoviev and Kamenev. Terrorist bloc 'discovered' and thousands imprisoned or executed
- Show Trials of 'Old Bolsheviks' – Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin used by Stalin to destroy any alternative leadership of the state
- Lenin had given the lead in use of Terror. Stalin following a Bolshevik path of violence against opponents
- Trotsky was a threat – continually critiquing Stalin and his regime – had allies in the Soviet Union. Book – The Revolution Betrayed – denounced Stalin and the new elite as betrayal of the October Revolution

- Yagoda replaced as head of the NKVD due to his perceived failure to uncover enemies quickly. Stalin wanted to increase tempo of the Purges
- Stalin used the Purges to increase personal power and authority over party and the government. Broke the morale of even long-time allies such as Molotov and Voroshilov by forcing them to denounce subordinates, party colleagues to demonstrate total loyalty to Stalin
- party brought under control of the centre – regional party leadership decimated by Purges – Ukrainian Party leadership purged by 1938 and replaced by ethnic-Russians and Stalinist loyalists, e.g., Nikita Khrushchev given control of Ukrainian republic.

#### **Economic evidence:**

- industrialisation policies required a forced labour workforce for projects in inhospitable regions where Gulag camp system located of the Soviet Union
- Purges were used to scapegoat officials, managers, workers for economic failures inherent in planned economy
- 1936 saw economic downturn due to poor harvest, technical problems with railways and poor management of economy need for blame to be appointed away from regime
- Managers and Workers experienced tensions during the Stakhanovite campaign of 1936 as pressure was put on industry to increase production. Managers were denounced by Workers if they did not provide the necessary tools, preparations and materials for their attempt to become privileged Stakhanovite workers.

#### **Other evidence as explanation for the Purges might include:**

- Stalin's personality – vengeful, insecure and paranoid – especially after wife's suicide in 1932. Believed he was surrounded by enemies who would betray him – and the state
- Stalin on 1 December 1934 passes new decree to arrest and execute terrorist suspects Stalin blames the killing on 'Zinovievites' with no evidence from the assassin Nikolaev to implicate Zinoviev. 6,500 arrested in Moscow and Leningrad in one month alone under new administrative decree
- 1935 – January to February witnesses 843 associates of Zinoviev arrested, in Leningrad 11,000 'former people' arrested and sent to camps
- 1935 – a purge of 250,000 party members takes place setting the stage for the 1936 beginning of the Purges. NKVD closely involved in the 1935 purge
- Stalin sought to boost his heroic self-image as a great revolutionary leader who would build a socialist industrial society at all costs
- mid-1930s saw the rise of anti-Soviet power such as Nazi Germany and Japan who posed threat to Soviet state. Stalin was readying the nation for war and eradicating potential fifth column – Nationality operations of NKVD in 1938
- NKVD role in sustaining and expanding the Purges to maintain their importance and the response to over-fulfil quotas of executions and imprisonments of enemies
- Trotsky publishing Bulletin of the Opposition which provided information on Soviet Union's failings and attributing them to Stalin and new elite.

| <b>Historians</b>         | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|---------------------------|--|
| <b>Stephen Cohen</b>      | Argues Stalin determined to remove Old Bolsheviks who knew he was not Lenin's equal.                           |
| <b>Sheila Fitzpatrick</b> | Argues that the purges were 'from below'. Party leadership reacts to crises in mid-1930s and decides to purge. |
| <b>Robert Service</b>     | Contends that Stalin was the cause of the Purges due to his ideas and vengeful personality.                    |
| <b>Orlando Figes</b>      | Argues that the Spanish Civil War gave Stalin reason to purge at home to root out Trotskyites.                 |

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 65

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that there were social and economic problems:**

- decline of the Church and loss of faith in the clergy amongst many of the poor. Alfonso was ‘His Most Catholic Majesty’ and had become linked to an increasingly anti-liberal institution, now dominated more than ever by the large landowners
- as a ‘Soldier King’ he was also allied to this anti-liberal ‘failed’ relic of Spain’s imperial past
- the King’s personal life also added to the image of an uncaring, incompetent monarch
- condition of Spain in 1923 and problems of modernisation. Aristocrats who owned the latifundia were highly reactionary and the agrarian oligarchy dominated the government
- the nature of the Spanish agricultural system meant the land was unproductive. The problem, at its simplest was Spain’s inability to feed and nurture its population due to inefficient, unfairly maintained rural economy
- bad harvests also played their part
- Spain did not have a large industry except for Bilbao which had iron works and Barcelona textiles. Basques and Catalans paying a high proportion of Spain’s tax but had little say in a government dominated by the agrarian oligarchy (Paul Preston)
- between 1918 and 1921 there were uprisings by labourers in the south because of anarchist and socialist influences – the ‘*trienio bolchevique*’. The influence would continue in the 1920s
- recognition by politicians that land reform was urgently required. The problem was that few governments remained in place long enough to tackle the problem (Antony Beevor)
- by the late 1920s modernisation was urgently needed
- industrialisation had boomed during WWI, but quickly stopped. End of war resulted in wages cut and lay-offs. Class war was a result. The major economic problems of the early 1920s led to violent conflicts between employers and employees in industrial areas such as Catalonia
- but between 1923 and 1930 industrial production increased threefold. And again fell as a result of The Great Depression – iron by 33% and steel by 50%
- The Great Depression hit Spain hard and prices for main exports such as olive oil and wine fell in value. Agricultural land fell into disuse.

**Political problems – Centralist authority and regional discontent:**

- Spain’s history of removing monarchs ruled out retaining the throne due to ‘divine right’
- Alfonso refused to embrace any form of autonomy and presided over legislation which effectively advantaged large landowners over industrialists. This was particularly disliked in the major industrial areas such as Catalonia and the Basque Region
- the option of a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament along the lines of the British model was unattractive to Spaniards who had witnessed a corrupt ‘mirror’ of this system for many years. The King insisted on involving himself frequently in politics and could, therefore claim neither ignorance nor competence
- the system itself involved the King in choosing legislation and therefore ‘complicit’
- the growth of other political ideologies went in tandem with the poverty and loss of faith because of the corrupt political system and the Church. Anarchism was popular with the regionalists because they disagreed with Marxist socialism which emphasised the centralisation of the state, and they demanded the redistribution of the land which the peasants liked
- ongoing struggle between the centralist state and Catalonia and Basque provinces – demanding decentralisation and independence
- granting autonomy to the regions was not going to happen – against the beliefs of church and army. When the Republican alliance was formed in 1930 the Catalans joined because they were promised autonomy.

### Army and Empire problems:

- the obsession with Empire contributed to the country's poor economic position
- by the 1920s having lost the American Empire there was a determination to defend national unity and the existing social order (Paul Preston)
- the army became a major obstacle to reform dominated as it was by so many Generals
- the army established itself as a major reactionary force, hated by the people
- the army suffered defeat in Morocco in 1921 – incompetence angered the workers – but eventually the war was ended in 1925. Financially costly as well as damaging to national pride.

### Primo de Rivera *the Dictadura*:

- Catalonia hoped that their demands would be recognised in 1923, but the anti-Catalan crusade proved otherwise
- ruled via the army. Forced the retreat in Morocco but responsible for finally securing the Spanish protectorate by 1927
- economic nationalism meant protectionist policies. Complicated bureaucracy in industry was disliked by the capitalists after 1926
- collaborated successfully with the UGT and suppressed the CNT
- by 1929 the peseta began to fall in value, but the economy was not the reason for his resignation
- lost support of the army because he tried to abolish their privileges – artillery and engineer corps.

### Historians

### Perspective on the issue

R Carr

'The Republicans rejected monarchy as an illegitimate and outmoded form of government; theocratists rejected the Alfonsine branch . . . The Socialists considered (it) reactionary . . . The anarchists rejected it in toto. To the regionalists it . . . strangled local interests . . . the radical regenerationists believed (in) root and branch reform . . . ' 'The destruction of the historic provinces and their replacement by 'artificial entities' . . . was at the root of the regionalist movements.'

G Brenan

'Unlike England and France there was no upward movement from one (class) to another.' ' . . . the corruption of all the upper layers of society. The Army had become increasingly sensitive to any criticisms . . . '

Peter Callaghan

'(The church) was weakest in the great latifundia lands . . . where a rural proletariat lived in desperate circumstances.'

G Esenwein  
and A Shubert

'Where rapid industrialisation and massive immigration (took place) traditional culture and identity were seen as seriously threatened.'

## Question 66

Candidates might refer to:

### Army

#### Revolutionary:

- Officer Corps reduced. This closes several routes to promotion for junior officers
- Azaña cuts the period of military service to one year, saving money
- several Officer Academies are closed to reduce the number of new officers. The Zaragoza Academy is closed much to the dismay of its commanding officer, Francisco Franco
- beginnings of 'Republicanisation' of the Army including reserved places for NCOs
- in 1932, Gen Sanjurjo attempts to overthrow the government, showing the military's disdain for civilian interference in their affairs.

#### Less revolutionary:

- the Army responded to the Republican Government orders to put down unrest and rebellions of both left and right during this period
- many, especially those in senior positions, acknowledged that the Army was 'top heavy' and that reform was necessary
- the attempted coup of Sanjurjo in 1932 failed to gain support from the rest of the Army which remained loyal during this period
- the Army's power could not be reduced through some structural changes
- attempts to 'Republicanise' the Army failed, their loyalty could still not be guaranteed.

### Church

#### Revolutionary:

- arguably, debate over the religious clause of the constitution led to even greater polarisation of Spanish society and loss of working-class support from the 'faithful'
- restrictions on teaching removed the Catholic Church's ability to exert influence over the minds of the young
- religious orders such as the Jesuits were outlawed
- Cardinal Segura, Archbishop of Toledo and the leader of the Catholic Church in Spain, urged Catholics to oppose the government
- a tax was placed on the ringing of church bells, a clear, and somewhat petty, attack on the Church's customs
- in all, the rhetoric which accompanied the reforms (such as Azaña's declaration that 'all the convents in Spain were not worth the life of one republican' was a clear and significant threat to the Catholic Church and Catholicism in general.

#### Less revolutionary:

- religion not 'outlawed' meaning Spaniards continue to attend church. There is little evidence to suggest that the number of people attending mass dropped significantly as a result of the reforms
- dominant position of Catholicism still 'standing'
- the Catholic press, in particular *El Debate* remained powerful and attacked the Azaña's government during the period 1931-1933 and played a significant role in the 1933 election campaign
- there is clear evidence from Azaña's upbringing that he bore resentment against Catholic schooling.

## Agriculture

### Revolutionary:

- obligatory cultivation and confiscation of land which was given over to the landless peasants
- Largo Caballero established an eight-hour day for agricultural labourers which introduced overtime pay for the very first time
- Law of Municipal Boundaries (May 1931) required landowners to offer jobs to those living within their municipality before importing migrant workers. This prevented the undercutting of agricultural wages
- made eviction almost impossible and blocked rent rises
- rural wages rose dramatically and the bargaining power of the FNTT in wage disputes was vastly strengthened
- overall, agricultural reforms shifted the balance of power away from landowners and towards the workers.

### Less revolutionary:

- Institute of Agrarian Reform aimed to resettle 60,000 – 75,000 families per year but its budget was only 50m pesetas, a totally inadequate amount for the task
- although agricultural reforms were revolutionary in principle, Antony Beevor argues that they were mild in practice
- Caballero's Eight Laws were more radical/effective
- 1932 reforms accepted principle of ownership
- all owners except for 'Grande' were compensated
- Caballero called the 1932 reforms 'an aspirin to cure appenuestioqdcitis', a clear signal that the Left felt the reforms did not go far enough.

### Regionalism:

#### Revolutionary:

- Catalan Statute was a massive change from the status quo
- Military officers viewed the Catalan Statute as a real threat to Spanish unity. The military saw themselves as the guardians of the Spanish state and they were determined to fulfil this duty after the loss of empire
- fear amongst other groups such as Nationalists, Liberals and Conservatives of a possible breakup of Spain.

#### Less revolutionary:

- the right was able to use obstructionist tactics to prolong the debates on Catalan Autonomy for months. This may have continued if it was not for the attempted coup in August which served to revive the reformist energies of the government
- little for other regions such as the Basque lands and Galicia. This was a particular blow to the Basques. However, it is important to note that demand for regional autonomy was not as strong in the Basque lands as in Catalonia
- Autonomy Statute represented a balanced and satisfactory resolution to a complicated and sensitive issue, however, many Catalans felt that the Statute, especially in the financial sphere, did not go far enough.

| <b>Historians</b>                                | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|--|---|
| <b>Martin Blinkhorn</b>                          | 'By 1933, it was evident how successful the holders of local socio-economic power had been in retaining it and in evading or openly flouting unwelcome legislation.' This suggests that Azaña's reforms failed and thus, were not revolutionary.  |
| <b>Raymond Carr</b>                              | 'It (the Agrarian Reform Bill) seriously threatened the strongest economic class in Spain . . . and awakened the hopes of the impoverished peasantry.' This suggests that Azaña's agricultural reforms were indeed revolutionary.   |
| <b>George Richard Esewein and Adrian Shubert</b> | 'But even this moderate reform led the landowners, with Gil Robles' encouragement, to declare all-out war on the republic.' This suggests that even though the Agrarian bill was not in any way 'revolutionary' it was viewed as such by the landowners and their allies in the right-wing press. |
| <b>Gabriel Jackson</b>                           | 'No serious revision could be accomplished without attacking some of the most powerful vested interests in the country.' This suggests that any significant reform pursued by the Azaña government would have appeared revolutionary.   |



## Question 67

### Candidates might refer to:

#### Evidence which supports the view that the creation of the Popular Front was a reaction to the reversal of reforms:

- the limited gains made in tackling the agrarian issue during the Bienio Reformista had been undone since 1933
- many of the agrarian workers who had abstained or otherwise not voted for the Left in 1933 now saw the difference a Right-wing government could have
- the army had not been democratised as the initial reforms had intended. During the Bienio Negro the army had regained some of its former prestige and place in society. Only a united effort by the Left could reverse this
- the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia had been repealed. Catalan nationalists therefore joined the Popular Front to regain lost constitutional ground
- the actions of the governments of the Bienio Negro showed the Left that they could not repeat the mistakes of the election of 1933 where their disunity had allowed the election of those who sought to dismantle the gains made.

#### Evidence which supports the view that the creation of the Popular Front was a not a reaction to the reversal of reforms:

#### The electoral system:

- the election of 1933 had proved how the creation of unified blocs of parties brought electoral benefits in the shape of members in the Cortes. It was clear to those on the Left, still smarting from that defeat, that only a mass joint effort could propel them to victory in future
- the previous abstention by anarchists had been shown to be counter-productive. Although they may not officially join the Popular Front, the creation of the Front was helped by the change of stance of anarchist supporters to anyone with a more progressive programme.

#### The international situation:

- the defeat of the German Left, including the elimination of the strongest socialist party in Europe had a sobering effect on the Left in Spain. The PSOE did not want to follow the fate of the SPD who suffered from a divided Left
- the Soviet Union had changed policy. The bourgeois parties of Western Europe were no longer to be regarded as social fascists but were to be worked with in united fronts against actual fascists. The Popular Front movement was also to see success in France and in both countries the official Communist parties, backed by Moscow, joined in
- Western Europe was dividing between the forces of fascism and those of democracy. The Popular Front saw themselves as defenders of the fledgling Spanish democracy against the forces of fascism. In this emergency, all progressive, democratic elements had to come together.

#### The rise of CEDA:

- CEDA had been formed to fight the 1933 elections as a unified Right-wing party and had done so successfully
- Gil Robles was an admirer of both Mussolini and Hitler, so the Left were correct in fearing him
- the entry of CEDA members into the cabinet proved to be a catalyst for action for the Left. This included not only the Asturias rising but also positive action to galvanise the Left into working together to defeat the threat from CEDA.

#### Defeat in Asturias:

- the uprising had only taken hold in Asturias because different factions of the Left worked together there. This pointed the way forward for coordinated efforts from the Left
- the defeat showed the brutality of the regime and what could lie in store if the Right won again
- it was clear from the aftermath of the defeat that Right would dismantle all of the benefits of the Republic – the repeal of reform accelerated massively – and that winning the next election was crucial. The Left could only do this if they were united.

| <b>Historians</b>                               | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|---|--|
| <b>Antony Beevor</b>                            | Considers that 'The new Government (after October 1934) turned back the Republic's clock'.   |
| <b>Raymond Carr</b>                             | States that 'Robles had declared . . . that socialism must be defeated at all costs. When it (the Asturias Rising) was over the nation was morally divided between those who favoured repression and those who did not'.   |
| <b>William Phillips and Carla Rahn Phillips</b> | Contends 'Given the constitutional structure of the Republic, a small shift in the popular vote could mean a substantial change in the composition of the Cortes'.   |
| <b>Paul Preston</b>                             | Argues that Robles' speeches were often filled with 'anti-democratic and anti-Semitic innuendo', the oppressive, anti-reformist nature of his government partnership with Alejandro Lerroux's Radicals, and the frank admiration offered to foreign fascist regimes helped lead to the Right's defeat in the 1936 elections. |

## Question 68

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that it was Franco's links to Germany and Italy which were important in him becoming leader of the Nationalists:**

- Italy and Germany had shown reluctance to be involved directly in the Spanish conflict initially; it was only through Franco and his emissaries that they came on board. This raised him up in the eyes of the other conspirators
- the Germans in particular refused to deal with anyone except Franco, giving him prominence at home and abroad. This gave Franco an unassailable position in negotiations with other Generals over tactics and command. The Condor legion was directly responsible to Franco. Having strategic leadership over foreign troops meant that Franco could effectively lead the direction of the war. He could deploy troops to suit his strategy, making him the leading General
- Germany had a unified central command; the political head was also the effective head of the armed forces: it seemed logical that once Franco had assumed military leadership, thanks to his allies, he would also become the political head of the Right. Ideologically the Right in Spain were predisposed to having one leader
- the international dimension was crucial during the Spanish Civil War, especially the view others took of the events. Franco emerged as the de facto leader in the court of international public opinion due to his links with Germany and Italy before he actually took complete control.

**Evidence which supports the view that factors other than Franco's links to Germany and Italy were important in him becoming leader of the Nationalists:**

- Franco was beloved by the Army of Africa due to his previous service with them. He led them during the coup and brought them to the Peninsula. The reputation they enjoyed for both brilliance and brutality gave Franco's views more weight and he could begin to gain the upper hand in negotiations with other Generals
- Mola was more concerned with the successful conclusion of the war than with personal aggrandisement. He wanted to establish a Directory which would eventually oversee fresh elections. However, Mola was considering establishing himself as the political leader (with Franco the military one) shortly before his death
- Sanjurjo's death at the beginning of the War, when he was due to fly to Spain to take over the Nationalist uprising no doubt paved the way for another leader to emerge. Mola's death was similarly well timed for Franco. The fate of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, first imprisoned and then killed also suited Franco as it meant another contender for leadership was eliminated
- during Jose Antonio's absence, Franco kept the Falange leaderless and with the death of Sanjurjo and the defeat of Gil-Robles' tactics, there was a political vacuum on the Right which could realistically only be filled by a General during the conflict
- Franco cleverly manipulated the remaining Falangist would be successors to Primo, using and then imprisoning Hedilla. Hedilla had thought that he would be the de facto head of the Government with Franco a symbolic head of state. Franco used him to eliminate his rivals before arresting him for doing this.

| Historians      | Perspective on the issue   |
|-----------------|--|
| Antony Beevor   | Argues '(Franco) had no effective rival and the very nature of the Nationalist movement begged a single, disciplined command'.   |
| Paul Preston    | Argues 'Italian and German assistance would be channelled exclusively to Franco' 'With his major political rivals all dead, Franco was free to control . . . the political direction of the Nationalists'. |
| Julian Casanova | Argues 'Franco, with Sanjurjo dead, used his privileged position as commander of the Morocco garrison to prepare the ground for (becoming) . . . a Generalissimo'.   |
| Raymond Carr    | Argues Franco's claims (to be leader) were outstanding . . . he was in charge of the best Nationalist army'.   |

## Question 69

Candidates might refer to:

### Evidence which supports the view that the political system was effective:

- on 8 August, Franco had issued the law of head of state, which gave him the right to make laws. The consolidation of power in his own person which had started during the war was to become even more entrenched in peacetime. The new statute gave Franco the same powers as previously enjoyed only by medieval kings
- Franco had consolidated his position earlier that year by isolating possible opponents. Political enemies from inside the Nationalist camp were dealt with as they had been in the three years earlier. No dissention was allowed and the hopes of many on the Nationalist side for a return of the Monarchy were quickly dashed
- there were few major moves against the regime and even those that did occur had little success
- there was little indication that the resistance fighters enjoyed popular support
- there was little internal dissention. Most of the other potential leaders had been effectively dealt with during the war
- Franco's closest political allies were loyal to him and he received no serious challenges to his authority
- many people benefited from the regime. A new bureaucracy was filled with those who had supported Franco. This in turn ensured their loyalty and the perpetuation of the regime
- after doing badly economically, Spain recovered
- Franco's political philosophy was pragmatic enough to move with the times. His support for Hitler and Mussolini soon changed to that of emphasising his anti-communism, which endeared him to the West
- most political prisoners were eventually freed and returned to society.

### Evidence which supports the view that the political system was not effective:

- on 13 September 1936, all opposition parties and Trade Unions were officially outlawed
- there was little opportunity for repentance, this was a fiction, but around 100,000 prisoners were put into forced labour battalions
- the new regime rewrote history by stating that the Army had legitimately seized power in July 1936 and anyone fighting against the Nationalists after this was guilty of treason
- the search for, imprisonment and execution of former Republicans continued for years
- the threat of imprisonment forced millions to accept starvation wages. The exploitation of the defeated was justified in terms of needing to atone for their sins
- the deliberate terror which had marked the aftermath of conquering Republican held areas during the civil war continued unabated in the wake of the Nationalist victory
- 190 prisons were set up which held up to half a million prisoners. They were divided into those who were 'recoverable' and those who were not. Those who were not were shot
- a law passed in April called for revenge against everything that had happened in the Red Zone during the war. This was carried out with zeal and led to extreme hardship for many
- children were taken forcibly from left supporting parents and given to others to teach them to love the Francoist regime
- the years following the war saw starvation sweep across Spain in an unprecedented way. This was directly due to Franco's disastrous handling of the economy and his attempts to create a fascist style autarky. The new British ambassador, Hoare was appalled at the state of Madrid in 1940, with food shortages and deprivation widespread.

| <b>Historians</b>       | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|-------------------------|---|
| <b>Antony Beevor</b>    | Argues 'The post-war years would have been desperate, whatever government was in power'.  |
| <b>Paul Preston</b>     | Argues 'Every effort was made to maintain the division between the victors and the vanquished'.   |
| <b>Raymond Carr</b>     | Argues 'Franco's aim was 'to destroy the 19 <sup>th</sup> century'; that is, Parliamentary liberalism'.   |
| <b>Sheelagh Ellwood</b> | Argues 'Plurality and diversity were replaced in every sphere . . . acts of individual cruelty, however brutal, were easily surpassed by the collective cruelty of the Dictatorship'. |

## Section 9 – The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923–1945

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 70

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source A   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to the interpretations given</i>   |
|---|--|
| Two branches of the plot, one civilian and one military, were to be set up in the main cities of Spain, the Balearic and Canary Isles and Spanish Morocco.            | There was a two-pronged movement encompassing military personnel and civilians both on the mainland and overseas.                  |
| ‘All could take part in the rising except those who receive inspiration from abroad, socialists, freemasons, anarchists, communists, etc.’                            | The rising was to be a broad undertaking, not a coup by a small cabal.   |
| The provincial representatives were instructed to work out detailed plans for seizing public buildings in their localities, particularly lines of communication . . . | This was not to be just an isolated <i>pronunciamiento</i> , this was a coordinated, well-planned uprising of people across Spain. |

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- planning had been underway for several months involving both military and civilian people, e.g. Franco’s movements
- there was an attempt to legitimise the uprising as a movement or crusade against Bolshevism
- there were plans to take all of the provincial capitals and other places of strategic importance; this was not to be just a takeover in Madrid, such as with Primo in 1923.

#### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- immediately after the election General Mola began conspiring and by the end of March had been in contact with all the other officers who would form the plot. In May he issued a directive stating that the coup must involve the armed forces working with the other right-wing groups. The coup’s figurehead was Sanjurjo
- the Army Generals had been plotting a coup for some time and were looking for an excuse to strike. There were numerous attempts from within the army and outside it (particularly by the Falange) to get the army to rise against the new Government and previously
- Mola had been designated as the General to coordinate the coup as early as March; while others such as General Varela, General Goded and General Fanjul had considered having a coup in late 1935 rather than allow elections to even take place
- plans had been made to coordinate action throughout Spain and Spanish Morocco, in order to take every place of major population or strategic importance. The plane which was to bring Franco to Morocco had set off from Britain on the 11 July
- as soon as the election results were known in February there were those plotting a coup. Gil Robles was asked to lead one and General Franco, as chief of staff, tried to enlist the help of the Civil Guard in preventing the Popular Front from taking power. Franco also tried to persuade the Prime Minister to ignore the election result and keep governing, with the backing of the army
- the Carlist requetes trained for a coup in the Pyrenees with arms from Germany and elsewhere, while their leaders trained with Mussolini’s men in Italy. They held talks with the Union Militar Espanola (right-wing officers who wanted to overthrow the Government) through Colonel Varela. The Falange had also been plotting with officers for months before the coup
- the plans for the plane which would take Franco from the Canaries to Morocco had begun on the 5 July. The involvement of Franco had not been certain, though the plotters were determined to go ahead with or without him. The degree of detail with which the transport of Franco was arranged shows the amount of planning that went into the coup

- the plotters were well-aware of the mistakes that had been made during the Sanjurjada of 1932, when a similar attempt at an uprising was stopped virtually at the start because it was not widespread enough. This time the Generals were aware of the need to attempt to take every garrison with them and coordinate the uprising. Casual pronunciamientos would no longer work against an organised and partly armed proletariat.

| Historians         | Perspective on the issue   |
|--------------------|--|
| Paul Preston       | Argues 'The elections meant that henceforth the right would be more concerned with destroying the Republic than taking it over. Military plotting began in earnest'.   |
| Antony Beevor      | Believes that no group on the Right did more to cause disorder and therefore provoke a coup than the Falange.  |
| Raymond Carr       | Argues 'The organisation of the military conspiracy proved a difficult business, not least because the army itself was divided between those who accepted the Republic loyally and those who, like Mola, believed the politicians were bent on destroying the army'. |
| David Boyd Hancock | Contends that having failed at the ballot box, both Gil Robles and the Falange abandoned the democratic process in favour of bullets.  |

## Question 71

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>             |
|--|--|
| If Malaga was a disaster for the Republic, the battle of Guadalajara in March 1937 appeared as its first spectacular victory.  | Argues that until Guadalajara, the Republic had only known defeat and therefore this was a significant victory.                          |
| For the Left in Europe, Guadalajara was both a massive emotional experience and a political and diplomatic triumph.  | Argues that this was a propaganda coup which boosted international support for the Republic.   |
| To the wider international community, Guadalajara now provided irrefutable proof of the extent of fascist intervention, made particularly obvious in the shape of Italian prisoners. | Argues that Guadalajara showed the extent of fascist intervention in the Civil War which was now obvious to the international community. |

**Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- from a commanding position, the Republic lost a lot of ground in the early months of the war
- Guadalajara was the first time that fascism had been defeated in Europe and was a huge psychological boost for the European Left
- the Italians had been denying the extent of their involvement, now journalists were shown incontrovertible proof.

| Point in Source C   | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i> |
|---|--|
| The largest air battles of the entire war happened on the Ebro front and the battle of the Ebro provided an opportunity for the Nationalists and their allies to destroy the Republican air force once and for all. | The Ebro proved to be the final defeat for the Republican air force.   |
| . . . a great republican offensive collapsed because of a lack of follow-through due to wasting time on crushing points of enemy resistance instead of pushing on towards the main objective.                       | The Ebro was the same as other battles where a Republican offensive was turned into a defeat.                                |
| Apart from the terrible loss of human life, almost all the weapons needed for the defence of Catalonia had been lost on this grotesque gamble.  | This battle led to a significant loss of soldiers and weapons which left the road to Catalonia open.                         |



**Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the battles of Brunete and Teruel for instance had followed a very similar pattern, where a surprise attack had gained some ground initially but ended in defeat
- the Republic had long since lost the air superiority it had for a short time at the end of 1936. The depleted planes were now no match for the Condor Legion and Mussolini's aircraft. The Ebro saw their last effective engagements in the war
- the Republic had been divided previous to this battle, but Catalonia was now completely isolated and unguarded
- there is debate among historians about the effects of the battle. There are those who argue against Beevor and say that the battle meant that the Nationalists did not take Valencia.

**Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- initial conflicts in the war set the tone for the extermination of all resistance in the 'Terror'
- the Battle of Jarama, similar to Guadalajara, was a victory (or at least not a defeat) for the Republicans and a morale boost
- the defence of Madrid in the early part of the war had shown the importance of both air support and foreign aid
- the Battle of Brunete had been a massive loss for the Republic as their air force was decimated and 30,000 men lost, including many of the International Brigades. There was a huge loss of equipment too. It was a crushing blow to morale as well, as early victory turned into horrific defeat. The Communists, who had recently taken charge of military matters were humiliated by this loss
- the Battle of Teruel had also seen early victory for the Republic, but the subsequent loss meant that the way was open for Franco to drive towards the Mediterranean and split the Republican zone in two. Although both sides lost aircraft and other equipment, the Nationalists could replace them easily, especially after capturing the industrial areas in the north
- the bombing of cities, such as Madrid and Barcelona and of Guernica in the Basque country showed a new side to war in which the civilian population were in the front line.

| Historians   | Perspective on the issue   |
|--------------|--|
| Paul Preston | Argues 'As at Brunete (at Belchite), the Republicans gained an initial advantage but lacked sufficient force for the killer blow.'   |
| Laurie Lee   | Argues 'The gift of Teruel at Christmas had become for the Republicans no more than a poisoned toy. It was meant to be the victory that would change the war; it was indeed the seal of defeat.' |
| Helen Graham | Argues the Republicans, by launching the Battle of the Ebro, stopped the Nationalist assault on Valencia, inflicted huge losses on the Nationalist army and prolonged the war several months.    |
| Hugh Thomas  | Argues (Of the Ebro) 'It was audacious of the Republic to embark on an offensive in the summer of 1938, as the examples of Brunete, Belchite, and Teruel might have suggested to them.'          |

## Question 72

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D |  | Possible comment on the provenance of the source  |
|--------------------|--|---|
| Author             | Tommy Nicholson.                               | He was a typical working-class activist who identified with the Republican cause.   |
| Purpose            | To record recollections of why he volunteered. | To explain to a younger generation the appeal of the class struggle which he believed the Spanish Civil War to be.  |
| Timing             | 1970s recalling events in 1937.                | He remembers 1937 as the time when the Republic was short of volunteers and the Communist party took the lead in recruitment among young working-class men. |

| Point in Source D  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to the source content provenance</i>   |
|--|--|
| I worked in the Govan Wireworks and you couldn't but be active in the class struggle. Glasgow had a strong worker's movement and we all fervently believed in the emancipation of the working class across the world, to fight for society where the workers rule their own lives and where production is undertaken to meet the needs of all. | Many young working-class men totally believed in the class struggle and saw the Spanish Civil War as part of it. Here his expressions stress the passionate commitment to the cause with words like 'fervently'. |
| I was anxious to get to Spain. Like many others, I believed that the whole future of humanity was being fought out there and either socialism or fascism would win through. That's why we felt we had to go. Spain became your lifeblood.  | Even though it stresses that he wants to get to fight, the importance here is that he realises that this is about the future of 'humanity' and the political fight between Right and Left.                       |
| I was not a member of the Communist Party, having disagreements with them, so I wasn't allowed to go. But, come 1937, when volunteers were badly needed, they relented.  | Highlighting the pragmatic response of the Communist party opening up to volunteers as he described that volunteers in 1937 were badly needed.   |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- there was a belief that this was a fundamental struggle between good and evil, freedom and democracy. Many went to fight for this ideal
- there was a belief, espoused by many Brigaders from Britain, that if they did not go to fight fascism in Spain, they would have to fight it at home
- Europe was dividing into two camps, the fascist countries and the democracies. This was chance to stop a country going to the other side
- the International Brigades were organised by the Communists and under Communist control.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- those who had arrived for the People's Olympiad formed the first Brigade
- many members of the brigades came from countries such as Germany or Italy where fascism had already triumphed. This was their chance to fight back
- Left parties in Germany and elsewhere had been destroyed, people did not want to see this happen to the Left in Spain
- there was a great variety in the military experience of the volunteers, some were veterans of the Great War, others had never held a gun and were unprepared for the realities of battles
- some of those who joined did so out of a sense of adventure rather than strict ideology
- many from Britain and France had already been engaged in combatting Mosley's fascists or Action Francaise and the Croix de Feu
- many who joined were unemployed and had little motivation to stay in Britain (or elsewhere) in the 1930s
- almost 550 came from Scotland, proportionally a significant figure. Other working-class areas in Britain were also well represented
- there was a sense that this was a European war by proxy, a dress rehearsal for the conflict between the Axis powers and the rest
- once Germany and Italy's involvement was clear, many wanted to fight against them and to try to 'even things up'
- many Americans joined, despite their Government's view, as they saw themselves as internationalists
- others came from countries such as Canada, Cuba and China, showing this was not just a European conflict
- writers such as Orwell and Hemingway went to fight in Spain, though they did not all join the international Brigades. Often they joined militias, as did anarchists
- for some intellectuals and others it became 'the thing to do', travel to Spain and pose with a rifle taking a pot shot at the fascists: 'war tourism'.

**Historians**

**Perspective on the issue**

|                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| <b>Arthur Koestler</b>    | Argues Spain became the rendezvous of the international Left: Leftist Bohemia – Bloomsbury went on a revolutionary junket.   |
| <b>George Esenwein</b>    | Argues 'For many, the foreign volunteers who had come to Spain embodied the international spirit of anti-fascism'.   |
| <b>Antony Beevor</b>      | Argues 'Sheer courage, bolstered by the belief that the whole world depended on them'.   |
| <b>David Boyd Haycock</b> | Argues some went because, 'if Spain fell to fascism and joined with Germany and Italy then Britain and France were doomed' though most were open or secret communists. |

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 73

Candidates might refer to:

**Factors which may support the viewpoint of a Labour Party recovery by 1939:**

- mention of the decline of the Labour Party from holding office, 1929–1931, to its cabinet split, fall from power and relegation to a minority party in the Commons after the schism over MacDonald and proposed spending cuts
- a very brief review of Lansbury's period as leader and the overtly pacifist stance he brought to the Labour Party
- Clement Attlee replaced George Lansbury as leader of the Labour Party in 1935
- Attlee introduced major policy changes – greater emphasis on planning as a socialist tool, the abandonment by late 1937 of opposition to rearmament and a qualified abandonment of pacifism
- at the 1935 General Election Labour achieved a net gain of 94 seats and a swing of 9.4% nationally, leaving them with 154 seats.

**The Labour Party on the eve of war:**

- Labour Party opposition to the Munich Agreement of September 1938
- Labour Party demanded, in vain, that Chamberlain change his appeasement policy
- internal Labour Party disagreement over how to oppose the dictators, the Left headed by Stafford Cripps wanted to construct a United Front against the dictators, the National Executive turned them down. Cripps, Bevan and five others were expelled by the Party
- Labour Party pressure, ignored by Chamberlain, to come to an agreement with the USSR
- a review of the party's national status by 1939, including evidence of success in by-elections (especially the Ipswich one in February 1938 where a National Government majority of 7,000 was overturned)
- party membership had increased from 1.9 million in 1934 to 2.6 million in 1938 and that the party was able to run several big campaigns on focus issues each year, e.g., 'peace and security' and 'food and farming' in 1938/1939
- over 150 local constituency parties had their own newspapers and by the end of the 1930's Labour could boast the support of the country's biggest selling morning paper, the Daily Herald
- with the outbreak of war in September 1939, Labour agreed to an electoral truce, but refused to join Chamberlain's Government.

**If there had been a General Election in 1940:**

- significantly, historians are not convinced that Labour could have won an election in 1940. The by-election successes did not in themselves represent anywhere near a big enough swing to produce a Labour government in 1940 and as Andrew Thorpe says, 'the overall impression was of a party that had reached an electoral plateau'
- the consensus of opinion is that Labour had made significant strides on the road to recovery but would have to wait for the impact of the war to provide the political impetus to propel the party into power
- in December 1939, an opinion poll showed that 53% of those questioned preferred the National Government, against 47% for the opposition.

| <b>Historians</b>      | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|------------------------|---|
| <b>Steven Fielding</b> | Believes that limited progress had taken place but cast doubts on any possible election victory in 1940 ‘. . . taking the situation as a whole, it was quite clear that the various crises (of 30s) had done little to actually stimulate political change, either by raising interest or by changing allegiances. Conservative dominance remained intact’. |
| <b>Ben Pimlott</b>     | Argues that no leader of the opposition has been more abused or deserving of that abuse for a weak performance than Attlee in the late 1930s. He criticises Attlee for his insipid despatch box performance of the late 30s in the face of the massive social problems of the time.   |
| <b>Stephen Brooke</b>  | Places great emphasis on structural and ideological changes within the party and the extent to which Attlee had committed it to state planning as a basic tenet of party philosophy, but ‘had there been an election in 1939 or 1940 it is unlikely that Labour would have won it.’   |
| <b>Derrick Murphy</b>  | Believes that there was little chance of Labour ousting the National Government in a potential election of 1940, ‘Labour would have stood little chance of victory. The electoral hill to be climbed was simply too steep.’   |

## Question 74

Candidates might consider evidence such as:

### Civil Defence Preparations:

- the Emergency Powers (Defence Act) of August 1938 allowed the government to take measures in defence of the nation and to maintain public order
- shortage of ARP volunteers prior to the outbreak of war
- disagreement between the Government and local authorities over who should pay for the cost of Civil Defence Precautions
- shelter provision, Anderson and Morrison shelters. Affordability and effectiveness of these
- historical debate over the question of whether there were sufficient shelters and were they of sufficient quality?
- a 'Morrison Sandwich' was the popular name given to badly built shelters which had to be torn down and replaced as they were unstable due to the poor materials used
- Government's belief in the possibility of the public developing a 'Deep Shelter Mentality' delayed the use of the London Underground for sheltering. Many civilians took the initiative by simply buying a ticket and not getting on the train
- an analysis of the extent to which the ARP scheme provided effective protection for civilians and the response of the emergency services to the Blitz
- the Blackout was unpopular with many civilians, and the ARP wardens who enforced it were often disliked
- evacuation in September 1939. Numbers of evacuees. Issues arising from evacuation, including treatment of evacuees and the varying attitudes towards them
- voluntary and overseas evacuation
- 140,000 patients sent home from hospitals to make way for expected air raid casualties
- anti-aircraft defences. Serious shortage of guns to defend cities
- Women's Voluntary Service for Civil Defence. (February 1939) Did a variety of jobs including medical support and staffing public kitchens
- role of the Observer Corps
- gas masks. Numbers distributed
- rescue services including Auxiliary Fire Service, medical services.

### The Armed Forces:

- the Military Training Act of 27 April 1939 forced all British men aged 20 and 21 who were fit and able were to undertake six months' military training
- the National Service (Armed Forces) Act made all able men between the ages of 18 and 41 liable for conscription; as part of the legislation it was decided that single men would be called to war before married men. Men aged 20 to 23 were required to register on 21 October 1939 — the start of a long and drawn-out process of registration by age group, which only saw 40-year-olds registering in June 1941
- by the end of 1939 more than 1.5 million men had been conscripted into the armed forces. Of those, just over 1.1 million went to the British Army and the rest were split between the Royal Navy and the RAF
- the Defence Act contained around 100 measures aimed at calling up military reservists and Air Raid Precautions (ARP) volunteers for mobilisation
- the Army was given the lowest priority of the three services
- detailed evidence of the preparedness of the armed forces for warfare and the conflicting ideas of the role likely to be played by the Army in any future war. Defence of the Empire was the main priority for the Army during the 1930s
- size of the Army, equipment, training of soldiers
- the Royal Navy was the largest in the world in 1939. It consisted of 15 large battleships, 15 heavy cruisers, 46 light cruisers, 7 aircraft carriers, 181 destroyers and 59 submarines. However, only about half had been modernised and the rest were deficient in horizontal armour needed for protection against modern, long-range shellfire
- strategic role of the Royal Navy, defending the Empire and protecting Britain's sea routes

- anti-submarine measures to combat the U-boats menace. However Coastal Command was not sufficiently prepared in 1939 to locate and destroy U-boats
- September 1939 Bomber Command consisted of 55 squadrons (920 aircraft). However, only about 350 of these were suitable for long-range operations. Fighter Command had 39 squadrons (600 aircraft) but the RAF only had 96 reconnaissance aircraft
- development and introduction of impressive new RAF fighters (which replaced biplanes) Spitfires and Hurricanes, which were a match for the Luftwaffe
- development of radar (RDF) and its crucial importance to the defence of Britain
- the degree to which the Norway campaign and the evacuation at Dunkirk showed up exactly how unprepared the armed forces were.

#### **The Economy:**

- Chamberlain's hope of 'playing the long game.' This was the belief that France would hold the Germans, and in the meantime Anglo – French strength would be built up to the point of overwhelming superiority and economic warfare would weaken the enemy's capacity and will to fight
- if Britain was to field the promised 32 division Army before the end of the first year of war, and at the same time reach its targets of aircraft and ship production, a much more rapid and extensive imposition of economic controls was required
- the government did move early on to take over the importation of raw materials, but allocations to industry allowed too many inessential goods to continue to be made. Inessential goods could be imported only under licence, but licences were not difficult to obtain
- the extent to which Chamberlain's ideological opposition to government intervention in the economy led to failings in economic planning
- Chamberlain's unwillingness to consult with the trade unions over mobilisation of labour and production targets
- Attlee's comment that Chamberlain 'treated us like dirt.' Chamberlain had been Chancellor during the 1930s and was associated with the Means Test and mass unemployment
- one and a quarter million people were still unemployed by January 1940
- spare industrial capacity in the economy still existed into 1940
- an export drive was promoted in the belief that a balance of payments surplus might provide the resources needed for the war
- shipping space was not rigorously rationed; inessential goods were still being imported
- ration books had been ready since 1938, were issued at the end of September but food rationing did not begin until January 1940.

#### **Appeasement:**

- Chamberlain's adherence to the policy of appeasement and his desire to avoid war with Nazi Germany culminating in the Munich Agreement of September 1938, which ultimately failed to prevent war
- Chamberlain's extreme reluctance to engage in any meaningful negotiations with the USSR over a possible alliance against Hitler and his distrust of the French as allies
- the debate over Churchill's assertion that Britain could have been instrumental in creating a Grand Alliance against Germany in the late 1930s and whether such an outcome was ever possible
- government was repeatedly advised by its Chiefs of Staff during the 1930s that they could not fight against Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously and therefore Britain should not become involved in a conflict in which she would not have the resources to fight
- apparent reluctance of the Empire to become involved in another conflict
- the isolationist policy of the USA during the 1930s.

| <b>Historians</b>     | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>   |
|-----------------------|---|
| <b>Andrew Roberts</b> | Maintains civil defence was as effective as it could have been under the circumstances.   |
| <b>Nick Tiratsoo</b>  | Is critical of the lack of deep shelters (particularly in the East End of London). An area which was an obvious German target.  |
| <b>Paul Addison</b>   | Is scathing about Chamberlain's economic complacency and his deep-seated desire not to let the trade unions have any say in manpower distribution or production targets nor to upset the normal workings of market forces in the economy. |
| <b>Robert Mackay</b>  | Takes a more sympathetic stance on the issue of Britain's preparations for war and questions the degree to which any democracy can effectively prepare for total war.   |



## Question 75

### Candidates might refer to:

- the Empire fell into two distinct parts. There were the self-governing Dominions – Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. And there were those regions that were wholly or partly governed from London, including India, which had its own viceroy, as well as the West Indies and British colonies in Africa and the Far East
- at the outbreak of war in 1939, India and the other colonial parts of the Empire had no choice and automatically joined in the war on the side of Britain. The Dominions made their own decision to enter the war on the British side
- the wounds of the First World War were still evident in Australia, New Zealand and Canada so these Dominions were understandably reluctant to become involved in another war
- at the start of the war only Canada and South Africa truly supported Britain with the Anzacs joining later
- India was mobilised not only for manpower but for invaluable raw materials for the production of war goods
- at a time when the war was going badly, the contribution of the Empire and Dominions was invaluable
- throughout the war, South Africans served in the RAF and about 4,000 served in the Royal Navy
- South African soldiers successfully fought the Italians in both East Africa and at El Alamein
- as early as December 1939, e.g., Canadian troops were despatched to Europe and in January 1940 Australian and New Zealand forces bolstered military commitments in the Middle East. By war's end these three nations had made vital contributions in each the three major theatres of war: Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific
- during 1940–1941 Australian troops served in campaigns in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Palestine, Crete, Greece, Malaya and Singapore. After repelling menacing advances by the enemy in Europe and the Pacific, by 1942 Australian forces had contributed impressively to Allied successes on a range of battlefronts including the deserts of North Africa, the jungles of Papua New Guinea, and the seas of the Pacific Ocean
- the Royal Australian Navy played an important and diverse role in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. At the peak of the war, out of a population of seven million more than 500,000 served in the armed forces with hundreds of thousands more engaged in munitions or building roads and airfields. In total Australian battle casualties amounted to 72,814
- in all, more than 200,000 New Zealand men and women served in the armed forces during the war. Of these 140,000 were despatched overseas largely to fight in campaigns in the Middle East and Italy. In total 11,625 sacrificed their lives during the Second World War
- Canada's involvement in World War II was equally impressive. Serving in every major theatre of war Canadian troops witnessed action in, e.g., Hong Kong, Sicily, Italy, and North Western Europe. Canadian forces also stood on vital guard duty in Britain during the period of greatest threat of German invasion and Canadian naval vessels proved invaluable during the vital Battle for the Atlantic. Most notably Canadian forces made a huge contribution to the D-Day landings of June 1944 and the subsequent Allied advances into central Europe during 1944 and 1945. At its maximum strength in 1943 Canadian armed forces amounted to half a million, of whom 43,000 were killed in combat
- Africans, more than 7,000 Caribbean people, and a total of 2.5 million Indians fought for Britain during the Second World War. In total 170,000 Commonwealth men and women lost their lives or went missing as a result of the war
- Colonial troops saw service in military campaigns across the globe. During the course of the war, e.g., the Fifth Indian Division fought against the Italians in Sudan, the Germans in Libya, and the Japanese in Burma, Malaya and Java
- Canada was the site of the first British Commonwealth Air Training Scheme flying school, where many pilots from the Empire and Dominions were trained
- the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) fought against the Japanese, while Royal Indian Navy ships fought in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. There were around 40,000 Indian servicemen in the British Merchant Navy

- in the West Indies, thousands of men joined the local home guard and the British Army. They were eventually sent to Europe for training, but few were allowed to fight on the front line. Approximately 5,500 West Indian RAF personnel came to Britain in 1944–1945. From 1944, West Indian women served in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) and the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) in Britain. Over 40,000 West Indian workers volunteered to live and work as agricultural labourers in the USA
- the financial contribution to the war by the Empire and the Dominions may be referred to
- Canada also gave the British 4 billion C\$ worth of money and supplies. This was second only to the United States and top on a per capita basis. In 1946 it cancelled Britain's war debt.

| Historians          | Perspective on the issue  |
|---------------------|---|
| Jack Losh           | Has unearthed the scale of discrimination towards the more than half a million black African soldiers who fought for Britain during the Second World War who were paid up to three times less than their white counterparts.  |
| Yasmin Khan         | Points out that no less than five million citizens of the British empire joined the military services between 1939 and 1945, and that almost two million of these, 'the largest volunteer army in history', were from South Asia. At many of Britain's greatest victories and at several of the war's most crucial turning points – El Alamein, Monte Cassino, Kohima – a great proportion of 'British' troops were not British at all, but Indian. |
| Ashley Jackson      | Argues that by 1941, the year of the siege of Tobruk, only a quarter of the troops of the British Eighth Army were British. The rest came from India, Sri Lanka, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Uganda, Tanganyika, the Gold Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Bechuanaland, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Palestine, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Cyprus.   |
| Madhushree Mukerjee | Has argued the 1943 famine in Bengal was exacerbated by the decisions of Winston Churchill's wartime cabinet in London. The cabinet was warned repeatedly that the exhaustive use of Indian resources for the war effort could result in famine, but it opted to continue exporting rice from India to elsewhere in the empire.   |

## Question 76

Candidates might refer to:

### Technological advances at sea and in the air:

- the use of High Frequency Direction Finding equipment (Huff–Duff) on escort ships further improved U-boat detection on the convoys
- improved radio communication from ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore helped significantly in avoiding lurking U-boats
- ASV (air to surface radar) radar helped detect surfaced U-boats at a far greater distance and aircraft could be directed towards them speedily
- the development of the ‘hedgehog’ multiple mortar system, fired from the front of escort vessels instead of the rear as depth charges were, was a big improvement in U-boat destruction
- the 250 pound depth-charge introduced in 1941 was an improvement on the earlier anti-submarine bomb which was a failure
- aircraft – the deployment of VLR aircraft in the shape of Liberators with centimetric radar helped to close the mid-Atlantic gap and helped immensely in the detection of U-boats
- after initial limited success against the U-boats from 1942 onwards Coastal Command proved to be very successful against the U-boats
- Bomber Harris was finally persuaded to release more long-range aircraft for the purpose of attacking U-boats, instead of bombing U–boat pens and production facilities as he favoured
- by January 1943 Coastal Command had effective Long Range and Very Long-Range aircraft in service including, Catalinas, Halifaxes, Liberators, Sunderlands and Wellingtons
- VLR aircraft forced U-boats to patrol in the mid-Atlantic which was further from their bases
- Sunderland Flying Boats equipped with Leigh light (powerful searchlight) was developed for Coastal Command
- destruction of some U-boat bases by Bomber Command (although some bombing of U–boat bases was unsuccessful and resulted in the death of many French civilians)
- increased use of aircraft carriers provided convoys with air cover in the vulnerable mid Atlantic Gap
- by the end of the war in Europe, air power had sunk more U-boats than surface vessels.

### Cracking the Enigma Code:

- British described any intelligence gained from Enigma as ‘Ultra’, Ultra was top secret only a select few commanders were made aware of the full significance of Ultra and used it sparingly to prevent the Germans from realising that their code had been broken
- the capture of the Enigma Code machine in March 1941 was a vital breakthrough in intelligence and the resulting ‘Ultra’ intelligence gave the British a priceless advantage
- code-breakers at Bletchley Park worked throughout the war to keep their information current. With advance notice of where the U-boats were operating, the British were able to divert convoys away from the wolf packs
- the Germans were convinced that Enigma output could not be broken, so they used the machine for all sorts of communications on the battlefield, at sea, in the sky and also within its secret services.

Other potential factors which may have contributed to Allied victory:

### Contribution of Allied navies:

- allied occupation of Iceland gave Britain valuable Atlantic bases
- the Royal Navy received 50 old US warships in exchange for US access to British bases (Destroyers for Bases Agreement)
- the Royal Canadian Navy grew enormously and played a crucial role in convoy protection
- the US Navy took over convoy protection in the western Atlantic and their naval strength eventually wore down the U-boats in this theatre
- the foundation of victory over the U-boats was laid at the Casablanca Conference, January 1943, when Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that the defeat of the U-boats was the Allies’ top priority.

**German tactical errors:**

- initially the Germans put their efforts into building large surface vessels with the intention of challenging the Royal Navy on the high seas, e.g., the Bismarck
- at the outbreak of war, the Germans had only 30 U-boats, too few to seriously disrupt British trade routes
- different models of German U-boats. Type V11 the most produced (700) U-boats and Type 1X, long-range U-boats
- Hitler overruled Admiral Karl Donitz and transferred U-boats to the Mediterranean in 1941
- arguably the U-boats should have been concentrated in the Atlantic to maximise their effect as Donitz wished.

**The End of the U-boat campaign:**

- during the Battle of the Atlantic the Merchant Navy lost 30,000 men and approximately 3,000 ships
- U-boat losses increased dramatically throughout the war – 87 in 1942, 244 in 1943 and 249 in 1944 the German navy lost a total of 783 U-boats and 28,000 sailors during the war.

| Historians    | Perspective on the issue  |
|---------------|---|
| Richard Overy | Is reluctant to pinpoint any one factor over the other as a specific reason for victory but commends highly the energy, drive and invention of Admiral Horton as being significant. |
| David Syrett  | Stresses the huge importance of intelligence in winning the battle and in particular, the cracking of the Enigma code.  |
| Jim Lotz      | Praises the enormous contribution of the Canadian Navy to ultimate victory.   |
| John Keegan   | Stresses the importance of the revamped convoy system as an integral part of the success against the U-boats.   |

## Question 77

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports or refutes the view that the Labour Government of 1945 successfully managed the economy:**

- Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1945–1947, made it clear that the overriding priority of economic policy was to substantially increase overseas exports, cut back on non-essential imports and find a way to reduce the balance of payments deficit. The economy was therefore geared towards producing exportable commodities at the expense of domestic consumables. Balance of payments surpluses in two of the years showed some degree of success in this sphere
- some reference to the Financial Dunkirk scenario would be expected and an appraisal of how Labour, with the aid of foreign loans, weathered the financial storms during the aftermath of World War Two
- exports increased threefold in this period and that industrial output also increased significantly
- inflation was kept to a maximum of 5 per cent through wage and price controls
- there was no return to the mass unemployment suffered by the industrial heartlands of Britain in the thirties through a sensitive handling of demobilisation
- unemployment was held at a steady 2 and a half per cent which contrasted greatly with the high levels pre-war and was partly attributable to nationalisation of strategic industries and demand management policies of the government
- Labour was successful in providing the climate for economic growth over the 6 years.

**Evidence which supports or refutes the success of Nationalisation and its effects on the economy:**

- nationalised industries – Labour's programme of nationalisation was extensive
- the Bank of England and Civil Aviation were nationalised in 1946
- the coal industry was taken into state control in 1947. When the National Coal Board was established in 1947, two trade union leaders were appointed to the Board – Walter Citrine of the TUC and Ebbw Edwards of the National Union of Mineworkers
- electricity and gas industries were nationalised in 1948
- the transport infrastructure – railways, most wharves and docks, London's buses and tubes, and later road haulage, were nationalised
- the major, but ailing iron and steel industry was nationalised in 1950
- several smaller industries and services like cables and telecommunications and parts of the hotel and catering trade were also in state hands by 1951
- by 1951 roughly 20% of the national economy was controlled by the state employing a workforce of over two million people
- however, critics claim that only decaying and unprofitable sectors were taken into state control in order, as Herbert Morrison put it, to 'make possible the organisation of a more efficient industry' in the interests of the nation as a whole
- critics also claim that astronomical sums in compensation payments were given to the former owners (many of whom became leading figures on the Boards of Directors of their respective public corporation), helps explain why there was so little opposition to nationalisation (except in the case of iron and steel)
- that the creation of a fully-fledged welfare state was achieved against this kind of economic backdrop
- the severe winter of 1947 and Shinwell's mishandling of the fuel crisis
- the government did not tackle the fundamental weakness of the economy in areas of over manning in traditional industries. Comment on the state of labour unrest in 1945–1951 period
- critics also refer to the frequent Sterling crises and the devaluation of the pound, over reliance on US economic aid and the failure to meet the demands of the public for consumer goods in the period of austerity which cost them dearly at the 1951 General election
- however, critics claim the bureaucratic nature of the planned economy stifled enterprise and individual initiative.

| <b>Historians</b>       | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-------------------------|--|
| <b>Peter Hennessy</b>   | Is complimentary over Labour's introduction of the recommendations of the Beveridge Report in the face of economic problems which Britain was facing at the end of the war.  |
| <b>Kenneth Morgan</b>   | Is a staunch supporter of Labour's economic record, citing Attlee's government as one of the most successful governments of the 20 <sup>th</sup> century.  |
| <b>Jim Tomlinson</b>    | Criticises both the lack of genuine socialism in its policies and Labour's nationalisation plans for not incorporating workers' representatives on boards of management and failing to pursue redistributive taxation policies.  |
| <b>Correlli Barnett</b> | Argues that nothing was done to regenerate British industry or recapitalise it in terms of plant and capacity. Equally he criticises the creation of an expensive welfare state, ill-affordable in a time when there were other more pressing priorities such as education and which led, he says, to a dependency culture from which Britain has never broken free. |

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 78

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

| Point identified in Source A  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|---|
| . . . Attlee presided over Cabinets when Churchill was abroad . . .   | As Deputy Prime Minister Attlee presided over very many Cabinet meetings when Churchill was abroad meeting Allied leaders.    |
| . . . Attlee's chairmanship became more and more practised and this heightened his stature with his own colleagues. . . | Attlee became a skilful government leader and his status with his colleagues improved.  |
| . . . Labour ministers were also able to secure the passage of a limited amount of social legislation . . .             | Labour ministers were able to introduce a measure of social reform.   |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Attlee conducted the Cabinet business very efficiently; important decisions were made quickly and not put off as Churchill was prone to do
- Ernie Bevin, Minister of Labour, was very influential and directed manpower during the war
- details of the work of the 'Bevin Boys'
- Bevin was not afraid to take difficult decisions such as introducing a measure of wartime conscription for women which was unpopular.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- details of the work of the Home Secretary. Herbert Morrison. Morrison improved Civil Defence provisions, especially in London. (Morrison Shelter)
- Morrison was a very able politician and performed very well in Parliament defending the actions of the Coalition Government of which he was a member
- although both were Labour ministers Bevin loathed Morrison. Bevin believed that Morrison could not be trusted and had ambition to replace Attlee
- details of the work of Hugh Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare later President of the Board of Trade. Member of the larger cabinet
- details on A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty from 1940
- details of the work of Arthur Greenwood
- Attlee and Greenwood were initial members the Churchill's Coalition Government War Cabinet, May 1940
- Greenwood was sacked in 1942 due to his alcohol problem
- Attlee was a member of the War Cabinet for its duration and was deputy PM from 1942
- Attlee and Greenwood were firmly opposed to the possibility of peace talks to Hitler via Mussolini in May 1940 which Halifax was pushing for
- the impressive performance of the Labour ministers in the Coalition Government undoubtedly helped the Labour Party win the 1945 General Election.

| <b>Historians</b>       | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-------------------------|--|
| <b>Paul Addison</b>     | Argues that Churchill beheaded the Conservative Party by giving Labour too much political power in the Coalition Government.   |
| <b>Mark Donnelly</b>    | Believes that the war helped to increase support for the party's policies of state intervention and economic collectivism.   |
| <b>Jonathan Schneer</b> | Argues that Labour Ministers had to compromise in the Coalition Government. E.g., they had to agree to delay decisions about reconstruction until after the war was over.  |
| <b>Nick Tiratsoo</b>    | Argues that although Attlee urged his followers to accept loyally the policies of the Coalition, the left wing of his party took little notice of this and provided the core of wartime opposition to the Coalition. |



## Question 79

The candidate may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given   |
|--|---|
| Very little account was taken of the views of those whose cooperation would be vital to their success – the authorities in both the evacuating and the receiving areas, and the evacuee families themselves. | Argues that before evacuation actually took place the government failed to seek the opinions of both the authorities who would send and receive the evacuees and the evacuees themselves. |
| The Anderson Committee failed to anticipate the hostility of working-class parents to the idea of sending their children to live with strangers.   | Believes that the government did not appreciate the amount of working-class opposition towards sending their children to live with strangers.   |
| Across Britain the response to the policy met with mixed reactions from families, with only about a third of the expected number initially taking up the offer of evacuation.                                | Contends that at the beginning of the evacuation process the number of evacuees was disappointingly small.  |

### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- many parents were very reluctant to part with their children
- evacuation was not compulsory, those who wanted to go went
- many evacuee families often found it difficult to reside with their host, to the extent that two families sharing the same home often lived almost completely separate existences
- Operation Pied Piper. In the first four days of September 1939, nearly 3,000,000 people were transported from towns and cities in danger from enemy bombers to places of safety in the countryside.

| Point in Source C  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given                  |
|--|--|
| A strong case can be made for arguing that it was stressful for the people who found themselves being required to accommodate the escaping thousands in their homes.                                       | Contends that it was often a challenging time for the hosts who took in the very many evacuees.  |
| Hosts who were expecting to act as parent substitutes to one or two children aged between five and ten might be shocked to find themselves landed with a pair of strapping, streetwise teenagers.          | Believes that people who were fully expecting to accommodate younger children could have to accept teenagers with all that may entail. |
| Sometimes there were difficulties arising out of differences in social attitudes and the social mismatching that occurred was mainly caused by poor city children being allocated to affluent rural hosts. | Argues that social mismatching was an issue, normally with poorer evacuees being placed with better off hosts.                         |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the evacuees were frequently difficult to provide for. Many evacuees also came with little in the way of clothing and some rural hosts could not believe how their poverty was reflected in their clothing
- some evacuees chosen by their hosts for their suitability to work on farms etc
- many families were split up
- studies showed that evacuee families were usually most happy when they resided with hosts from a similar social background.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- many evacuees returned home during the 'Phoney War' as the bombing campaign by the Luftwaffe did not materialise
- with the uncertainties over registering for evacuation, the actual movement was also disjointed-evacuees were gathered into groups and put on the first available train, sometimes regardless of its destination
- some reception areas received more than the expected number of evacuees and others received groups that they were not expecting
- there was evidence that some children were not treated as they ought to have been with regard to their physical or emotional wellbeing
- in Scotland initially 176,000 children were assembled. Within three days 120,000 were evacuated. Glaswegians typically went to Rothesay or Kintyre; some even went to rural Perthshire. If you were from Edinburgh you were likely to be billeted in the Borders or the Highlands. Around 500,000 Scots were eligible for the Government's evacuation scheme. Not only children, but those in the vulnerable categories such as mothers with children under school age, invalids and the blind were also eligible. Nevertheless, the uptake of the evacuation scheme was less than 40%
- the Scottish system was fundamentally different from the English system. In Scotland the children were placed in family groups rather than their counterparts in England who were placed in school class groups. This may have been due to the peculiarities of the Scottish education system
- the consequence was Scottish children were less likely to be placed away from their siblings. When the evacuees arrived at their destinations it was apparent from the start that urban and rural experiences of life were indeed in polar opposition. Suddenly rural communities were faced with children from socially deprived urban areas and some brought with them the maladies of the urban poor, such as, lice, scabies, nits, rickets, tuberculosis and diphtheria
- in many studies bed wetting is also used as an indicator of social deprivation. However, we need to be sceptical of this because hosts were paid extra if their evacuees soiled their bedclothes. It has been suggested that records about this were easily falsified to gain extra income
- goods as well as people were evacuated. Including the paintings from the National Gallery and the Bank of England
- the education of many children was disrupted as rural schools could not cope with the influx of children from the cities
- those who found it most difficult were those who came to Britain as refugees from Eastern Europe. Not only did they have to deal with suspicion because of increased xenophobia at this time they were also unsure if they would ever see their parents or homeland ever again
- for many evacuees it was a grand adventure and the experience has been described as the best of times
- many people evacuated themselves privately to friends and relatives, or hotels, in rural Britain
- it has been claimed that the man in charge of evacuation, Sir John Anderson, was a cold, inhumane character with little understanding of the emotional upheaval that might be created by evacuation
- space for roughly 4.8 million people was found, and the government also constructed camps which provided accommodation for several thousand people
- according to the war and social change thesis evacuation played a major role in the promotion of social solidarity as town met country and working class met middle class
- approximately 15,000 people went overseas organised privately or by the Children's Overseas Reception Board. This came to an end when the City of Benares was sunk by a U-boat in September 1940 and many children were killed

- by the end of the war approximately 4 million city inhabitants had spent some time in the country
- from September 1944, the evacuation process was officially halted and reversed for most areas except for London and the East coast. Returning to London was not officially approved until June 1945.

| Historians                     | Perspective on the issue   |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Paul Addison                   | Believes that evacuation undoubtedly saved many lives.   |
| Richard Titmuss                | Argues that evacuation stirred the national conscience and produced important changes in social policies.  |
| John Macnicol                  | Suggests that far from pricking middle-class conscience and promoting social welfare reform, evacuation served only to reinforce existing class prejudice about lazy mothers and generally poor parenting and what was required to solve the problems of verminous children was better parental education not a welfare system. Echoes of this argument certainly resounded round Whitehall. |
| John Stewart and John Welshman | Have investigated a Scottish dimension to the attitude in which evacuees were received. In England they blamed the structure of society or the socio-economic status of the evacuee for their apparent poverty; absolving them of responsibility for their appearance or demeanour.  |

## Question 80

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D |  | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance  |
|--------------------|--|---|
| <b>Author</b>      | Clement Attlee.  | Attlee served in the wartime coalition Government as Deputy PM from 1942. He became Prime Minister in 1945 after winning a landslide election victory. (he was also leader of the Labour Party)<br>His government was responsible for introducing the Welfare State between 1945 and 1951. Attlee was arguably the most qualified person to comment as he was the person in charge of its implementation. |
| <b>Purpose</b>     | To explain the welfare reforms introduced by Attlee's Governments. | It describes some of the positive effects of the post-war Labour Governments 1945–51, which resulted in an increased standard of living for the majority of the population.   |
| <b>Timing</b>      | Published in 1954.   | Published only three years after Labour lost the 1951 General Election and whilst Attlee was still the leader of the Labour Party and leader of the Opposition. By 1954 Attlee had time to reflect on the effects of the post-war Labour Governments.   |

| Point in Source D  | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance.  |
|--|---|
| . . . a welcome levelling up of conditions with the great mass of abject poverty disappearing as a result of the development of the social services. | Attlee believes that the terrible poverty of the past is no more, due to the expansion of social services.  |
| . . . our policy of universal healthcare was an essential part of post-war reconstruction.   | Attlee suggests that the introduction of the National Health Service was a key part of the post-war governments' social policy and emphasises its importance by using the word 'essential'. |
| . . . wider range of opportunity. There is a far better chance for capable persons of getting a full education and of developing their faculties.    | Attlee contends that individuals are benefiting from the higher levels of education as a result of Labour's implementation of Butler's Education Act. Again the positive language used.     |

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- little was done to promote educational equality through the Butler Act
- the 1944 Butler Education Act introduced the concept of selection at 11 years of age and compulsory free secondary education for all
- the school leaving age was raised to 15 years of age
- Disease: Bevan built a badly-needed NHS system from scratch, despite the formidable opposition of the BMA. The development of the NHS and an evaluation of its worth as a policy of equality.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- 1942 Beveridge Report identified the 'Five Giants', Disease, Want, Squalor, Ignorance, Idleness, which had to be addressed
- Attlee's Government introduced the recommendations of the Beveridge Report creating the welfare state, which provided care for all of the population from the cradle to the grave
- Want: an examination of the principles and workings of the welfare state as a system of universal and comprehensive services, and the degree to which this found acceptance with the public
- universality meant an end to the hated Means Test
- Squalor: Council housing given higher priority than private housing by Bevan
- provision of quality, affordable council housing, and the disappointment felt at Labour's record on this issue by 1951
- Idleness: unemployment was extremely low at 2.5% in 1946
- Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that full employment was, 'the greatest revolution brought about by the Labour Government'.

**However:**

- a benefit system based on flat-rate insurance payments was hardly equal in nature. Some even saw it as a stealth tax on the least well off
- the principle of universal benefits might aid those most well off who didn't require them
- the NHS did not eliminate private medicine nor discourage its usage in NHS hospitals
- Ignorance: the Butler Act established socially divisive systems through selection and allowed private schools to flourish
- the major complaint of left-wing critics has been that the Attlee years did not see enough socialism to create a 'New Jerusalem'. For left-wing critics, the immediate post-war years were marked by a betrayal of socialist idealism and by wasted opportunities. Instead of using public backing as evidenced in 1945 to introduce wholesale socialist change, Labour instead opted for cautious reformism: e.g., failing to break down entrenched class barriers
- Labour ministers, it has been argued, may have introduced long-overdue social reforms, but they failed to redistribute wealth or to break down rigid class barriers; 1% of the population, e.g., still owned 50% of all private capital
- however, when judged against a range of contemporary yardsticks – the performance of previous governments, the aims of Labour compared with the Conservative Party, and the economic circumstances inherited in 1945 – Attlee's record emerges in a far more positive light.

| <b>Historians</b>       | <b>Perspective on the issue</b>  |
|-------------------------|--|
| <b>Kenneth Morgan</b>   | Argues that Labour's achievements may not have changed society as much as they would have liked, but their achievements 'acted as a platform for successive governments to effect much change'.  |
| <b>David Vincent</b>    | Argues that the middle and upper classes benefited much more from the Welfare State than the working classes.  |
| <b>Correlli Barnett</b> | Contends that the country was seduced by dreams and illusions of a New Jerusalem which it could not afford and were ultimately ruinous to the country's fortunes.  |
| <b>Jim Tomlinson</b>    | Believes that overall, the Attlee government did establish a society with much less poverty, and a much greater degree of equality, than had previously existed in Britain, without sacrificing the paramount need to restore the economy. |

**[END OF MARKING INSTRUCTIONS]**